"Risk Management in Financing Infrastructure Projects" by Krishna Kumar, N.
"RISK MANAGEMENT IN FINANCING 
INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS" 
THESIS 
SUBMITTED FOR THE AWARD OF THE DEGREE OF 
EXECUTIVE DOCTORATE 
IN 
BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION 
BY 
N.KRISHNA KUMAR 
UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF 
External supen/isor 
Dr. RM. Chidambaram 
Prof.& Head.Dept. of Bank Management 
Dean,Faculty of Management 
Alagappa University 
Karaikudi 630 004 
Tamil Nadu, India 
Internal supervisor (v' 
Dr. JavaidAkhtar 
Reader ~ -—-
Department of Business Administration 
Aligarh Muslim University 
Aligarh-202002. 
India. 
^ 
. # 
DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION 
ALIGARH MUSLIM UNIVERSITY 
ALIGARH-202002. (INDIA) 
2004 
T6474 
ilf r i '•(• o f M i p l)( ' . - in 
I .\ r i l I I. V " ' (1. (II . ' i| ITIKMl I, S l.ll ' I i I 
. ' M i l I 'C '> I ' . H I h 
i \ I . | . < I l i I ' l i i ' , I I 111 I. h I i V •' i- . I I, y 
I ' l l I • ) , \ i i i ; ' o ; ' ( . ) ( ) , ' 
l ' i - ) y r u , i r y ; ' . ' V ; ^ ' ? , I. 'wlK) 
D . N o . / F M S R " 
Mr. N. Krishna Kumar, 
TC-40/544 Third Puthen S t r e e t 
.~Majnaca.ud._P-,.OT-I^ivondrumr-K«rai4- -
T h e C o n i i i t t e e f o r E ! : ( ? C \ J t i vi? D o c l o r . a t i . ' i n Lua <. i lu? r>--. 
A d m i n i s t r a t i o n , F a c u l t y o f M a n o g p n i e n t S t u d i o s a n d t U > 5 e a r c h i , i n 
i t f ) m e e t i n g h e l d o n February 2 / } n n d 2 9 , 2 0 0 0 ' l i n r , g r a n t / i d y o u 
p r o v i s i o n a l r c g i r> t r a t i o p u n d r . ' r t l i r - l,';;f; c u t i v c O I 'A p r n q r ,-iriinic o n 
t h R t o p i c g i v e n b e l o w . 
" Risk Management in Financing I n f r a s t r u c t u r e P r o j e c t s " . 
V o u i i h . - i l l (M. i rsu i? l l ' i f r r M s o a r c l i W ' l r l . , n n . l c i - llic f,!i pp r v j -. j o n ' i f : 
:'£;•; t o r n r . 1 a d v i a o r ; 
Dr. R. M. Chidambaram, 
Professor & Head, Dept. of Bank Management 
Alagappa University, Karaidudi 623001 (Tamil Nandu) 
Internal advisor: 
, - .Dr.. Javald Akhtar, Reader, Dept. of Business Administration, 
AMU7":AIlgarl^ 
Y o i i a r o i - o i i u x r i ? d t o p a y t l i i > r •• p i i •, i 11' I'o o i i iun i 'd i a I o 1 y a r i ' l 
i l f p o c . i t , a r ( i | > y n T tlit.» f e e ; r i: r !• i i i1 . :\\. I . l i i - D o a t i ' ^ . (') ( ' f i t. f W I M T P 
y o u v . l i a l l I I I ' a l l o t r d t l i i ' R i-ii i s I. r / i I i u i i r i i u n l n ' i - . I l i r ' . | , t t , i . n C 
p a y i i H M i l , o f Cnv r i l i a l l IM:' r. I M I - ; I l i r - i ' I ' d .-i •. M i r d a t e i i j ' y n u i 
r i i . j i '11, r , i I. 1 o n . 
.Tlil>;i o f P o r i •••. s u b j o c l . t o y o u r I J O I I I ' I (. o n n i .1 I - r r-d p l i ' l i l i l e ( o r 
C M i r o l i i i i M r i . i n t i n ? I^^)I^A pi-OM I'aii i iho ••> 1, 1.11 •? rM i ^JM r l i l - U i ' , ] j i i , 
U i i i v f ' r •;. i I. y . 
I ' r o f . A r n a r K a z i n i 
D i ' a n £ C l i a i r i i i a n , DDA C o r n r r n t t p i ? 
r { ; ( i , p r n a l a d v l R o r f o , " i n Co r i i i . j r, j o n 
I n t e r n a l a d v i s o i - ( 'o i i n f 6 r i i i ; \ i i o n 
C l ' i a i n n a n , Do p a r t i ruMi t o f l u r i i n c s , . .'"I' l ini n i - i t r a t i o n Cor 
r e c o r d 
Depi'iy R e g i s t r a r ( h d i i i i •• •. i o n s ) (or r o ^ o i d 
D o D u i . y R e g i s t r a r ( C x a i i i i n ,»t i o n n ) f o r r o c n r i j 
/sun ALL iNDlA MANAGEMENT ASSOCIAFiON CEN'I 'RE FOR MANAGEMHIN I" ["-:DUCA"riON l^Z TV 
January 9, 2001 
Mr. N. Krishna Kumar 
TC-40/544, Third Puthin Street 
P.O. Mamacaud 
Tnvandrum 
Kera la-695 009 
Sub: ExGCUtive'Doctornte^ in Business Administration 
Dear Sir, 
This refers to JRC of Executive DBA l^royramino ticid on 22'"^ to 24'" February 2000 at 
Aligarh and your subsequent admission in tliis (Mogratnme for research (jliase. It is triy 
pleasure to inform you that Aliyarti Muslim University lias issued ttie following 
enrolment number to you for DBA Programme. 
tlaoie 
Mr .N Krishna Kumar 
FhTQlm.e.n]_y.U,nib.ei 
DD-4GC4 
You oic requested to mention this enrulmcnl numhei in .'ill youi con(.y';|.)undencc \viili 
AIMAarid AMU in future. 
WisiVing you all the best for successful com[)letion of ttiis prestigious programme. 
Sincerely Yours, 
/Y//.-/^ 
Md. Wn.s!iid 
Asst. Director 
Uar,:v-)f'inoiil Mou-.c. M ln;lilulron.-,l Aica. l.o'lln l-yi ' l . \\y<i l.'.'ll.i ) ! " O'lj. !• 1 H'.'' •".'O vy^MV:,. ^f>\ 700;', W) ll\A 
r.V, No: 9 M 1-'1CZGGE9 E-ni,iil. iiilo ninvii.'a'c<".', o"! in IhltinM Mip //,v,r«,.iim,"i \\v\ oig 
Dr. Javaid Akhtar 
Reader 
Department of Business Administration 
Aligarh Muslim University 
Aligarh-202002, INDIA 
Ph.: 3584 (Int), 0571- 2702044 (O), 
2709028(R) 
Email: javedmba_amu@rediffinail.com 
September 30, 2004 
CERTIFICATE 
This is to certify that the thesis titled "RISK MANAGEMENT IN 
FINANCING INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS" submitted to the Department 
of Business Administration, Faculty of Management Studies & Research, Aligarh 
Muslim University for the award of the Degree of "Doctorate in Business 
Administration" is the record of original work done by Mr. N. Krishna Kumar 
during the period of his study under my supervision and guidance. It is also 
certified that this research work has not been submitted in parts or in full to this or 
any other University for award of any Degree or Diploma. 
Dryjavaia Akntar 
Internal Supervisor 
KARAiKUDI - 630 004 
DEPARTMENT OF BANK MANAGEMENT 
OATE.20-Xfim2JQa4... 
CERTIFICATE 
This Is to certify that the thesis 'Risk Management 
in Fingncing Infrastructure Projects' submitted to 
ths' Department of Business Administration, Faculty 
of Management Studies and Research, Aligarh Muslim 
University for the award of the Degree of Doctor of 
Philosophy in Business Administration is the record 
of original research work done by Ur N.Krishna Kumar 
during the period of his study under my supervision 
and guidance* It is also certified that this research 
work has not been submitted in parts ox in full to 
this or any other university for award of any degree 
or diploma. 
w . --* J^ 
Or BM CHIDAMBARAM 
(External Supervisor) 
Professor and Head 
Department of Bank Management 
Dean, Faculty of Management 
AlagapDa University 
KARAIKUDI 630 004 Tamil Nadu 
DECLARATION 
I, N. Krishna Kumar, do hereby declare that the thesis titled ^ RISK 
MANAGEMENT IN FINANCING INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECT^ 
submitted to the Department of Business Administration, Faculty of 
Management Studies & Research, Aligarh Muslim University for the 
award of the Degree of "Doctorate in Business Administration" is the 
record of original work carried out by me under the supervision of 
Dr.Javaid Akhter, Reader in Business Administration, Aligarh Muslim 
University (AMU), Aligarh (Internal Guide) and Dr. RM. Chidambaram, 
Professor and Head, Dept. of Bank Management, Dean, Faculty of 
Management, Alagappa University, Karaikudi, Tamil Nadu (External 
Guide) and I further confirm that this research work has not been 
submitted by me in parts or in full to this or any other University for 
award of any Degree or Diploma. 
N . K R B S H N A K U M A R , B.Sc.;B.Com,MBM,ADMR,CAlIB.C.H.B.R.Awardee(IBA) 
Research Scholar 
64-A/42, Brindaban Complex 
Thane (West), Mumbai - 400 601. 
Maharashtra. India. 
Email: taIk2krishna69@hotmail.com 
Acknowledgments 
It is indeed a momentous milestone of my professional life for having been able to 
complete this long enduring academic odyssey the seeds of which were sown more 
than half a decade earlier when I was working as a "Lecturer and Consultant' in 
Centre for Management Development, Trivandrum, Kerala. The nature of work at the 
Centre involved faculty members engaging in Management Consulting, Research 
and Training - the tripod of activity which were to teach me innumerable things in 
application of knowledge in later part of my life. I am thankful to many Professors and 
collegues of the Centre for having spotted and guided me to take up Doctoral 
Research. I am indebted to all of them and notably to Prof. R.S. Murali, FCA.AICWA, 
ACS,DCM (ICA) - the head of Finance & MIS Faculty; Dr. Sanal Kumar, Fellow 
Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad and Mr. Padmakumar - Currently 
Secretary, Restructuring and Internal Audit Board, Government of Kerala who have 
been a tremendous source of inspiration to start with. All the three happened to be 
great friends, philosophers and guide to me. 
I am extremely thankful to the All India Management Association (AIMA) and the 
Aligarh Muslim University (AMU) for having devised this course with a rigourous 
curriculum of course work and dissertation, using most modern methods of scientific 
delivery of the internet age, without which working professionals like me wouldn't 
have had an opportunity to hone our research skills. I recall travelling to Cochin from 
Trivandrum on a number of occasions to attend the Satellite based Interactive 
Network for Education and Training (SINET) sessions conducted by AIMA with help 
from the local Kerala Management Association (KMA) from 1995 to 1997 as part of 
the coursework modules. Most of us who had enrolled from that part of India could 
create a campus life on week ends while attending the sessions and discuss. We 
could network and learn/ exchange. 
Mere words would not express my sincere thanks to my guide Dr. Rm. 
Chidambaram, Professor & Head, Department of Bank Management, Aiagappa 
University, Karaikudi, Tamilnadu. I am extremely fortunate to have been educated 
under an award winning teacher like him in University, and his role and the learning I 
could derive from him is up there with the highest I can think of, and it is an honest 
admission to state that he had played momentous role in turning many homo-sapiens 
like me to human beings. I salute him for all the contributions and guidance he has 
made to me over the years. I am deeply indebted to Dr. Javaid Akhter, Associate 
Professor, Aligarh Muslim University for having guided me all at the right moments of 
this programme, and the many sessions I could spend with him during my visits to 
Aligarh has impressed me with revelations of many methodological nuances that had 
to be tackled in research. The many sessions and discussions I had with him could 
drive-in and re-emphasize the role of methodological content in research, which has 
helped me to be constantly reminded of it in this dissertation and I hope I had done 
my level best in addressing it. 
I am thankful to my current employer - ' Corporation Bank' and the top management 
for having reposed so much confidence in me, which has propelled me to aim for 
greater heights. I am greatful to each one of the whole lot of institutions (academic, 
financial and otherwise) and individuals who had provided me enthusiastic support 
and enrichment over the past five years in taking this study to its logical conclusion. 
Notable of them in the academic field include : Centre for Development Studies 
(CDS), Trivandrum; National Institute of Bank Management (Pune); Indian Institute of 
Management Bangalore and Ahmedabad; National Institute of Public finance and 
policy. New Delhi, HUDCO Centre for Human settlements. New Delhi; Institute for 
Social and Economic Change (ISEC), Bangalore, Bankers Training College, Mumbai, 
Reserve Bank Staff College, Chennai, Madras School of Economics, Madras Institute 
of Development Studies, WTC Institute, Mumbai, UTI Institute of Capital Markets, 
Mumbai. I should thank the Indian Council for social Sciences Research (ICSSR), 
New Delhi and the Indian Statistical Institute (ISI), Calcutta on whose selection, I had 
the opportunity to undergo a month-long Research Methodology Course at ISEC and 
an Advanced Econometrics Modelling course with Statistical Softwares at ISI, 
Calcutta during my tenure as a Faculty at the Centre during the period 1994 -1998. 
All of these have contributed in a huge way in understanding research per se in 
general and research methodology in particular. My unfailing thanks are also due to 
the Indian Banks' Association (IBA) and its Board to have given a scholarship under 
the C.H. Bhabha Research Scholarship scheme after an industry-wide selection to 
work on the topic "Managing Operation Risk' (which I subsequently completed and 
was awarded a Citation and a Silver Plague) by giving four-months leave from my 
active banking career. This was a blessing in disguise for my doctoral work, as I 
could collect a lot of data and information by visiting and interacting with industry 
professionals and academicians. I could use the visits I did in a multi-pronged way. 
Furthermore, coming to the financial institutions in whose perspective this research 
has been carried out, I have received tremendous support from many institutions and 
most of the Risk professionals in such institutions have become a good friend of mine 
over the years, institutions like the IDFC, ILFS, MSRDC, IDBI, HUDCO and 
infrastructure companies like L & T, BSES, Simplex, Jog Engineering, CIDCO, MIDC, 
GMR consultants, CRIS Infac, and consultants like ICF5A Infrastructure advisory, 
KINFRA, Mc Kinsey, Price Waterhouse Coopers, have all provided timely help 
whenever required. Without their active involvement getting data, constructing the 
model and testing it would not have resulted. I had spent long hours with IDFC 
officials and their Risk Team who deserve special mention. 
I am extremely thankful to my faculty friends in the research circle like Dr. 
Christopher Dhas and Dr. Arumugam of Centre for Development Studies who were 
kind enough to provide me with lot of statistical softwares like SPSS, Micro TSP, 
Micro Stat etc., which have been very useful in the analysis. Support has also come 
from many quantitative professors at institutions like CDS and UTI Institute of Capital 
Markets, Mumbai who have helped me in cross verifying the statistical runs used in 
the research. Interactions with Dr. Anbumani of Bharatiyar University, Coimbatore 
during Course-work module and later has helped a lot in furthering clarity in research 
methods. 
Finally, I owe a lot to my parents (including my Late father Shri. P.K. Narayana 
Menon) the teachings of whom will stand me in good stead against all trials and 
tribulations. My dear wife Mrs. R. Ragamalika needs very special mention. She has 
been a raga of my life, though literal ragas are greek and latin to her. I will carry 
tremendous guilt for not supporting her enough in bringing up my two-years-two-
months old, first son "Suraj' and my just-two-months old, second son 'Sandeep'. I 
should be asking their forgiveness when they grow old as many of my pursuits have 
been possible only by cutting back my time towards them. 
Mumbai 
23^ ^^  Feb 2004. N. Krishna Kumar 
Email: talk2l<rishna69@hotmail.com 
Risk management in Financing Infrastructure Projects 
CONTENTS 
Doctoral Registration Letter - From Aligarh Muslim University 
- From All India Management Assn 
Certificate from Internal Guide 
Certificate from External Guide 
Declaration 
Acknowledgements 
Abstract 
Chapter 1 
1. Financing Infrastructure Projects - Basics 
1.0 Introduction 
1.1 Role of Infrastructure and its links with Economic Growth 
1.2 Distinctive Features of the Infrastructure Sector 
1.3 Uniqueness of Infrastructure Financing 
1.4 Traditional ways of Provisioning and financing 
1.5 The Transitional Paths 
1.6 Definition 
1.7 Statement of the Problem 
1.8 Topical Relevance 
1.9 Scope and Framework of the Study 
1.9 Nature of the Study 
Chapter 2 
2. RESEARCH DESIGN 
2.1 Research Objectives 
2.2 Hypothesis of the study 
2.3 Review of Literature 
2.3.1 .Review of Literature in the Print Medium 
2.3.2 Review of Literature in Internet Resources 
2.4 Theoretical Perspectives 
2.5 Methodology 
2.5.1. Collection of Data 
2.5.2. Tools and Techniques for Analyses of Data 
2.6 Limitations of the study 
Chapter 3 
Risli Management and Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) for 
Infrastructure 
3.1 Introduction 
3.2 Risk Management Defined 
1 
ii 
iii 
iv 
V 
vi 
vii 
Page 
No. 
1 
1 
2 
3 
5 
10 
11 
12 
14 
15 
16 
16 
16 
18 
19 
20 
20 
21 
21 
23 
24 
3.3. Risk Management Process 24 
3.3.1. Risk Identification 24 
3.3.2 Risk Analysis/Quantification 27 
3.3.3 Risk Evaluation 29 
3.3.4 Risk Monitoring 30 
3.3.5 Risk Control 31 
3.4 Risk Management in Infrastructure Projects 32 
3.4.1 Project Risk Evaluation 32 
3.4.2 Risks in Project Financing 33 
3.4.3 Generic Risks Identified 36 
3.4.4 Risk Allocation 39 
3.5 The Guiding Principles of PPPs 43 
3.6 Reasons for Partnerships in Infrastructure Provisioning 45 
3.7 The Nationalization-Privatization Cycle 45 
3.8 Advantages of PPPs 47 
3.9 The Spectrum of PPPs in Infrastructure 49 
3.9.1 Government Department 50 
3.9.2 Public Authority 50 
3.9.3 Service Contract 50 
3.9.4 Operations and Maintenance Contract or Lease 50 
3.9.5 Co-operative 51 
3.9.6 Lease-Build-Operate 51 
3.9.7 Build-Transfer-Operate (BTO) 51 
3.9.8 Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) 52 
3.9.9 Wraparound Addition 52 
3.9.10 Buy-Build-Operate (BBO) 53 
3.9.11 Build-Own-Operate (BOO) 53 
3.9.12 Build-Own-Operate-Transfer ( BOOT) 54 
3.9.13 Develop-Operate-Transfer (DOT) 54 
3.9.14 Rehabilitate-Operate-Transfer(ROT) 55 
3.10 Models of Public Private Partnerships 55 
3.11 Methods of PPPs 56 
3.12 Options for PPPs in Infrastructure Provisioning 57 
3.13 Strategies for Increasing PPPs in Infrastructure 58 
3.14 BOT Approach to Project Finance 60 
3.14.1. What is BOT? 61 
3.14.2 Types/Variants to BOT 63 
3.14.3 Characteristics of BOT Structuring 64 
3.14.4 The BOT Mechanism 65 
3.14.4.1. Government Preparation for Bidding 66 
3.14.4.2. Sponsors Preparation of a Bid 67 
3.14.4.3. Bid Selection 67 
3.14.4.4. Project development 68 
3.14.4.5. Project implementation 68 
3.14.4.6. Project Operation 68 
3.14.4.7. Transfer to Host Government 69 
3.14.4.8. Financing Techniques and Instruments 70 
3.15. Contractual Structure ofaBOT Project 71 
3.16. Challenges in the BOT Project 73 
3.17 Fields of Application - Recent Developments 74 
Chapter 4 
An Empirical Analysis on the Population of 
PPPs and BOT Projects 
4.1 Introduction 75 
4.2 Objectives 76 
4.3 Data Sourcing - The PPI Project Database and the Loanware 77 
Database 
4.3.1. PPI Project Database 77 
4.3.2. Loanware Database 79 
4.4. Analysis of Private Investment Flows 80 
4.4.1. Regional Trends 81 
4.4.2 Sectoral Trends 82 
4.4.3 Industrial and Geographic distribution of Project 83 
Finance Loans 
4.4.4 Differing Approaches 86 
4.4.5 Country Concentrations 87 
4.4.6 Ranking as per PPI 87 
4.4.7 Characteristics of the largest Project Finance Deals 
4.4.8 Characteristics of Project Finance Vs Non-Project 
Finance Loans 91 
4.5. Loan Pricing Samples 94 
4.6. Loan Pricing Regressions 
4.7. Summary and Conclusions 103 
Chapter 5 
Project Evaluation Model for Private Infrastructure 
Projects 
5.1. Introduction 
5.2.Project Evaluation Model 
5.2.1. Model Structure 
5.2.2. One Dimensional Value Functions 
5.2.3. Decomposed Assessment of Attribute Weights 
5.2.4. Category Weights 
5.2.5. Attribute Weights 
5.2.6. The Delta Factor 
104 
104 
106 
107 
109 
110 
112 
114 
5.3 Model Validation 
5.4 Group Comparison - Insiders Vs Outsiders 
5.5 Example Project Evaluation : The Mumbai - Pune 
Expressway 
5.6 Sensitivity Analysis - Attribute Weights Vs Worth Scores 
5.7 CCandPA Index Thresholds 
5.8 PEM Sensitivity Analysis Tool 
5.9 Conclusion 
Appendix 5.1 (Attribute Descriptions) 
Appendix 5.2 (Points PI and P2 for Attribute Value Functions 
- Results) 
Chapter 6 
Best Practices and Status of Adoption in India 
6.1 Introduction 
6.2 Status of Infrastructure Sectors in India 
6.2.1. Power 
6.2.1.1. Process of Restructuring in the Power Sector 
6.2.2.2. Power Sector Reforms in India 
6.2.2.3. Power Sector Reforms and States 
6.2.1.4. Views of Committee/Reports 
6.2.2. Roads and Bridges 
6.2.2.1. Central Road Fund 
6.2.2.2. Annuity VsEPC 
6.2.2.3. Toll Roads 
6.2.2.4. Rural Roads 
6.2.3.Water 
6.2.4. Port 
6.2.4.1. Current Operational Performance 
6.2.4.2. Meeting the Growing Demand for Port 
Services 
6.2.4.3. Private Provision to date 
6.2.4.4. State Initiatives 
6.2.4.5. Risk Allocation under Concession Framework 
6.2.4.6. Sector Regulation 
6.2.4.7. Modernizing the Port Sector 
6.2.4.8. Inland Waterways 
6.2.5 Telecommunication 
6.2.5.1. Private Sector Participation 
6.2.5.2. Interconnection Terms 
6.2.5.3. Moving to a competitive Telecom Market 
6.2.6 Airports 
6.2.7 Urban Infrastructure 
6.3. Best Practices - Power 
6.4. Best Practices - Water 
6.5. Best Practices - Roads 
114 
118 
] ) 9 
120 
121 
122 
123 
124 
126 
128 
128 
128 
131 
134 
137 
143 
145 
148 
150 
151 
151 
152 
154 
155 
156 
157 
158 
158 
159 
160 
161 
161 
162 
164 
164 
165 
166 
167 
169 
171 
6.6. Best Practices - Ports 176 
6.7. Best Practices - Airports 178 
6.8. Adoption of Best Practices in India 181 
6.8.1. Ranking Methodology 181 
6.8.2. Analysis of Sectors 183 
6.8.2.1. IRM-Power 183 
6.8.2.2. IRM -Water 184 
6.8.2.3. IRM - Roads & Bridges 184 
6.8.2.4. IRM-Ports 185 
6.8.2.5. IRM - Telecom 185 
6.8.2.6. IRM - Airports 185 
6.8.2.6. IRM - Urban Infrastnicture 185 
6.9. Ranking of Infrastructure Sectors in India 186 
6.10. The Road Ahead 187 
Chapter 7 
Summary of Findings and Conclusion 
7.1 Summary of Findings 
7.2 Analysis with Aggregates 
7.3 Analysis with Disaggregates 189 
7.4 Adoption of Best Practices 190 
7.5 Extension of this Research Findings 191 
7.6 The Road Ahead 193 
7.7 Conclusion 193 
Books/ Articles/ Reports/ Monographs/ Presentations 194 
Referred 
Summits/ Conferences Attended in the area of Infrastructure 205 
Websites Referred 207 
Appendix - 1 (Statistical Appendix) 209 
Appendix - II (Benchmarks) 221 
Risk management in Financing Infrastructure 
Projects 
List of Tables 
Chapter 3 
Risk Management and Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) for 
Infrastructure 
3.1 Reasons for Public Private partnerships in Infrastructure 
3.2 Infrastructure Development Functions by Service Arrangement 
3.3 Models of PPPs in Infrastructure 
3.4 Advantages and Disadvantages of PPP methods used 
3.5 Options for Private Sector Participation in Infrastructure and 
Public Service Provision 
3.6 Government Strategies for Encouraging Private Infrastructure 
Chapter 4 
An Empirical Analysis on the Population of 
PPPs and BOX Projects 
4.1 Investment in Infrastructure Projects with Private Participation in 
Developing Countries by Region or Sector : 1990 - 2000 
4.2 Industrial Distribution of Project Finance and all Syndicated 
Loans 
4.3 Geographic Distribution of Project Finance and all Syndicated 
Loans 
4.4 Financial Details of the Fifteen Largest project Finance Deals 
Since 1980 
4.5 Characteristics of Project Finance Vs Other Syndicated Loan 
Sample 
4.6 Loan Pricing Regression for Different Loan samples 
Chapter 5 
Project Evaluation Model for Private Infrastructure Projects 
5.1 Category Weights 
5.2 Group Composite Attribute Weights 
5.3 Hypothetical Project Profiles 
5.4 Correlation between Group Weights Assessed using DRM and 
EM Methods 
5.5 Correlations between evaluations for Hypothetical Company 
And Project Profiles using DRM and EM 
5.6 Correlation between Evaluation of insiders and outsiders 
For Hypothetical company and project profiles 
Page No. 
46 
54 
55 
56 
58 
59 
81 
83 
84 
89 
92 
100 
110 
113 
116 
117 
117 
5.7 Attribute Performance Levels and holistic decomposed 119 
Evaluations for Mumbai- Pune Expressway Project 
5.8 Alternative Computations of PA index for Mumbai - Pune 121 
Expressway project. 
5.9 Rough Estimates for Index Thresholds 121 
Appendix 5,1 (Attribute Descriptions) 124 
Appendix 5.2 (Points Table of PI and P2 for Attribute Value 126 
Functions 
Chapter 6 
Best Practices and Status of Adoption in India 
6.1 Power Sector Reforms : A Score Card for States 138 
6.2 Productivity in Container handling - International Comparisons 155 
6.3 Growth in Container Traffic (in thousands of tons) 156 
6.4 Private Initiatives in the Port Sector 157 
6.5 Key Issues arising from PSP and funding 173 
6.6 Characteristics pfthe PSP Options 174 
6.7 Development Bank Requirements for involvement in PSP 176 
Expressways 
6.8 Respondents grouping for the survey on Adoption of Best 181 
Practices in Private Infrastructure Financing Arrangements 
6.9 Ranking of Infrastructure Sectors 186 
Risk management in Financing Infrastructure 
Projects 
List of Figures 
Chapter 1 
1. Financing Infrastructure Projects - Basics 
1.1 Structure of Flow of Investment to Infrastructure 
1.2 Forms of Public Ownership 
Chapter 3 
Risk Management and Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) for 
Infrastructure 
3.1 Integrated Enterprise Risk Management 
3.2 Pro-active Risk Management Process 
3.3 Risk Factor Charts 
3.4 Risk Matrix 
3.5 Risk Map 
3.6 Project Life Cycle - Main Risks 
3.7 Structure of Project Finance Deal 
3.8 Government/ Contractor Risk Allocation 
3.9 Financial Risk 
3.10 Objective & Guiding Principles of PPPs 
3.11 The Nationalization - Privatization Cycle 
3.12 The Spectrum of Public Private Partnerships 
3.13 Typical PPP Project Structure 
3.14 Summary of Stages in a BOT Procurement Procedure 
3.15 The Contractual Stmcture of a typical BOT 
Chapter 4 
An Empirical Analysis on the Population of 
PPPs and BOT Projects 
4.1 Investment in Infrastructure Projects with Private Participation in 
Developing Countries 1990 - 2000 
4.2 Cumulative Investment in Infrastructure projects with Private 
Participation in Developing Countries, by Region 1990-2000 
4.3 Cumulative Investment in Infrastructure projects with Private 
Participation in Developing Countries, by Sector 1990-2000 
4.4 Investment in Infrastructure Projects with Private Participation in 
Developing Countries, by Region and Type of Project, 1990 -
2000. 
4.5 Top 10 Developing Countries by Total investment in 
Infrastructure Projects with Private Participation, 1990-2000 
Page Number 
11 
14 
25 
25 
26 
26 
27 
33 
34 
35 
36 
44 
47 
49 
60 
62 
71 
80 
82 
83 
86 
Chapter 5 
Project Evaluation Model for Private Infrastructure Projects 
5.1 Hierarchical Structure of Project Evaluation Model 
5.2 Qualitative Attribute Perfonnance Scale 
5.3 Generic Form of Value Curves for Model Attributes 
5.4 DRM Group weights and Range of Individual Weights for 
Attributes belonging to PA Index 
5.5. Project Profile Evaluation - Comparison of Groups and Methods 
5.6 Sensitivity Analysis - Attribute Contributions to PA index of P6 
Chapter 6 
Best Practices and Status of Adoption in India 
6.1 Status of International Power Restructuring 
6.2 The 5-Step Restructuring Process 
6.3 Range of Private Sector Participation Options 
6.4 An evolving and flexible model for Infrastructure service 
delivery 
Risk management in Financing Infrastructure Projects 
Chapter 1 
Financing Infrastructure Projects - Basics 
1.0. Introduction 
Inadequate infrastructure is considered to be the biggest stumbling block in any 
country's growth. The economic plans and strategies would reach a dead end on this 
point alone. The general disillusionment with the public sector's performance, its 
inefficient and insensitive approach to consumer needs and government's poor fiscal 
position has triggered the breaking up of the government monopoly over 
infrastructure. As governments shift their position from being infrastructure providers to 
facilitators, private entrepreneurs, banks and financial institutions (FIs) assume a more 
direct role. Concerted actions for bringing in more private participation in economic 
infrastructure have already been initiated by governments and other authorities. The 
whole gamut of issues centre on the strategy to commercialise infrastructure. While, 
there are several dimensions to the issue of private participation in infrastructure 
projects, the financing of such projects requires special attention. 
1.1. Role of Infrastructure and its links with Econonnic Growth 
Infrastructure facilities are often referred to as the "wheels of growth'. More often it can 
also turn out to be the "engine of growth'. The adequacy of infrastructure can 
determine one country's success and another's failure. Poor infrastructure is in fact 
proving to be a major bottleneck to achieving high and sustainable rates of growth in 
most developing countries. That infrastructure is inexplicably intertwined with 
economic growth, is amply manifest from an input-output matrix of an economy, which 
~wouia ^ u w telerrommunications, electricity and water being used in the production 
process of nearly every sector, and transport as an input in every commodity. 
Empirical studies that seek to quantify the link between infrastructure and economic 
growth abound. Some evidence is quoted here: 
• studies linking aggregate infrastructure spending to the growth of GDP show 
very high returns in both time series and cross-national analysis with implied 
rates of returns computed at 60% for the USA , 77% for Taiwan and China , 
63% for a cross-section of developing countries.^ 
• Studies estimating the impact of infrastructure on production costs in some 
OECD countries find that infrastructure significantly reduces production costs in 
the manufacturing sector.^ 
• In the context of rural infrastructure, time series analysis for eighty-five districts 
and thirteen Indian states reveal that lower transport costs increased farmers' 
access to markets and led to considerable agricultural expansion. Modern 
irrigation methods brought higher yields. Improved communications through 
roads lowered banks' cost of doing business, expanded lending to farmers for 
fertilizers further increasing yields.^ 
1.2 Distinctive Features of the Infrastructure sector 
Broadly, infrastructure projects have the following features: 
• On the financing side- large capital costs relative to maintenance and operating 
costs. Sunk costs are substantia]; a large proportion of the cost has to be 
irrevocably committed upfront before the project becomes operational. The 
gestation period is long; revenue streams are slow to pour in. 
• High costs of enjtry_ and exit redNCfis competitiveness and hence 
"contestability'"* of infrastructure services. 
• The services produced are non-tradables. Consequently excess demands 
cannot be met by importing. Likewise excess supplies cannot be exported. 
The non-exportability of services also implies that investments generate only 
Munnell (1990), Uchimura and Gao (1993), Easterly and Rebelo (1993) as quoted in the world development report 
(1994). These figures are contested in some other studies. It would be interesting to explore whether the differences in 
rates of returns are a result of inclusion of externalities from such investment in some of the studies. Further, there is 
raging debate on whether infrastructure investment causes growth or growth causes infrastructure investment, is not 
fully established. 
^ Studies summarized in Aschauer (1993). 
"* Ahmed and Hossain (1990) and Binswanger et al (1989) as quoted in the world development 
report(1994) 
Baumoi's "theory of contestable markets" suggests that the threat of entry coupled with the possibility 
of exit is sufficient to restrain even a single incumbent producer in the market from reaping monopoly 
profits. It is the threat of entry that acts as a regulator. However the theory is based on a number of 
rather strong assumptions. Baumol, W J(1982) American economic review 72. 
local currency revenues. This makes the availability of foreign exchange for 
repayments of external obligations, in the absence of capital account 
convertibility, subject to government intervention. 
• The sector is vulnerable to regulatory and policy changes. What is specific in 
the case of infrastructure is the existence, in most cases, of politically sensitive 
tariffs. For instance, most states supply electricity at virtually no charge to 
agricultural users. 
1.3. Uniqueness of Infrastructure Financing 
At the outset, it may be underscored that infrastructure financing is different from the 
traditional asset-based financing in a number of ways, with the former being more 
complex and risky, as the funding structure mostly relies on future cash flows from a 
specific infrastructure asset as the primary source of repayment. These peculiarities 
indicate that clearly infrastructure provision need to be differentiated from those of non-
infrastructure. The characteristics specific to infrastructure investments make them 
vulnerable to certain risks. In the traditional forms of infrastructure provision by the 
public sector , it was the government that bore all of the risks. However, private 
provision calls for a much more careful assessment and allocation of the risks. Risks 
must be allocated to and thus borne by those who are best suited to mitigate them. 
Only then can an infrastructure project become viable. To illustrate the issues of risk 
analysis and mitigation it is worth considering Project finance as a mechanism/ model 
for private financing of infrastructure. It has been explained and analysed exhaustively 
in the subsequent chapters. What must be borne in mind is that no one model can be 
expected to fit in as a universal elixir for the problem of infrastructure financing. That is 
probably the reason why global banks call this sphere of financing as 'Structured 
Finance' and create groups by pooling expertise, synergy and homogeneity to 
functions. 
Projects are not homogenous. Neither are solutions. Characteristics differ between 
different sectors and within each sector between different phases of the project. The 
nature of private/ public participation varies as do the financing requirements. The 
finance has to be disaggregated by origin (foreign and domestic), sectors (public, 
private and joint), by techniques and instruments of finance and by the type of finance, 
i.e., new investment, maintenance and working capital. Infrastructure financing is, 
therefore, really a portmanteau concept embodying different elements and 
characteristics requiring different approaches and tools which is what mal<es it unique. 
For a researcher/modeller, it is a veritable minefield which would call for understanding 
and analysing of these myriad issues to even attempt a solution. The increased 
acceptance of private financing in infrastructure has begun to shift the focus of the 
debate from the 'why' to "how'. This has fuelled the demand for lessons on best 
practices in reform strategies, regulatory frameworks, institutional and financing 
arrangements and risk mitigation. For policy makers, private investors, banks and FIs 
and consumers alike, the key challenge is to use the positive and negative lessons 
learnt from the experiences of other countries and sectors. This will help in devising 
arrangements for private participation that are fair, predictable and sustainable and 
above all, that deliver better services with greater efficiency. 
In the changed Indian economic environment, it is imperative that all the participants 
concerned, including the regulators, co-ordinating agencies and other authorities in 
infrastructure financing equip themselves with the necessary expertise in dealing with 
the aspects related to bank and institutional financing to infrastructure. In the Indian 
context, as the government's capacity to raise finance is increasingly constrained by 
fiscal considerations, coupled with poor performance and pricing of publicly owned 
infrastructure facilities, the importance of private finance has become crucial. The role 
of money and capital markets in channelling the private savings into economic 
activities hardly needs emphasis. Given the present status of the Indian money and 
capital markets in channelling the private savings into economic activities, which are 
known for their shallowness and imperfection (particularly the debt markets), it would 
be very difficult to expect these segments of the financial market to cater to the 
financing needs of private infrastructure companies in a big way. 
in this scenario, Indian banks and FIs with their huge resource base would naturally 
become the primary source of infrastructure finance. While Indian banks and FIs do 
finance private infrastoicture projects, they have long way to go. Cleariy, the path to 
be trodden by Indian banks and FIs is bumpy and subject to a number of risks, the 
success of Indian banks and FIs-in insulating themselves against the potential losses 
in pursuing the uncharted path lies in developing expertise to understand the 
complexities of infrastructure finance. As they say, the secret of success lies in 
learning from others' mistakes and experiences. 
Before venturing in to financing issues of infrastructure projects, it is necessary to 
understand certain basic facts about infrastructure projects. More importantly, the 
lender should look at the infrastructure sector from different dimensions so as to take a 
holistic view. Better understanding of the sectoral dynamics from different 
perspectives would help the lender greatly in his efforts to quantify and manage the 
risk arising out of various factors. Further, the infrastructure sector has its own unique 
features which are not found in the other sectors of the economy. The lender's views 
on a project should be based on a wider canvas and therefore, he should appreciate 
the inter-linkages of the3-eclQUMtlrsocia_cuJtura(, political and economic factors. The 
lender should also keep in mind the historical development, evolution of the sector, 
key-drivers of commercialisation of infrastructure, contemporary scenario at local, 
state, national and international levels. 
1.4 Traditional ways of provisioning and financing infrastructure 
Traditionally, infrastructure has been provided by the government, with the government 
bearing the investment risk. Government's budgetary support for the infrastructure 
sector through tax revenue and government borrowing has been the pre-dominant 
source of finance. Developing countries have also received finance (concessional and 
non-concessional) from bilateral and multilateral sources. 
The reason for this traditional model of infrastructure provision have hinged on the : 
• natural monopoly features of many of these services; 
• public good characteristics which make revenue collection to recoup the 
investment very difficult; 
• spill-overs /externalities both negative (emissions from fossil fuels) and 
positive (promotion of social equity through investments in rural infrastructure ) 
that possibly lead to a divergence between social and private costs (and 
benefits). Thus, these services may be over/under provided - a case for a role 
for public investments based on a social cost-benefit analysis. 
Alongside these theoretical reasons, was the consideration that the large investment 
requirement and long gestation periods would serve as a serious disincentive to 
private initiative. The governments in developing countries, on the other hand, have 
been trying to meet the required investment albeit with very limited success. India's 
case isn't any different and latest data on infrastructure spends proves that it is still 
very low on everyone's plan though many talk about it. During the liberalisation era, 
infrastructure investment has generally taken a severe beating, but the situation 
improved somewhat in tlie last fiscal, according to the latest data of the CSO (central 
statistical organisation). Gross capital formation(GCF) in infrastructure industries has 
recovered marginally in '00-01 to 4.6 percent of GDP from 4.2 percent in the previous 
year, though it remains far lower than the level of 6,5 percent of GDP in '91-92. 
Classification of infrastructure investment between the public sector and the private 
sector is available only till '98-99. it shows that both the sectors have been reluctant to 
invest heavily in the infrastructure sector. The public sector's investment in capital 
formation has fallen from 4.4 percent of GDP in '91-92 to 3 percent in 98-99. the 
private sector's investment also fell from an already lower level of 2.1 percent of GDP 
in 91-92 to 1.3 percent in '98-99. For the purpose of this analysis, gross capital 
formation (GCF) in electricity, gas & water supply and transportation, communications, 
storage and distribution has been considered as investment in infrastructure. These 
sectors were selected on the basis of the core nature of these activities. 
That the infrastructure investment is low on the government's agenda now is also 
reflected in the central government's expenditure allocation for infrastructure. It fell 
from 26 percent of its total expenditure in '91-92 to 16 percent in '00-01, registering a 
drop of 63 percent in the share. This could be due to two reasons-first, the 
government's policy of moving out of infrastructure and allowing the entry of private 
and foreign participation in this sector and second, its attempts to curb the deficit by 
cutting down on plan capital expenditure. In relative terms, state governments have 
not followed in the footsteps of the centre in reducing the commitment to infrastructure 
development. Thus, state governments' expenditure on capital formation fell only 
marginally from 19 percent of the total expenditure in '93-94 to 17 percent in '00-01. 
The expectation that the space vacated by the public sector would be occupied by the 
private sector has clearly not been met, perhaps due to unclear policies. The inability 
of the private sector infrastructure projects to take off in a big away has again brought 
into focus the need for enhanced government investments in these areas. The recent 
report on currency and finance by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) has attempted to 
quantify the role of public investment in the growth process. It estimated the traditional 
production function for the manufacturing sector by adding public investment as an 
additional variable, "the public capital in infrastructure emerges as the most dominant 
factor in explaining output growth in the manufacturing sector," says the report. Public 
provision has, however, had its many problems. Lack of accountability has led to poor 
management and cost overruns. The emphasis has been on new projects with little 
focus on completion of existing projects within a time schedule. Further operation and 
maintenance has been neglected, both in budgetary allocations as well as in externally 
aided projects.^ A backlog of unmet demands remain to be met. 
The more fundamental problems with public sector provision of infrastructure, 
however, relates to the macro-economic constraints on the government; a BOP 
problem with a widening deficit on the current account; a fiscal deficit that the IMF 
fears will touch the 10% level despite the government's announcements at aiming at a 
4% level. Paradoxically, despite their recognized importance, capital expenditure, 
mostly infrastructure outlays, are the most vulnerable to cuts in government budgets 
during periods of adjustments and fiscal austerity. This is true of both developed and 
developing countries, reflecting a familiar political problem that governments find it 
easier to cut capital as against current expenditure. What exacerbates the financing 
problem is inadequate cost recovery owing largely to a politically sensitive tariff 
structure with large elements of subsidization and cross-subsidization (across different 
users) and a general aversion to a tariff revision. 
These reasons necessitate a rethinking on infrastructure provision and serve as a 
pointer to an increased role for private sector participation. What has facilitated such 
private sector provision are technical and financial innovations. Technical 
developments allow for unbundling of infrastructure services. Unbundling along with 
deregulation allows for private entry and competition. The economies of large-scale 
production and delivery (the natural monopolies argument), although still important in 
some infrastructure activities, have diminished specially in power generation and 
telecommunications leading to the possibility of an unbundling -the separation of 
activities in which economies of scale are not important, and hence can be provided 
competitively , from those in which they are. This technological possibility of 
unbundling^ will allow for private sector participation, creating a quasi -competitive 
environment where some aspects, power generation and provision of value-added 
services for instance, will be directly provided for by the private sector. 
The world development report 1994 points out that international donor policies and practices often reinforce 
distortions in recipient countries. With full or partial tying of aid, donor objectives (such as seeking contracts for capital 
goods supply or consultancy services) play a part in preference for new investment over maintenance. 
The term unbundling refers to segregating the sectoral functions into identifiable units like for eg., in the Power sector, 
separating generation, transmission, distribution and possibly retailing to achieve maximum benefits for the consumer 
1.5 The Transitional paths 
The exact nature and route to private sector participation is a contentious issue, 
depending critically on political commitment, strengtii of opposition to change, 
institutional capabilities, investor's perceptions and the domestic and legal 
environment. Further different infrastructure sub-sectors need to be addressed in 
different ways. No single blueprint exists. The sectoral unbundling discussed above, 
coupled with deregulation, is one of the possible routes to private sector participation. 
It is an approach that has it's advantages for "beginners" in terms of its low political 
and regulatory costs. Unlike the divestiture route, many of the existing assets remain 
under State ownership. In contractual agreements like Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) 
and Build-Operate-Lease-Transfer (BOLT), the ownership of the new assets created 
by the private sector is subsequently transferred back to the government. Regulatory 
costs too are low since each new project is a contract- based relationship allowing for 
a postponement of a wholesale regulatory change. 
In such a backdrop of transition, this study examines major infrastructure sectors like 
power, water supply, roads, ports and airports and de-lineates practices to analyse 
and understand risks involved so that Risk Management solutions are possible in the 
infrastructure financing arena. As incidental to the macro framework of the study many 
related aspects like: (i) sector policy issues relating to pricing and competition; (ii) 
conducive legal and regulatory frameworks; (iii) the unbundling, mitigating, and 
management of risks; and (iv) mechanisms to reduce transaction costs have also been 
looked into. 
1.6 Definition 
The term 'infrastructure' can be broadly defined to include all the facilities/services 
necessary to conduct daily life, for example power, education and health facilities, etc. 
Contemporary wisdom classifies infrastructure as: (i) social infrastructure and (ii) 
economic infrastructure; to mean a school, hospital, water, sewerage etc.,as social 
and to mean a road, power, transport, telecommunication etc., as commercial. A 
somewhat ownership -based classification also exists, which classifies it as (i) Public 
Infrastructure and (ii) Private Infrastructure. The distinction in these classification is 
often elusive. With commercialisation, even many so-called social necessities like 
water or say educating the masses have become economic in nature. It may also be 
that what is social for some is economic value for others. The distinction based on 
ownership is furthermore elusive. We speak of a parl< or a government office building 
as being publicly owned, but we use the same term to describe Infosys, as it has many 
stockholders and any member of the public may buy part of the company: That is to 
say that it is a private company that is publicly owned. In the same way, a public 
restaurant is one that caters to the public at large, although it may be owned by a sole-
proprietor. Confusingly, we use the same word, public, to describe three very different 
conditions: government-ownership, widespread-ownership, and open access. This 
semantic confusion is nevertheless instructive, for if implies that government 
ownership - and by extension, government action - is not necessary to achieve 
widespread (i.e., "public") benefits. May be Privatization or Public-Private Partnerships 
(PPP) as it is called in the infrastructure spectrum, capitalizes on this under-
appreciated truism and takes advantage of the full array of ownership and operating 
relations to satisfy people's wants and needs and thereby to serve the public interest. 
An exhaustive list of infrastructure facilities would consist of the following: 
' a. Power. 
b. Telecommunication. 
c. Transport - Road, Ports, Airports. 
d. Urban infrastructure. 
(1) Rapid Transport for Metros. 
(2) Townships/ satellite towns. 
(3) Water supply/sewerage. 
e. Railway. 
f. Education. 
g. Health care. 
h. Fuel/Energy - Coal/ Petroleum/Other energy sources. 
i. Irrigation. 
j . Inland waterways. 
Jnder income Tax Act, 1961 (as amended by Finance Act 1999), infrastructure facility 
would mean : 
a. A Road, highway, bridge, airport, port, rail system or water supply project, 
irrigation project, sanitation and sewerage system or any other notified public 
facility of a similar nature. 
b. An industrial undertaking set up in any part of India for the generation and 
distribution of power which begins to generate power during 1.4.1993 to 
31.3.2003, or an industrial undertaking which starts transmission or distribution 
by laying a network anytime during 1.4.1999 to 31.3.2003. 
c. A project for providing telecommunication services on or after 1.4.1995. 
d. A housing project covered under section 80-16(10) 
e. An undertaking for developing, developing and operating or maintaining and 
operating a notified industrial park. 
RBI for its regulatory purpose has also adopted the above mentioned definition. 
However, in this Report the term 'ftmnnmlrMnfrastructure' has been narrowed down 
and refers to four infrastructure sectors: power, transportation (roads, railways, ports 
and airports), telecommunication, and urban infrastructure, which are central to the 
economic activities. 
In this chapter some fundamental aspects of the infrastructure sector have been 
discussed to provide a better understanding of it. While the analysis and discussions 
made here are general and universally applicable, wherever warranted, issues of 
relevance in the Indian context and sector specific issues have been elaborated. 
1.7. Statement of the problem 
To understand the research problem better it is worth considering, how the financing of 
infrastructure and the flow of investments works in the present set up. This can be 
conceptualised as depicted in Figure 1.1. 
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Figure 1.1 
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Broadly inTrastructure can be divided into economic infrastructure and social 
infrastructure and the investments in infrastructure is through public, private and joint 
sector investment flows. As far as public investments are concerned it occurs at national 
level, sub- national level and by local bodies. The financing mechanism is through 
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deficit financing, public debt and taxes. The risk of financing through these mechanism 
leading towards profits and losses need to be analysed. Similarly, the risks can be 
analysed in the case of joint sector investments. 
The more important analysis should pertain to private investments, especially in the 
context of economic liberalisation. The flow of private investments in infrastructure is by 
foreign investors in one hand and by domestic investors on the other. It can also be 
through joint venture participation by these entities. 
The foreign investments can take the form of direct investment or through portfolio 
participation. It is imperative here to analyse the investments as to whether it is 
financed through owned capital or borrowed capital and thereby analyse the risks 
involved. Quantifying these risks are equally important to analyse the influences of the 
numerous variables and to come out with risk management practices. Thus spotting, 
allocating and mitigating these risks is the central feature of private infrastructure 
financing and the problem areas of this research tries to analyse exactly that. 
1.8 Topical Relevance 
So much so being the subject matter of infrastructure financing -it is against this 
backdrop this research proposal is conceived and has topical relevance to the fast 
changing economic conditions of the country in general and project financing in 
particular. But, unfortunately, there have not been many studies which have recorded 
the past experiences from the lenders' perspective. In the Indian context there are 
hardly any serious studies in this regard excepting, of course. The India Infrastructure 
Report', which raises issues at the industry and economic policy level. Hence, there is 
a need for undertaking a study that would exclusively look at infrastructure financing 
from lenders' perspective. 
1.9 Scope and Framework of the Study 
The infrastructure sector, being a very vast area, can be studied from different 
perspectives. The scope of this study is primarily to look at the financing issues of 
economic infrastructure projects from lending banker's perspective. Indian banks are 
on a learning curve in so far as understanding the mechanics of the infrastructure 
financing. For that matter, so are the project promoters, policy makers and regulators. 
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The lack of expertise resulting in poor confidence level of lenders contributes in 
impeding the growth of the infrastructure financing market. 
This study, therefore, is an exercise to explore the international best practices pursued 
by international bankers and other connected institutions in financing infrastructure 
projects. The need of the hour is how fast and how effectively Indian banks can 
strategise themselves and meet the financing needs of the infrastructure market. It 
needs to be appreciated that infrastructure financing is an emerging area, and banks 
and FIs, which are currently undergoing metamorphosis, are in a position to capitalize 
on the new financing opportunities available. 
Apart from aiming to address the relevant financing issues, the Study also intends to 
discuss some of the incidental aspects such as regulatory policies and sector specific 
issues in the Indian context. This, however, is again limited to those issues that are 
germane to Indian banks and FIs. The Study covers general financing issues relating 
to five infrastructure sectors-power, telecom, transportation (roads, ports, airports) and 
urban infrastructure- which are central to economic activity and water which is an 
important social infrastructure. Wherever the term "infrastructure' is used, the same 
shall refer to the infrastructure with the above referred ambit. For the purpose of this 
Study, Indian Banks and FIs have been treated in the same manner. The reason for 
tagging FIs with banks for the purpose of this Study needs some elaboration. While 
'Indian banks' mean all scheduled commercial Banks (including foreign banks but 
excluding Regional Rural Banks), the term 'FIs' mainly refers to the major development 
financial institutions in the infrastructure sector viz. IDFC (Infrastructure Development 
and Finance Company), ILFS (Infrastructure Leasing and Financial Services), IDBI 
(Industrial Development Bank of India), ICICI, HUDCO (Housing and Urban 
Development Corporation), IFCI. The process of financial sector reform has led to 
significant changes in the working of banks and FIs. More particularly, deregulation of 
interest rates, dis-intermediation, increased autonomy to banks in credit decisions and 
inter penetration of banks and FIs into term loan/project finance and working capital 
segment have significantly altered the operating environment of both banks and FIs. 
In the changed scenario, the FIs are clamouring for commercial bank status and a few 
have already adopted 'universal banking' as their business model. In this context, it 
has to be mentioned that the Khan working Group has also advocated harmonising the 
role and operations of FIs and banks. This has bearing on areas like infrastructure 
finance in the coming years. 
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1.10. Nature of the study 
The proposed research Is highly exploratory in nature. An empirical study on risk 
analysis being a key element in infrastructure financing, it has a high scope for its 
applicability in an emerging market like India which lacks expertise in it. Furthermore, 
the topic selected has high interface with all the macro economic indicators and many 
functional areas of management, (incl. Infrastructure management) in its scope and 
applicability. From the current state of Public Ownership by Government the forms it 
can take can be conceptualised as follows: 
Privatization Commercialization Private financing of 
Public Infrastructure 
(PFPI) 
Selling Assets Sweating Assets Paying for Services 
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Chapter 2 
Research Design 
2.1 Research Objectives 
Having discussed the basics and the broader framework of infrastructure financing in 
Chapter 1, this research study explores the topic with the following major objectives 
from the lenders perspective: 
1. To understand and analyse the use of private capital as a means to finance 
infrastructure projects and to empirically compare the financial characteristics, 
geographic and industrial distribution of Project Finance and Non-Project 
Finance Loans. It would also examine the Pricing of loans (spreads) for project 
finance and non-project finance loans to know its influence. 
2. To analyse the various Risks involved in Infrastructure financing by identifying, 
estimating, evaluating and managing risk exposures to Infrastructure Projects 
by adopting Best Practices in Financing of Infrastructure. 
3. As an extension of the study an attempt has also been made to construct an 
Infrastructure Financing Index by estimating and comparing the current status of 
Infrastructure Financing in India with respect to the Global Best Practices 
benchmarks. 
2.2 Hypothesis of the Study 
The study will examine the following hypothesis: 
1. The use of Private Capital to finance public infrastructure projects has come to 
stay in Project Finance. 
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2.3 Review of Literature 
2.3.1 Review of Literature in the Print IVIedium 
An evaluation of the Review of Literature on "infrastructure financing' brings forth tine 
body of l<nowledge as it exists now, leading to the establishment of the need for this 
study. 
For instance, in the global context, 'World Development Report 1994: infrastructure 
for Development' published by world Bank, is an important publication, which 
discusses a number of wide-ranging issues on the subject. This report explores the 
ways in which developing countries can improve the provision and quality of 
infrastructure services. The report carries a separate chapter on financing issues of 
private infrastructure projects. Besides, its bibliography itself is a good guide for 
further research on the subject. Further, the world bank has published a number of 
report, discussion papers, viewpoints, etc, on various sector specific, project 
specific and country specific issues. Similarly, International Finance Corporation 
(IFC), the world bank affiliate, drawing upon their full range of operational experience 
in infrastructure finance in private sector, has brought out two publication (a) 
'Financing private Infrastructure', and (b) 'Project finance in Developing Countries' 
under their Lessons of Experience series. These two publication, though concise, 
provide a focused picture on the issues involved in financing infrastructure projects. 
In the Asian Context, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) has done considerable work 
in infrastructure financing by drawing on its Asian experiences as a lender in the sector 
for long. Recently, the research team of ADB has also propounded sectoral "Best 
Practices' for attracting private investments in infrastructure by covering various 
sectors like Roads, Power, Water, Airport, Ports and Urban Infrastructure. These are 
fast becoming as "benchmarks' to be followed by lenders in the Asian context. Thus it 
could be said that the maximum literature and the knowledge base on the subject is 
there only with these multi-lateral lending agencies who are present in this spectrum 
for long. Further, there are several useful publications by private leading international 
publishers like Euromoney, John Wiely, etc. these publications are also of immense 
help for the practitioners, academicians, and researchers. 
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In the Indian context, clearly, there has been lack of serious literature, case studies 
dealing in infrastructure related issues. And, it is only in the past few years some 
action has been initiated. However, it should be mentioned that 'The India 
Infrastructure Report' brought out by the Expert Group on the 
Commercialisation of Infrastructure Projects (Chairman: Shri Rakesh Mohan), is 
a very useful study. The Report, (consisting of three volumes and running to around 
450 pages), submitted to government in June 1996, is truly a seminal work of very high 
standard. 
The Report, apart from plotting the experiences in the global context and helping to 
reduce the knowledge gap, has made a detailed study of the contemporary issues to 
be addressed by various authorities in short, medium and long term. There is no 
doubt that this Report is in itself an important milestone in the Indian Infrastructure 
sector. After the submission of this Report, based on its recommendations, several 
policy initiatives have been taken by the Government and other authorities. Surely, the 
Report is an approach document for the decision makers, a practical workbook for all 
the players in the market and a source of comprehensive information for the 
academicians and researchers. Mention should also be made to another bold initiative 
taken by the new institution. Infrastructure Development and Finance Company 
(IDFG), which was started in the year 1998, in creating 3iNetwork, which is a network 
of 3 institutions viz., Indian Institute of Management Ahmedabad (IIMA), Indian 
Institute of Technology Kanpur (IITK) and IDFG with the aim of harnessing local 
knowledge and research interests to expand intellectual envelope in the filed. It has 
thirty professors contributing to the process on an ongoing basis and their efforts have 
also been institutionalised in the recent years through publication of an annual India 
Infrastructure Report published by Oxford University Press on thematic concerns in 
the field. The first such report was published in 2001 titled "Issues in Regulation and 
Market Structure"; the 2002 report was based on "Governance Issues for 
Commercialisation" and the 2003 report covered the issue of "Public Expenditure 
Allocation and Accountability". Coming to a rigorous academic study, a work by 
Devapriya K.A.K.; (2003) on the topic " A Study of Project Finance in Asia with 
Emphasis on Private Infrastructure Project Finance"; PhD thesis; University of Hong 
Kong comes closest to the work done in the topic area. 
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Outside the domain of the above, barring some articles in financial journals and news 
papers addressing issues in bits and pieces, and certain Study Reports by some of the 
consulting companies like PriceWaterhouse Coopers Ltd., McKinsey etc., not much 
work has been done in the Indian Context. The reason for the poor level of research 
and documentation may not really be difficult to explain, as infrastructure market being 
in its formative years, lack of initiatives to take up research studies by the Government 
and Quasi-Government bodies connected with the sector, lack of financial resources to 
sponsor studies, lack of transparency in decision making process, hesitation by 
players, including government, to share the positive and negative experiences could 
be considered as some of the reasons. However, there is considerable change 
happening in the recent past, as lot of interest is being created in the sphere (thanks to 
the government's hardsell approach of highlighting infrastructure development as the 
area with highest priority and highlighting their achievements in road development, 
telecom growth etc., by placing full page advertisement in prominent dailies with 
obvious intentions) and there are many coming forward to contribute to the field. The 
launch of an exclusive monthly magazine called "Indian Infrastructure' a few years 
back would explain the interest and potential for literature in the field. In this context, it 
has to be mentioned that many such efforts are required for harnessing and expanding 
the body of knowledge from various perspectives which will go a long way in 
contributing to the field of 'infrastructure' which is the backbone of a vibrant economy. 
This study is one such analytical effort in the topic looking at the issues from the 
lenders perspective to find possible solutions. 
2.3.2. Review of Literature in Internet Resources 
Internet is perhaps the most important medium that has changed the way researchers 
go about their job. As in the case of 'brick and mortar' entities becoming 'brick and 
click' entities, print literature is fast giving way to digitised literature. Today, no serious 
research study can ignore the resources available on the internet - be it books 
published or papers or treatises available world over on the respective subject. 
Recognising this fact, internet resources have been amply exploited for this study. A 
list of websites containing literature on the subject is given in the end (Pages 207-208). 
As in the case of print literature, it was clearly noticed that the world Bank website 
(www.worldbank.orq) leads the group in harnessing the full potential of the internet. 
True to its stature, the world bank website provides a global view on the infrastructure 
sector. Thousands of pages of research output-on infrastructure alone have been 
made available on their website. Similarly, other world Bank group members - IFC, 
MIGA, and world Bank Institute have published a large number of papers, reports etc., 
on the internet. Several other multilateral institutions including ADB have also done a 
tremendous amount of work in amassing and disseminating knowledge on this field. It 
is not as if only high profile institutions such as World Bank and IFC utilize the internet 
route for disseminating knowledge. Many individuals, small organisations. 
Municipalities, Panchayats and non-governmental organizations, citizens groups, 
various interest groups have also used the internet effectively for disseminating their 
views and the output of their studies/ efforts. There are several discussion Groups on 
the internet where serious discussions relating to various aspects of infrastructure 
development and financing takes place. The frank and free discussions, which take 
place under this banner, were found to be quite useful and enlightening in 
understanding the different view points and experiences from people across the globe. 
Even the local site of 3iNetwork referred earlier offers a discussion board service 
which allows researchers put posers and get answers from the professors contributing 
their service. This researcher, taking advantage of this, was able to tap the medium to 
develop contacts with quite a few professionals located in different countries and India, 
who were associated with the infrastructure sector. Furthermore, with a view to 
capturing the best practices prevailing across the globe and to bring in cross-country 
experiences, the researcher could establish contact with scholars of several 
institutions located in Washington D.C., New York, London and Amsterdam like the 
World bank Institute, Columbia University, Amsterdam Institute of Finance, Bauhaus-
Universitat Weimer, Germany, rating agencies like Standard and Poor. 
2.4. Theoretical Perspectives 
The theoretical perspectives for this research is inspired by works on Theories of Risks 
& Economic Behaviour, Economics of Uncertainty, Economic Decisions under 
Uncertainty, Portfolio theory etc., most of which are by the authors of the highest calibre 
and Nobel laureates like Arrow, Von Neumann and Morgenstern, Harry M.Markowitz, 
Karl Henrick borch, Jacques Dreze etc. Analysing and understanding their work in 
abstract areas have greatly contributed to the understanding and application of Risk 
Management strategies and methodologies discussed in this study. 
2.5. METHODOLOGY 
Methodology is at the heart of any research and the researcher knowing full well the 
importance of it (as the researcher himself was an academic faculty in the sphere of 
Management Consulting, Research and training during earlier part of his career) had 
given utmost importance to it. Be it collection of data or application of tools and 
techniques, a consistent discipline has been maintained in the study. The new vistas in 
modern day research methods like the use of internet, tele-conferencing, accessing 
global databases, use of computers and softwares in analysis have ail been highly 
exploited. 
2.5.1 Collection of data 
The subject matter being a very emerging area, the researcher was interested in 
collecting 'PRIMARY DATA / SECONDARY DATA' from the field. Mathematical model 
is data sensitive and have to be statistically acceptable. Knowing this fact the 
quantitative research design has been designed after initial framing of the model in most 
cases. As one of the main objective is to understand and analyse the use of private 
capital as a means to finance infrastructure projects and to empirically compare the 
financial characteristics, geographic and industrial distribution of Project Finance and 
Non-Project Finance Loans an attempt has been made to access the Global Databases 
in the relevant area. 
Though getting access to global databases is a very difficult and a costly proposition, it 
is one of the best ways of collecting data, be it primary or secondary in the modern day 
methods of collection of data (especially through digital sources). Authenticated and 
credible databases in the chosen research area could be scanned and internet sources 
have also been used optimally both in collecting secondary and primary data. This has 
been dealt in-depth in Chapter 4 and 5. 
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Further, the dissertation uses both primary data (collected through structured 
questionnaire / interview schedules) and secondary data (collected from reports, 
monographs, research papers and global databases) through out this study. Particular 
mention has to be made to the survey on infrastructure projects specific to India 
(which are detailed in Chapter 6) wherein more than 200 projects covering all 
important infrastructure sectors has been done. This is one of the largest baseline 
surveys in terms of coverage in the evolving subject of Risk management in 
fnfrastructure Financing and fs closure to ground realities as it involved eliciting 
information by people and institutions who have first hand knowledge of it. 
2.5.2. Tools and Techniques for Analysis of Data 
The study has used both qualitative and quantitative tools in its analysis. It has also 
captured qualitative data and had tried to quantify it by using modern day tools and 
methods. Whole lot of tools and techniques which are of mathematical, statistical, 
econometric, simulation have been used in this study which are detailed in the 
relevant portions of the analysis. Detailed empirical analysis on population data of 
infrastructure projects sourced through global databases has been attempted in 
Chapter 4. The project finance software Dexia Credit which is highly tuned for use in 
infrastructure sector, and has been optimally used in analysing the various 
characteristics of population data available in the Database. As the software also 
allows for graphical representation of the analysed data with the same data feeds, 
many figures was also possible in Chapter 4. 
Apart from using basic statistical techniques like correlations and regressions the 
study has used multi-attribute evaluation models for Project Evaluation of Private 
Infrastructure Projects at the unit level. This has been dealt in detail in Chapter 5. Use 
of proven multi-criteria ranking methods was the hallmark in Chapter 6 to compare 
the progress made in the various infrastructure sectors. The software by Rank Tool 
Inc. has facilitated the ranking of various parameters selected after surveying the 
infrastructure sectors and benchmarking it to prescribed Best Practices. 
2.6. LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
Risk Management in Infrastructure Project financing being in the evolutionary stage, 
the greatest challenge in developing a robust risk measurement framework is the lack 
21 
of good, clean data on past risk events. Many a times only qualitative data/ estimates/ 
patterns only are available which restricts an highly empirical research study in the 
area. Further, it has to be mentioned that many financial institutions and infrastructure 
sponsors are not ready to part with cash flow data on projects financed/ handled by 
them. The researcher had experienced great difficulty in accessing such data and to 
that extent the objectivity could have suffered. 
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Chapter 3 
Risk Management and Public Private Partnerships for 
Infrastructure 
3.1 Introduction 
Few issues in modern finance have inspired the interest of both practitioners and 
theoreticians more than the subject of risk evaluation and management.^ "The ability to 
understand, measure, and weigh risk is," according to Peter Bernstein, "at the heart of 
modern life.^" Virtually every investment and financing decision involving inter-temporal 
allocation of resources under uncertain conditions is associated with some risk, which is in 
effect, either assumed in the expectation of a higher return, or is transferred to others 
through hedging and/or contracting arrangements. 
Yet, increased exposure to risk has been an inevitable consequence of recent economic, 
technological, and financial changes, which have come to represent the defining themes of 
the 1990s. These include the globalization of economic activity, the mobility of capital flows 
across national boundaries, widespread privatization of public sector enterprises, intensified 
competition, and high volatility in international financial and currency markets. In the face of 
such paradigmatic developments, the viability of long-term capital investments, particularly 
in the core infrastructure sectors of power, transport and telecommunications, hinges 
critically on how risks associated with such investments are evaluated and managed. While 
it is very difficult to represent all risk related issues in a generic sense, as it is different in 
each sphere or domain. Figure 3.1 captures a highly generic way of conceptualizing 
Enterprise-wide risk by a global consulting giant. 
It's important to emphasize that no matter how difficult the conceptualisation be, the process 
of risk management is quite often given to logic and iteration in any area / domain. And any 
proactive risk management'^  process follows the step-by-step approach of identifying. 
Not surprisingly, risk management has grown In recent years Into a mature discipline with a wealth of literature, specialized 
skills, and sophisticated compufer-basted systems that can be applied to investment project appraisal, pension plans, 
portfolio asset allocation, credit derivatives, regulatory capital adequacy for the banking sector, and derivative trading. 
^ Bernstein (1996). 
Two inherently different approaches to risk management exist. One is reactive and the other is proactive. Reactive risk 
management means the project team reacts to the consequences of risks (actual problems) as they occur. Proactive risk 
management means that the project team has a visible process for managing risks that is measurable and repeatable. 
Preventing risk is the transition point between reactive and proactive approaches and is the one used in Infrastructure 
financing. 
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analysing/assessing or measuring/quantifying, evaluating, monitoring and controlling the 
inter-play of risk variables in that domain. An effective project team assesses risks 
continuously and uses the information for decision-making in all phases of the project. On 
many projects, risks are assessed only once during initial project planning. Major risks are 
identified and mitigated, but then are never explicitly reviewed again. This is not an example 
of good risk management. Prevention occurs in the planning stages of a project, when the 
team can take action to preclude risks from occurring. It is important to point out that 
prevention is still essentially a reactive strategy for managing risks; it is not a cure for the 
cause of risk, only a means to avoid its symptoms. To reach the higher levels of proactive 
risk management, the team must be willing to take risks. This means not fearing risk but 
rather viewing it as a means to create the right type of opportunity. When the project team 
uses proactive risk management, they assess risks continuously and use them for decision-
making in all phases of the project. They carry the risks forward and deal with them until 
they are resolved or until they turn into problems and are handled as such. To do so, the 
team must be able to unemotionally evaluate the risks (and opportunities) and then take 
actions that will address the causes of these risks, not just their symptoms. The team's 
ability to manage risk and opportunity will be the determining success factor. 
3.2 Risk Management Defined 
Risk management sets forth a discipline and environment of proactive decisions and actions 
to assess continuously what can go wrong, determine what risks are important to deal with, 
and implement strategies to deal with those risks. 
3.3 Risl< Managennent Process 
Figure 3.2 attempts to visualize the proactive risk management process that we are 
discussing. 
3.3.1 Step 1: Risk Identification 
Risk identification is the first step in the proactive risk management process. Risks must be 
identified before they can be managed. Risk identification provides the project team with the 
opportunities, cues, and information that allow them to surface major risks before they 
adversely affect the project. The process that occurs between team members and 
stakeholders is very important. It is a powerful way to expose assumptions and differing 
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viewpoints. It is unlikely that a team will agree on the ranking of all risk factors. Depending 
on experience, different team members will see the project differently. If after discussion no 
agreement can be reached, the best approach is a voting technique wherein the majority 
wins. If the votes are tied, the worst case should be used for the risk assessment. 
Figure 3.1 
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The development in social sciences research helps the risk managers to use various tools 
and techniques for Risk identification. Project team members and key project stakeholders 
use Risk factor charts, Risk matrix, Risk Maps~etc, through a^series of~0pyn discussions, or 
workshops to identify and rank risks for the project. When they discover a risk as a result of 
working through the tools, they should develop a risk statement and enter it on the master 
list of risks. Figure 3.3 and Fig 3.4 below would give an idea how a Risk Factor Chart and 
Risk Matrix would look respectively. Risk factors are grouped by focus area and risk factor 
category. The tools like Risk Matrix help in delineating the risks by category or groups (a 
sample of the matrix used for the data collection of this study which identifies the Risks and 
the stakeholder who manages it can be seen in Figure 3.4). 
Figure 3.3 Risk Factor Charts 
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Figure 3.4 Risk Matrix 
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More often Risk maps are also used in identifying risl< characteristics and assessing the 
degree of the risk variable or attribute as can be seen from Figure 3.5. Each risk factor has 
one or more characteristic that describes whether the risk should be considered a high, 
medium, or low risk. 
Figure 3.5 Risk Map 
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While the above are some of the tools in identifying the risk variables, once it is identified, it 
must be expressed clearly. This is referred to as Risk Statement'. When stating a risk, the 
team must consider not only a symptom, but also a result. Hence, the statement of risk 
should include what is causing the situation to arise (that is, the condition) and the expected 
result (that is, the consequence). 
3.3.2 Step 2: Risk Analysis/ Quantification 
Risk analysis is the second step in the proactive risk management process. The purpose of 
this step is to determine the magnitude of the individual risks and to rank them with respect 
to Cost, Schedule and Performance. To this aim it is necessary to determine the probability 
of occurrence and the consequence severity of the events identified in the previous step as 
Risk Variables/ Items. In order to standardise this evaluation and to reduce possible 
subjectivity during the assessment, a set of reference tables (both for probability and for 
consequence) shall be prepared and used throughout the project. 
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Risk analysis is the conversion of risk data into risk decision-making information. Thorough 
analysis ensures that the team is working on the right risks. Risk is composed of two factors: 
risk probability and risk impact. Risk probability is the likelihood that an event will actually 
occur. Using a numerical value for risk probability is desirable for ranking risks. Risk 
probability must be greater than zero, or the risk does not pose a threat to the project. 
Likewise, the probability must be less than 100 percent or the risk is a certainty—in other 
words, it is a known problem. Risk impact measures the severity of adverse effects, or the 
magnitude of a loss, if the risk comes to pass. Deciding how to measure sustained ioses is 
not a trivial matter. If the risk has a financial impact, a dollar value is the preferred way to 
quantify the magnitude of loss. The financial impact may be long-term costs in operations 
and support, loss of market share, short-term costs in additional work, or lost opportunity 
cost. Other risks can have a level of impact where a subjective scale from 1 to 5 is more 
appropriate. These essentially rate the viability of project success. High values indicate 
serious loss to the project. Medium values show loss to portions of the project or loss of 
effectiveness. 
To evaluate a list of risks, the overall threat of each risk needs to be clearly understood. 
Sometimes a high-probability risk has low mipact and can he safely ignored; sometimes a 
^ — • _ . — . • ^ 
high-impact risk hasJow43r43babil%--afid-eafi-be--safely4gBor-ed-asJwelk-The risks that have 
high exposure (high probability and high impact) are the ones worth managing. This can be 
done by reducing either the risk probability or the risk impact and is termed as "risk 
exposure'. When estimating probability and impact, we should be aware of what we know 
and what we don't know. If we think a risk could result in a million dollar loss, but our level of 
confidence is 50 percent, the people who are reviewing the risk analysis need to understand 
these factors. The risk impact has to be classified as to whether the impact of the risk is, for 
example, financial, strategic, technical, or legal. The magnitude of impact should the risk 
actually occur is referred to as "Risk Impact'. This number could be the dollar value of the 
loss or simply a number between 1 and 10 that indicates relative magnitude. The result of 
multiplying risk impact by risk probability is often used to rank risks. 
There could be whole lot of tools, techniques (nowadays to read as "softwares'), 
methodologies, approaches that are possible in " Risk Analysis'. It could range from a 
simple statistical measure to very advanced stochastic measures or even inter-disciplinary 
modelling which can bring say methodologies from rocketry science to stock market (or say 
methodologies in stock market behaviour to Anthropology). Such is the breadth of 
knowledge and ideas that can be used for analysing risks, it would be inappropriate to list a 
few. Thus it could only be said that risk analysis weighs the threat of each risk to help decide 
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which risks merit taking action. Managing risk takes time and effort away from other parts of 
the project, so it is important for the team to do only what is absolutely necessary to manage 
them. The key is to identify a limited number of major risks that must be managed (usually 
10 or less). We shall note that to rank risk exposure, all of the risk impact values must be in 
the same units of measurement, either dollars or levels of impact. After ranking the risk 
exposure, the team should focus on a risk management strategy and how to incorporate the 
risk action plans into the overall project plan. Experienced Risk Managers surveyed for the 
study are of the opinion that simple but effective technique for monitoring risk is to list the 
top 10 risk major risk items in the project. The top 10 risk list is externally visible to all 
project stakeholders and can be included in the vision/scope document and the project plan. 
3.3.3. Step 3 : Risk Evaluation 
Risk Evaluation or Risk Action Planning is the third step in the risk management process. It 
turns risk information into decisions and actions. Planning involves developing actions to 
address individual risks, prioritising risk actions, and creating an integrated risk management 
plan or framework. 
The four key areas the team should address during risk evaluation are: 
Research: Do we know enough about this risk? Do we need to study the risk further to 
acquire more information and better determine the characteristics of the risk before we can 
decide what action to take? 
Accept: Can we live with the consequences if the risk were actually to occur? Can we 
accept the risk and take no further action? 
Manage: Can the team do anything to mitigate the impact of the risk should the risk 
occur? 
Avoid: Can we avoid the risk by changing the scope? 
The moot questions raised above need to be addressed in the light of the overall Risk 
Management Goals of the project/ enterprise. The three main risk management goals for 
any project are to: 
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(i) Reduce the probability of occurrence, 
(ii) Reduce the magnitude of loss. 
(iii)Change the consequences of the risk. 
Risk Management Strategies : 
Risk Management strategies are also evolved at this stage and a number of strategies are 
possible to reduce risk: 
• For those risks the project team can control, apply the resources needed to reduce 
the risk. 
• For those risks outside the control of the project team, find vi/ork-arounds. 
It may be possible for the project team to transfer the risk by: 
• Moving to different hardware. 
• Moving a software feature of the project to another part of the system that is better 
able to handle it. 
• Sub-contracting the work to a more experienced player who can assume the risk. 
A metrics can be thought of by the team which will use it to determine whether the planned 
risk management actions are working. 
The Risk Contingency Strategy: 
The idea behind a contingency strategy is to haveafallback plan in place that can be 
activatedin_cas_e all effnrtsjojnanage the risk fail. The team would execute the risk 
contingency strategy if the risk contingency strategy trigger were reached. 
3.3.4. Step 4: Risk IVIonitoring 
Risk monitoring or tracking is the fourth step in the risk management process. In it, the team 
monitors the status of risks and the actions it has taken to mitigate them. Risk tracking is 
essential for effective action plan implementation. This means devising the risk metrics and 
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triggering events needed to ensure ttiat the planned risk actions are working. Tracking is the 
watch dog function of the risk action plan. It is a good idea to include a risk review during 
regular project reviews and debriefs. This should include assessing the progress of 
resolving the project's top 10 risks. A "Risk Status Reporting' is a useful form of 
management at this stage. For project reviews, the team should show the major risks for the 
project and the status of risk management actions. If project reviews are regularly scheduled 
(monthly or at major milestones), showing the previous ranking of risks is useful, as is the 
number of times a risk was in the top 10 risk list. 
Risk status reporting can identify four possible risk management situations: 
• A risk is resolved, completing the risk action plan. 
• Risk actions are tracking the risk management plan, in which case the risk actions can 
continue as planned. 
• Some risk actions are not tracking the risk management plan, in which case corrective 
measures should be determined and implemented. 
• The situation has changed significantly with respect to one or more risks and will 
usually involve reassessing the risks or re-planning an activity. 
As the project team takes actions to manage risks, the total risk exposure for the project 
should begin to approach acceptable levels. 
3.3.5 Step 5: Risk Control 
Risk control is the last step in the proactive risk management process. After the team has 
chosen the risk metrics and the triggering events, there is nothing unique about risk 
management. Rather, risk management melts into project management processes to control 
the risk action plans, correct for variations from the plans, respond to triggering events, and 
improve the risk management process. 
Risk management relies on project management processes to: 
• Control risk action plans. 
• Correct for variations from plans. 
• Respond to triggering events. 
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Thus the above steps form part of a generic way of understanding the Risk Management 
processes for any enterprise or project. There isn't much of a difference when we apply 
these processes in a specific way, say to infrastructure projects. These are dealt in detail in 
the paragraphs below. 
3.4 Risk Management in Infrastructure Projects 
The basic principle governing risk management in an infrastructure project finance deal is 
intuitive and well articulated"; allocate project-specific risks to parties best able to bear them 
(taking into account each party's appetite for and aversion to risk), control performance risk 
through incentives, and use market hedging instruments (derivatives) for covering market-
wide risks arising from fluctuations in, for instance, interest and exchange rates. In practice, 
however, difficulties arise due to market imperfections, i.e., derivative markets (swaps, 
forwards) for currency and interest rate risk hedging that are either non-existent or not 
sufficiently developed in most emerging countries, limited contracting possibilities (due to 
enforceability and credibility problems), and differing methodologies for risk measurement 
and evaluation. As a result, governments have been asked to provide guarantees for 
various kinds to projects, often at no charge. 
3.4.1 Project Risk Evaluation 
There are two important aspects of infrastructure project finance risks that distinguish it from 
corporate and traditional limited recourse project finance: 
(a) a high concentration of project risks in the early phase of project life cycle, i.e. the 
pre-completion phase; and 
(b) a risk profile that undergoes important changes as the project comes to fruition, with 
a relatively stable stream of cash flows that is subject to market and regulatory risks 
once the project is completed. Figure 3.6 below describes the main risks that arise 
in the development and operational phases. 
The argument for risk management in project finance is stronger than in corporate finance. In the case of corporate finance, 
the argument for risk management or hedging rests on the notion that hedging adds value to the extent that it helps ensure that 
a company has sufficient internal funds available to take advantage of attractive investment opportunities. See Froot, 
Scharfstein, and Stein (1993). In a project finance deal, risk management bears directly on the success or failure of the 
project. 
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In this context it is pertinent to understand tiie financing structures that are used in Project 
finance as it has a bearing on how the risks are allocated between the stakeholders and 
managed. 
3.4.2 Risks in Project Financing 
The ternn Project Financing refers to a wide range of financing structures where the 
provision of funds is not primarily dependent upon the credit support of the sponsors or the 
value of the project's physical assets but on the project's capacity to serve the debt and 
provide an equity return to the sponsors through its cash flows. Project finance involves the 
setting up of an "ad hoc" project company (called a Special Purpose Vehicle - SPV) to carry 
out the venture. The SPV is capitalised through equity and debt funding which is used to 
cover project capital expenditures and pre-operational costs; once the project is completed, 
the SPV can start its commercial activities thus generating the necessary cash flows to 
repay the financing. Thus the SPV is a separately capitalised, stand-alone entity that is 
legally separate from its parent company - in which they remain the principal shareholders. 
Fundingfoi^ the projejtjs acquiredjhrouoh this vehicle, which may have a different credit 
rating from its sponsors or the country in which the project is located^The assets associated 
with the project in_gujBStiQruAulJ-^Jsa43e-ovmed_byJhe_vebicle. It will be allotted onfy the 
minimum amount of capital required to meet the financial needs of the project, and, in most 
cases, the vehicle does not consolidate with the sponsors' balance sheets. Figure 3.7 
dissects and illustrates the Structure of a Project Finance deal. 
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Project Finance Defined 
Standard & Poor's one of the better known rating agencies (whicin rates 
infrastructure projects as well) defines a project company as a group of agreements 
and contracts between lenders, project sponsors, and other interested parties that 
creates a form of business organization that will issue a finite amount of debt on 
inception; will operate in a focused line of business; and will ask that lenders look 
only to a specific asset to generate cash flow as the sole source of principal and 
interest payments and collateral. 
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It can be seen that the structure of project finance deals involves many parties, all of which 
bear some portion of the risks of the scheme. The investment phase comprises all the 
activities associated with the construction of project assets, ( some times under a turn-key 
contract). The capital expenditures relating to the infrastructure are incurred here. The 
investment phase starts with the so called "Financial closing" (i.e. when the financing 
contracts are finalised and the SPV is entitled to draw down the funds) and ends when 
project's assets are completed and the SPV starts commercial operations (i.e. generate 
revenues). The financial exposure of the SPV increases throughout the investment phase 
and reaches its peek when all debt and equity funds have been drawn down. Once the 
system is up and running and commercial operations commence, the SPV starts repaying 
the financing thus reducing financial exposure 
Both those who lend to the venture and those who invest in it rely on the project's expected 
revenue stream for returns. As a result, these parties share with the sponsor some of the 
risks associated with the project. Such risks include technical, financial, operational, 
commercial and political risks. Those lending money to the project - usually international 
banks - have to decide which of these risks are acceptable for them to hold on their books 
and which should be covered through sponsor support, governmental guarantees, insurance 
and other contractual arrangements, including derivative products. This is true of projects 
floated by the Government as sponsors or projects under the Public Private Partnerships 
(PPPs) also. A layering (or de-layering) of the various risks and allocating it among the 
stakeholders is what is attempted by way of a structure which can be visualised as seen in 
Figure 3.8 
Figure 3.8 
The sponsor's objectives in using project financing are usually threefold. First, the sponsor 
aims to minimise its exposure to risk, thereby helping to preserve its own credit standing and 
its future access to capital markets. It also is attempting to minimise the cost of financing the 
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project itself. If the structure can make the debt attractive to prospective lenders and 
investors in some way, it can reduce the cost of funding the project overall. And, lastly, by 
achieving these things it will maximise the return on its equity investment. Forming a 
comprehensive list of the risks facing both sponsors and lenders in project financing would 
be almost impossible, and would be, to some extent, project-specific. But all project finance 
deals share certain common risks, including: resource or reserves risk; completion risk; 
operational risk; technical risk; legal risk; market risk; and country or political risk. In project 
finance these risk must be carefully assessed and mitigated. Some risks like the Market Risk 
would turn out to be lethal for the project, if it were not to be properly assessed and 
addressed. Market risk is the risk that the target market will not materialize and it shocks 
the financial health of the project brought about by a sudden shift in economic conditions 
outside the sponsor's control, through sudden and dramatic moves in foreign exchange 
rates, commodity prices, energy prices, inflation rates and interest rates etc. The most usual 
way protecting from these risks is represented by the signing of "off-take agreements" 
between the SPV and its customers. An off-take agreement is a contractual obligation by a 
customer to effect a series of payments to the SPV, over a certain period of time, in 
exchange for using the products/ services provided by the vehicle company (SPV). Figure 
3.9 captures how not only the nature but also the level of project risks varies over the life 
cycle of a project. 
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3.4.3 Generic Risks identified 
Very detailed analysis of more than hundred infrastructure projects were carried out as part 
of this study. Many tools including Risk Matrix and focus group interviews have been 
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conducted to identify and elicit risl<s involved in infrastructure projects. The researcher could 
also attend more than ten workshops, conferences/seminars on crucial infrastructure areas 
in the span of four years and could examine many model concession agreements (including 
many generated through international bids) by visiting many development banks. From 
these analyses though generalizations of risks issues would be fraught with mistakes, 
specifying generic risks in infrastructure that can be identified in the various phases of a 
project was possible, and are as follows: 
Construction Period Risks 
1. Land Expropriation 
2. Cost Overruns 
3. Increase in Financing Cost 
4. Time & Quality Risk 
5. Contractor Default 
6. Default by Concession Company 
7. Time, Cost & Scope of Identified but Related Work and Variations 
8. Environmental Damage - Subsisting/On-going 
Operation Period Risks ^^  -^ 
1. Government department default. 
2. Concession company default 
3. Termination of concession by concession company 
4. Environment damage - Ongoing. 
5. Labour Risk 
6. Technology Risk. 
Market & Revenue Risk 
1. Insufficient Income from User Levies 
2. Insufficient Demand for Facility 
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Finance Risk 
1. Inflation risk 
2. Interest rate risk 
3. Current risk 
Legal Risk 
1. Changes in law. 
2. Title/ Lease 
3. Rigtits. 
4. Security 
5. Structure. 
6. Insolvency of concession company 
7. Breach of financing documents. 
Miscellaneous Risks 
1. In-direct Political Force Majeure. 
2. Natural Force Majeure. 
3. Sequestration. 
4. Exclusivity. 
5. Development Approvals. 
6. Adverse Government Action/Inaction. 
7. Increase in Taxes. 
8. Termination of Concession by Government. 
9. Payment Failure by Government 
38 
3.4.4 Risk Allocation 
Optimal risk allocation aims to minimise both the chances of project risks materialising and 
the consequences if they do, by allocating risks to the party best able to control them at the 
least cost. It has two elements: 
1. Optimal risk management and impetus to achieve it; and 
2. Value for money. 
The first of these is based on the view that the party best able to control a risk should be 
allocated that risk. The second element - value for money - is related to the first, in that the 
party best able to manage a risk should also be able to manage it at least cost. 
Although many risks are in the control of each party, to some degree certain risks are 
completely outside the control of both parties. If neither party is in a position of full control, 
the risk allocation should reflect how the private party 'prices' the risk and whether it is 
reasonable for government to pay that price, taking into account the likelihood of the risk 
eventuating, the cost to government if it retained that risk and government's ability to 
mitigate any consequences if the risk materialises. Alternatively, the parties may share the 
risk through various risk sharing mechanisms. 
Basically, in risk allocation, nothing is free. In bidding for a project, the private party 
estimates the project risks and their potential impacts on project revenues, and in effect sets 
premiums to insulate itself from the financial results of materialised risks. The premiums are 
averaged across the project or all projects in which the private party is involved and are 
weighted according to the probability and consequences of various kinds of events. In 
reality, the risk premium set is a form of self-insurance. Nevertheless, the financial 
consequences of some risk, either in full or in part, may be transferred explicitly to others, 
including insurance brokers. Private parties accept most risks, provided the premium paid is 
sufficiently large. The question for government is whether the risk premium is good value for 
money or whether it is more cost-effective for government to take on the risk itself, taking 
into account the likelihood of a particular risk occurring and how government may be able to 
mitigate the impacts. For this purpose, a risk management plan is needed for determining 
the risk take-back by government which involves the following elements: 
• Identify all the project risks.: These include the general risks which feature in the risk 
matrix and discussed above and the project specific risks (for example, the risk to 
public health in a water project); 
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• determine the core services whicii are to be provided by government and for which 
the risl< cannot be transferred to the private party; 
• Examine each risl< and identify those which government is best placed to manage as 
a result of the level of control it exercises and those which it may otherwise not be 
optimal to leave with the private party. These should in each instance be taken back 
by government; 
• Ascertain whether any of the remaining risks should be shared in accordance with 
risk sharing mechanisms as a result of market convention or specific factors relating 
to the project; and 
• Adjust the risk allocation inherent in the basic PPP adjustment structure and use the 
contract to reflect that adjustment and allow for any power imbalance between the 
parties arising from special government powers. 
On practical grounds, the government must identify the risks it will take back before it puts 
the project to the market, as part of the process of determining government's risk allocation 
position. These risks are identified on a project by project basis. However, generally 
speaking, the risks assumed by government are likely to include items such as the risk of 
legislation or of a policy change discriminating against the project, the risk of government 
wishing to change (eg increase) the service standards or volumes, some elements of native 
title risk and some elements of pre-existing latent defect and contamination risk. 
Partnerships represent the second generation of policies to bring competitive forces and 
market disciplines to bear on government provision of goods and services. Unlike the first 
generation of outright privatization (which in any case is not easily workable in multi-party 
democracies), PPPs involve a sharing of both responsibility and risk in a collaborative 
framework. They seek to draw upon the best available skills, knowledge and resources, 
whether they are in the public or the private sector, and deliver value for money in the 
provision of infrastructure. Though the discussion on PPPs has been carried in-depth in 
subsequent paragraphs of this chapter and report, mention has to be made here as we 
discuss allocation of risks (more so in the PPP format). The Table below constructed from 
the data and analysis made as part of this study summarises the risk allocation in 
infrastructure projects as it is dealt between the various stake-holders. 
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Risk Matrix for Public Sector/Private Sector Infrastructure Investments ~ 
Type of risk Source of risk Risk taken by 
Site risks: 
Site conditions 
Site preparation 
Land use 
Technical risk: 
Construction risk: 
Cost ovemin 
Delay in completion 
Failure to meet performance criteria 
Operating risk 
Operating cost overrun 
Delays or interruption in operation 
Shortfall in service quality 
Ground conditions, supporting 
structures 
Site redemption, tenure, 
pollution/discharge, obtaining 
permits, community liaison 
Pre-existing liability 
Native title, cultural heritage 
Fault in tender specifications 
Contractor design fault 
InefTicient work practices and 
wastage of materials 
Changes in law, delays in approval, 
etc 
Lack of coordination of contractors, 
failure to obtain standard planning 
approvals 
Insured force majeure events 
Quality shortfall/defects in 
construction/commissioning tests 
failure 
Project company request for change 
in practice 
Industrial relations, repairs, 
occupational health and safety, 
maintenance, other costs 
Government change to output 
specifications 
Operator fault 
Government delays in granting or 
renewing approvals, providing 
contracted inputs 
Operator fault 
Project company fault 
Construction contractor 
Operating company project company 
Government 
Government 
Government 
Design contractor 
Construction contractor 
Project company / investors 
Construction contractor 
Insurer 
Construction 
Contractor/project company 
Project company/investors 
Operator 
Government 
Operator 
Government 
Operator 
Project company /investors 
41 
Revenue risk 
Increase in input prices 
Change in taxes, tariffs 
Demand for output 
Financial risks 
Interest rates 
Inflation 
Force majeure risk 
Regulatory/Political risks 
Changes in law 
Political interference 
Project default risk 
Asset Risk 
Contractual violations by 
government-owned support network 
Contractual violations by private 
supplier 
Other 
Fall in revenue 
Decreased demand 
Fluctuations with insufficient 
hedging 
Payments eroded by inflation 
Floods, earthquake, riots, strikes 
Construction Period 
Operating period 
Breach/cancellation of licenc 
Expropriation 
Failure to renew approvals, 
discriminatory taxes, import 
restrictions 
Combination of risks 
Sponsor suitability risk 
Technical obsolescence 
Termination 
Residual transfer value 
Government 
Private supplier 
Project company/investors 
Project company/investors 
Project company/investors 
Project company/Government 
Project company/Government 
Shared 
Construction contractor 
Project company, with government 
compensation as per contract 
Government 
Insurer, project company/investor 
Government 
Equity investors followed by banks, 
bondholders and institutional lenders 
Government 
Project company 
Project company/operator 
Government, with compensation for 
maintenance obligations 
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The risk management and the value for money proposition discussed above is achieved in 
the PPPs by: 
• Focus on services: The emphasis is on services received by government, not 
government procurement of infrastructure. Government pays for services provided 
by the private party, which are delivered through privately owned infrastructure as 
part of the service package; 
• Whole-of-life costing: With a PPP there is the opportunity for full iritegration -
under the responsibility of one party - of up-front design and construction costs with 
ongoing service delivery, operational, maintenance and refurbishment costs; 
• Innovation: A PPP approach focuses on output specifications, providing wider 
opportunity and incentive for bidders to develop innovative solutions in meeting 
these requirements; 
• Asset utilization: Infrastructure developed by government is rarely used to 
generate third-party revenue, given the absence of commercial motivation. Private 
sector providers are motivated to develop opportunities for revenue beyond the 
government payment stream and this is used in part to reduce the cost of services to 
government; and 
• Risk transfer: Risk retained by government in owning and operating infrastructure 
typically carries substantial, and often unvalued, cost. Transferring some of the risk 
to a private party which can better manage it at least cost can substantially reduce 
the overall cost to government. 
While all of these elements play a role, none is more important than the last. A PPP is at 
heart a risk-sharing relationship between the public and private sector, which exists to bring 
about a desired public policy outcome in a cost effective manner. Achievement of 'value for 
money' relies on obtaining an optimal transfer of risk because the entity in the best position 
to manage a particular risk should be able to do so at the lowest price. 
3.5 The Guiding Principles of PPPs 
The Guiding Principles of PPPs have to be framed keeping in mind the Government's 
objectives and concerns of users, developers, investors and other stakeholders as seen in 
Figure 3.10. The need for infrastructure-particularly in capital-starved former socialist 
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countries and developing countries, lias outstripped the supply of conventional public funds. 
Increasingly, therefore, we see private groups financing, designing, building, operating, and 
even owning infrastructure via innovative public-private partnerships. Transportation 
facilities (roads, bridges, tunnels, rail systems, ports, and airports), water-supply system and 
wastewater treatment plants telecommunications systems, electricity generation and 
distribution systems, public buildings, and solid-waste and hazardous-waste disposal 
facilities are being built, expanded, rehabilitated, operated, and maintained around the world 
through privatised arrangements, relying more on the private sector and less and less on 
government to satisfy people's needs. 
The distinguishing characteristic of such facilities is that, being toll goods, they lend 
themselves to user charges, because end users or government intermediaries can pay 
directly according to usage. Therefore market forces can come into play: private capital can 
be raised, thereby reducing or obviating the need for government borrowing, and operating 
costs can be paid for by users, which is more equitable than tax subsidized services and 
generally less expensive than government production of the services. 
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3.6 Reasons for Partnerships in Infrastructure provisioning 
As part of the survey conducted with lenders and infrastructure providers (totalling 20 
institutions) to understand the empirical reasons for public-private partnerships in 
infrastructure (which included FIs/ Banks like IDFC, ICICI, ILFS, IDBI, IFCI, HUDCO, SBI, 
BOB and Infrastructure Providers like Maharashtra State Road Development Corporation 
(MSRDC), BSES, L & T, Simplex, UPSRDC, Gammon, GMR, Ideal Roads etc.), the officials 
responded as shown in the table 3.1, which summarizes the responses for different kinds of 
facilities. Lack of expertise and savings in capital costs are the most frequently cited 
reasons for privatising infrastructure facilities, while savings in operating costs ranks third. 
Similar results were obtained in a survey of a random sample of 200 users of these facilities 
conducted in Maharashtra and Kerala. Other reasons cited in the two studies are speedier 
implementation, providing services otherwise unavailable, solving political and labour 
problems, and sharing risks. The researcher on closer analysis find that the reasons are 
very similar even in developed countries like US and UK wherein it has been established in 
similar studies^. 
3.7 THE NATIONALIZATION-PRIVATIZATION CYCLE 
Many experts on Privatization are of the opinion that nationalisation-privatization is a cycle in 
the economic sense, and they swear that it is more so when it comes to providing services 
to the masses. The situation with respect to many existing infrastructure facilities is 
conceptualised and depicted in Figure 3.11, which illustrates a dismaying but common cycle 
of events in rail, roads, aviation, port services, telephone systems, electric power systems 
etc. 
' T. Irwin David, Privatization in America (Washington, D.C.: Touche Ross, 1987), fig.l 1 
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Table 3.1 
Reasons for Public Private Partnerships in Infrastructure 
Type of facility 
Airports 
Technology Parks/ 
Facilities 
Power 
Hospitals/ Health 
Housing 
Mass transit 
Municipal Services 
Port facilities 
Roads and bridges 
Solid-waste 
facilities 
Schools/ Education 
Urban Infrastructure 
Telecommunications 
Wastewater systems 
Water systems 
Capital 
savings 
4 
1 
2 
1 
3 
1 
3 
1 
1 
3 
3 
1 
3 
1 
1 
Lack of 
expertise 
1 
2 
2 
2 
2 
3 
1 
2 
2 
1 
1 
3 
3 
Need for 
facilities 
2 
2 
1 
1 
1 
4 
2 
3 
1 
1 
3 
4 
2 
2 
Operating 
savings 
2 
1 
2 
2 
1 
I 
2 
4 
4 
Means of 
financing 
2 
2 
2 
4 
4 
4 
Better 
service 
3 
2 
2 
4 
4 
2 
3 
Note: "1" denotes the most frequently cited reason for public-private partnership for 
that type of facility. 
The cycle can be explained as follows: To start with in the entrepreneurial stage, many small 
firms start up and provide service. As the new industry grows, mergers and consolidation 
take place, followed inexorably by government regulation of fees and franchises in response 
to complaints about fares and in an effort to control perceived "chaotic" competition. 
Thereafter, costs gradually rise because of inflation and the need for increased maintenance 
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as the facilities age, but, in the name of "protecting the public", politicians refuse to authorize 
rate increases or service adjustments. As a result, revenues are insufficient and firms start 
losing money. This in turn leads to reduced expenditures on maintenance and repair, no 
further investment in new equipment, increasingly erratic and interrupted service, calls for 
government action, government takeover, public subsidies for what is now a government-
run system, and declining efficiency under public operation. At length the point is reached 
beyond which subsidies cannot be sustained, and therefore either service must be cut back 
or user charges or taxes must be raised. Ultimately, the wheel comes full circle as 
privatisation is called upon to cure the problem. Most literature on privatisation methods are 
replete with the "cycle theory' and cases, which seem to prove that it follows the pattern 
faithfully in the same way, irrespective of whether it is bus service in New York City or 
reaching water to people in sub-saharan Africa. Furthermore, if the cycle theory were to be 
true, there isn't a better structure than the PPPs to explain it, as the models in PPPs like 
BOT structures etc., authorises transfer back to the public sector / government after the set 
period (say 25 years or so) in the design of the deal itself. 
FIGURE 3.11 - THE NATIONALIZATION-PRIVATIZATION CYCLE 
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3.8. ADVANTAGES OF PPPs 
Public-private partnerships for infrastructure satisfy the needs: (1) to upgrade systems to 
accommodate population growth, to satisfy tightened regulatory requirements (e.g., for 
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cleaner water), or to attract investment and development; (2) to minimize the cost of new 
infrastructure and consequent "rate shock" among citizens; and (3) to raise capital for other 
desired projects by receiving an up-front payment for the infrastructure concession. 
The PPPs can help governments address infrastructure needs in several ways; 
1. It helps identify and develop new, innovatively designed, user-financed, profit-
marking facilities or existing facilities in need of rehabilitation, renovation, or 
expansion. Private, profit oriented businesses have a direct financial incentive to 
seek and carry out new projects that will satisfy public needs at prices the public can 
pay, projects that would otherwise have to wait until government funds became 
available. Government-sponsored projects, in contrast, are often uneconomical, and 
most times end up as grandiose monuments that satisfy personal needs. 
2. By involving private sponsors and experienced commercial lenders, it assures in-
depth review of the technical and financial feasibility of the project. 
3. it can accesses private capital markets to supplement or substitute for hard-to-get 
government resources. New capital comes from a large and previously untapped 
pool of investors interested in higher-risk, higher-return investments than traditional 
municipal bonds; this can leverage limited public funds and may improve the 
government's credit rating. 
4. it builds more quickly and more cost effectively than government usually can, and 
therefore satisfies public needs more quickly at lower cost. Construction is generally 
more rapid because private developers are more flexible and do not have to 
observe government procurements rules and bureaucratic constraints that delay 
planning and construction schedules. 
5. It operates facilities more efficiently than government usually can, while complying 
with regulatory standards, such as those for water quality. 
6. Taxpaying private firms provide a new source of tax revenue. Privately developed 
projects are estimated to pay over two dollars in new tax and franchise revenue for 
every dollar in project cost; if the new infrastructure generates ancillary real-estate 
development or opportunities for concessions, for instance, even greater revenues 
will be realized. 
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7. It accepts risks that would otherwise ha\/e to be borne by the public sector. 
8. It transfers technology and trains government personnel during the course of a 
project. 
9. It establishes a private benchmark against which to measure the efficiency of similar 
projects and enhances public management of future projects. 
Government's vital role is to identify and plan to satisfy the fundamental need for particular 
infrastructure projects; investigate project feasibility; execute the myriad tasks involved in 
contract letting (see later discussion); assign monopoly rights (by the act of choosing the 
private partner); regulate prices in the public interest (in as much as the facility is usually a 
classical toll good, subject to monopoly); establish and monitor performance standards; and 
(usually) contribute to the financing. 
3.9 The Spectrum of PPPs in Infrastructure 
Public-private partnerships for infrastructure take many forms. Figure 3.12 shows the 
spectrum of principal models, ranging from fully public to fully private. In the terminology of 
the public-private fonns are contracts, franchises, and divestments. The rankings of the 
models in the right half of the figure, that is, their relative degree of "privateness," should not 
be interpreted too rigidly, as the differences are subtle and depend on individual cases. 
Figure 3.12 
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3.9.1 Government Department 
The traditional method of providing infrastructure-based services is directly through 
government departments. The government, which owns the facility, is responsible for 
designing, financing, building, and operating it. A common example is say Public Works 
Department (PWD), municipal water supplies etc. 
3.9.2 Pubfic Authority 
In both developed and developing countries public authorities are common for power, water, 
transportation, and telecommunications services. These are being reformed by 
commercialisation (managerial are financial autonomy and separate budgets based on user 
charges) and corporatization (legal company status with separation of ownership and 
management). The intentions of such changes are to achieve efficiency and accountability 
and to have the entity act like a business rather than a political body, institutions like TRAI 
(Tariff Regulatory Authority of India), CEA (Central Electricity Authority) are examples of this. 
Regional authorities like lA (Infrastructure Authority) created under the Maharashtra 
Infrastructure Development And Support Act (also referred to as MIDAS Act) and many 
such Authorities that are being created at the State level in India exemplify this form. They 
try to do the regulator's function. 
3.9.3 Service Contract 
Specific services associated with infrastructure may be contracted out to private firms. 
Examples here are ticketing, cleaning, and food catering for railroads; meter reading, billing 
and collection for water; and cleaning/ removal of solid waste from public highways etc. The 
public agency retains overall responsibility for operation and maintenance of the system 
except for the particular contracted services, and it bears all of the commercial risk. It must 
finance fixed assets and provide working capital. Compensation to the contractor may be 
on the basis of time, lump-sum, fixed fee, or cost-plus, or on the basis of a physical 
parameter (number of water bills sent out, meter reading of electricity bills etc). Service 
contracts are generally for periods of less than five years. 
3.9.4 Operations and maintenance contract or Lease 
A private partner operates and maintains a publicly owned facility under a management 
contract with the sponsoring government, which owns the facility. This arrangement is 
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similar to a service contract, but in tliis case the private partner has overall responsibility for 
operating and maintaining the system (commonly called an O&M Contract) and makes the 
day to-day decisions; it does not assume any of the capital risks, the objective is greater 
efficiency and effectiveness of service. This arrangement is used for maintenance of tool 
roads, supply of water. Airport maintenance etc. The facility could be leased to the private 
firm, which pays a lease fee and collects user charges; the French term affermage is 
commonly used for this arrangement. 
3.9.5. Co-operative 
A non-profit, voluntary, cooperative association assumes responsibility for the service. Rural 
cooperatives in countries as diverse as the United States, Canada, and Finland successfully 
expanded local telephone systems. Kenya, India, and China are among the many 
developing countries where irrigation management transfer is taking place, whereby water 
user associations take over and operate local irrigation works. Using their own labour and 
monetary contributions, these associations often succeed in maintaining the network of 
canals and ditches, and even dams, used in local distribution systems where centralized 
operation by the government water authority was failing. Examples are also found in other 
services. 
3.9.6 Lease-Build-Operate (LBO) 
A private firm is given a long-term lease to develop (with its own funds) and operate an 
expanded facility. It recovers its investment plus a reasonable return over the term of the 
lease and pays a rental fee. Because the facility remains publicly owned, this arrangement 
avoids possible legal problems associated with private ownership of a facility that was 
publicly financed originally. The largest public-private airport partnership in the united states 
is that for Stewart airport, a huge but underdeveloped facility located eighty-five miles north 
of New York city; it is being leased by the state for ninety-nine years to a British company. 
UK has experimented this form very successfully in many of its sectors. It is getting popular 
in India as well. 
3.9.7 Build-Transfer-Operate (BTO) 
A private developer finances and builds a facility and, upon completion, transfers legal 
ownership to the sponsoring government agency. The agency then leases the facility back 
to the developer under a long-term lease, during which the developer operates the facility 
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and has the opportunity to recover his investment and earn a reasonable return from user 
charges and commercial activities. 
3.9.8 Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) 
A Contractual arrangement whereby the Developer undertakes the construction, including 
financing, of a given infrastructure facility, and the operation and maintenance thereof. The 
Developer operates the facility over a fixed term during which he is allowed to charge facility 
users appropriate tolls, fees, rentals, and charges not exceeding those proposed in the bid 
or as negotiated and incorporated in the Contract to enable the recovery of investment in the 
project. The Developer transfers the facility to the Government Department concerned at the 
end of the fixed term that shall be specified in the Concession Agreement. This shall include 
a supply-and-operate situation which is a Contractual arrangement whereby the supplier of 
equipment and machinery for a given infrastructure facility, if the interest of the Government 
so requires, operates the facility providing in the process technology transfer and training to 
Government nominated individuals. 
A private developer is sometimes awarded a franchise (concession) to finance, build, own, 
and operate a facility and then transfer it to the public sector, then this is sometimes referred 
to as BOOT-build, own, operate, and transfer. This arrangement is similar to BTO but may 
encounter legal, regulatory, and liability issues arising during the long period of private 
ownership before the transfer. Nevertheless, this is perhaps the most common form of 
public-private partnership for building new infrastructure. In contrast to a sale or permanent 
concession, government retains strategic control over the project-which is often a political 
plus. 
3.9.9 Wraparound addition 
A private developer finances and constructs an addition to an existing public facility, and 
then operates the combined facility either for a fixed period or until he recovers costs plus a 
reasonable return on his invested capital. He may own the addition. The objective of this 
arrangement is to expand the facility despite the government's lack of resources or expertise 
to do so entirely with its own funds. Eg. Adding another terminal, to an Airport complex. 
Providing an additional warehouse in a Warehousing corporation etc. 
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3.9.10 Buy-Build-Operate (BBO) 
An existing public facility is sold to a private partner who renovates or expands it and 
operates it in perpetuity under a franchise. This is equivalent to divesting a company, which 
then operates under a franchise. As in other franchise models, during the negotiations prior 
to the sale, the public owner can use the franchise agreement to exercise public control over 
pricing, access, noise, safety, quality, and future capacity expansion. For example. The first 
sale in recent history of a wastewater treatment plant in the United States was carried out in 
Franklin, Ohio, using this arrangement. In Japan and Germany government-owned 
telephone systems were sold in order to make them more modern, efficient, and 
internationally competitive through the infusion of private investment. In Argentina and Peru 
they were sold in order to expand and improve service, (it is hard to believe, but before 
privatisation one had to wait an average of seventeen years to have a phone installed in 
Argentina!). In India the majority stakes in the government owned telephone company VSNL 
(which is the International carrier) was sold to the Tatas with an intention of modernising and 
improving service. 
3.9.11. Build-Own-Operate (BOO) 
A Contractual arrangement whereby a Developer is authorised to finance, construct, own, 
operate and maintain an infrastructure or development facility in perpetuity under a 
franchise, subject to regulatory constraints on pricing and operations. The Developer is 
allowed to recover his total investment by collecting user levies from facility users. Under 
this project, the Developer owns the assets of the facility and may choose assign its 
operation and maintenance to a facility operator. The Transfer of the facility to the 
Government is not envisaged in this structure. The long-term property rights provide a 
significant financial incentive for capital investment in the facility. Examples of this model 
are private toll roads in Virginia and California, the toll road in china connecting Hong Kong 
and Macao with Guangzhou, the new terminal at New York's JFK Airport, and the "chunnel" 
under the English channel. Numerous power projects in the Philippines and Indonesia, as 
well as ports in the region, are also public-private partnerships. The U.S. department of 
energy departed from its conventional approach of government-owned, contractor-operated 
facilities (M&O contracts) and changed to BOO Structure for remediating 54 million gallons 
of highly radioactive waste at its plutonium plant in Hanford, Washington. 
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3.9.12. Build-Own-Operate-Transfer (BOOT) 
A Contractual arrangement whereby the Developer is authorised to finance, construct, 
maintain and operate a project and whereby such project is to vest in the Developer for a 
specified period. During the operation period, the Developer will be permitted to charge user 
levies specified in the Concession Agreement, to recover the Investment made in the 
project. The Developer is liable to transfer the project to the Government Department, after 
the expiry of the period of operation. 
3.9.13 Develop-Operate-and-Transfer (DOT) 
A Contractual arrangement whereby favourable conditions external to a new infrastructure 
project which is to be built by a Developer are integrated into the BOT arrangement by 
giving that entity the right to develop adjoining property, and thus, enjoy some of the benefits 
the investment creates such as higher property or rent values. 
Functionally the various arrangement discussed above shall be grouped and presented as 
shown in Table 3.2. 
TABLE 3.2 
INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT FUNCTIONS BY SERVICE ARRANGEMENT 
Functions Service Arrangement 
Government 
Agency 
Public 
Authority 
Service 
Contracting 
Management 
contracting 
Leasing Concession 
Ownership of 
Capital financing 
(fixed assets) 
Current financing 
(woricing capital) 
Making additional 
Capital investments 
Operation and 
maintenance 
Managerial 
Authority 
Bearer of 
Commercial risk 
Basis of private 
Party compensation 
Typical duration 
Of arrangement 
State 
Government 
Government 
Government 
Government 
Government 
Government 
Not applicable 
No limit 
State 
public authority 
(limited subsidy) 
Market based 
Public authority 
public authority 
Public authority 
Public authority 
Not applicable 
No limit 
State or i 
Public agency 
Public agency 
Private finn for 
specific items 
Private finti for 
specific items 
Public partner 
Public partner 
For services 
rendered 
Less than 
5 years 
mixed 
Public partner 
Private partner 
Public partner 
Private firm 
Private firm 
Mainly public 
Partner 
For services 
and results 
3 to 5 years 
Stale or mixed 
Public 
partner 
Private 
firm 
Public 
partner 
Private 
finn 
Private 
firm 
Private 
finn 
Private finn 
Private firm 
Private finn 
Private finn 
Private firm 
Private firm 
Based on results, net of 
contractor payment for 
Use of existing assets 
5 to 10 
years 
10 to 30 
years 
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3.9.14 Rehabilitate-Operate-and-Transfer (ROT) v. 
(:h^h. 
A Contractual arrangement whereby an existing facility is turned over Xo the private sector \o 
refurbish, operate (collect user levies in operation period) and maintain for a franchise 
period, at the expiry of which the legal title to the facility is turned o\ex to the Government. 
The term is also used to describe the purchase of an existing facility from abroad, importing, 
refurbishing, erecting and consuming it within the host country. 
3.10. Models of Public-Private Partnerships 
From the above discussions the various models for PPPs that can be thought of can be 
summarised and modelled as depicted in Table 3.3. 
TABLE 3.3 - MODELS OF PPPs in INFRASTRUCTURE 
Type of facility Model Description 
Existing Facility Sale Private firm buys facility, 
Operates it under a franchise. 
And collects user fees. 
Lease Government leases facility to a 
Private firm, which operates it under a 
franchise and collects 
User fees 
Operations 
and Maintenance 
(O&M) Contract 
Private firm maintains and 
operates a government-owned 
facility; government pays private 
firm a fee. 
Existing facility 
Requiring Capital 
investment for 
expansion or 
rehabilitation 
Lease-Build-Operate Private firm leases or buys 
(LBO) 
Buy-Build-Operate 
(BBO) 
Wraparound 
Addition 
facility from government 
operates it under a concession, 
and expands or rehabilitates it, 
collecting user fees and paying a 
franchise fee 
Private firm expands a government 
owned facility. Owns only the 
expansion, but operates the whole 
facility, collecting fees. 
Contd..in Page 56 
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New facility to be 
Built 
Build-Transfer-
Operate (BTO) 
Build-Own-
Operate-Transfer 
(BOOT), also called 
Build-operate-
Transfer(BOT) 
Build-Own-Operate 
(BOO) 
Private firm finances and builds 
new facility, transfers it to Public 
Ownership, then operates it for 20 
to 40 years, collecting user fees. 
same as BTO, but facility is 
transferred to public ownership 
after 20 to 40 years 
Private firm finances, builds, owns 
and operates facility and collects fees 
under perpetual franchise. 
3.11 Methods of PPPs 
Having discussed the forms and models that can be thought of in PPPs, it is pertinent to 
analyse the methods used generally and the advantages/ disadvantages which have been 
captured in Table 3.4. 
TABLE 3.4 
ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF PPP METHODS USED 
Method Advantages Disadvantages 
Contract 
Franchise by 
Concession 
Franchise by 
Lease 
Increases productivity; saves money. 
Is transparent 
Brings expertise, technology, 
investment; cuts costs 
Bring expertise, technology; 
cuts costs 
Probable worker opposition 
Probable worker opposition 
Probable worker opposition 
Grant 
Voucher 
Mandate 
Less costly than direct govem-
govemment provision 
Gives recipients choice; saves 
Money; corruption free 
Imposes full cost on private 
Sector 
Sale to joint venture Brings expertise, technology, 
Investment; raises some cash; 
Government retains part 
Ownership 
Continued cost to government; 
not very transparent 
Continued cost to government 
Imposes full cost on private sector; 
masks government role 
Not very transparent 
Contd... 
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Sale to private buyer Brings expertise, technology, 
Investment; raises cash 
Sale to the public 
Sale to managers 
And employees 
Sale to users or 
Customer cooperative 
Free transfer to 
Joint venture 
Free transfer to 
The public 
Free transfer to 
Employees 
Free transfer to 
Users or customer 
Cooperative 
Free transfer to 
Orginal owner 
Liquidation 
Popular; transparent; 
Raises cash 
Retains operating experience; 
Popular with employees 
Popular; gets rid of problem; 
eliminates drain on funds; 
Raises cash; transparent 
Brings expertise, technology, 
investment; government retain 
Part ownership 
Popular with the public 
Popular with employees 
Popular; eliminates problem 
And money drain; transparent 
Fair 
Gets rid of problem; raises 
Some cash 
Possible worker opposition; 
may not attract buyers; not 
Very transparent 
Suitable only for low-risk 
situations; no new investment 
In the enterprise 
No new investment, expertise, or 
technology brought into the 
enterprise 
Raises no revenue 
Retains management; no revenue; 
no new investment or expertise 
No revenue; no new investment 
or expertise; unfair to public 
Raises no revenue 
Raises no revenue; unpopular? 
Worker opposition 
Default 
Withdrawal 
Deregulation 
Subtle solution 
can do gradually 
Good policy 
Temporary public complaints 
Public complaints 
Complex; opposition from 
Vested interests 
3.12 Options for PPPs in Infrastructure provisioning 
Having discussejd the possible routes to private sector participation in infrastructure, table 
3.5 elucidates the options for PPPs in infrastructure provisioning. 
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Table 3.5 
Options for 
Private Sector 
Participation 
Option 
Financ. of 
investments 
Financing of 
w.capital 
Contra, relation 
with users 
Duration (Yrs) 
Responsibility 
for setting rates 
Method of 
payment 
Method of 
recovering 
public 
expenditure 
Main objective 
ofPSP 
Ownership 
Financing 
Management 
Risk 
Service 
Contracts 
Public 
sector 
Public 
sector 
Public 
sector 
1-2 
Public 
sector 
Work 
done/ Unit 
price 
Rates 
Improve 
efficiency 
Public 
sector 
Public 
sector 
Public 
some 
private 
Public 
sector 
Private sector Participation in Infrastructure and Public Service Provision 
Manage-
ment 
Contracts 
Public 
sector 
Public 
sector 
Private 
sector 
3-5 
Private 
sector 
Cost-plus 
and 
productivity 
Rates 
Improve 
efficiency 
Public 
sector 
Public 
sector 
Private 
sector 
Public 
sector 
Lease 
Arrange-
ments 
Public 
sector 
Private 
sector 
Private 
sector 
5-10 
Contract 
Rates price 
User 
overcharge 
Improve 
efficiency 
Public 
sector 
Public 
sector 
Private 
sector 
Public and 
private 
Concess-
ions 
Private 
sector 
Private 
sector 
Private 
sector 
20-30 
Contract 
Rates 
Not 
applicable 
Mobilize 
private 
capital 
Public 
sector 
Private 
sector 
Private 
sector 
Private 
sector 
Build-Own-
Operate-
Transfer 
(BOOT) 
Private 
sector 
Private 
sector 
Private 
sector 
Time needed 
to retire debt 
Contract 
Rates 
Not 
applicable 
Mobilize 
capital and 
efficiency 
Private then 
public 
Private 
sector 
Private 
sector 
Private 
Sector 
Reverse 
BOOT 
Private 
sector 
Private 
sector 
Private 
sector 
Time needed 
to retire debt 
Contract 
Rates 
Annual fees 
by private 
firm 
Efficiency 
improvement 
Public then 
Private 
Public sector 
Private 
sector 
Public and 
Private 
Joint 
Ownership 
(mixed 
companies) 
Private sector 
Private sector 
Public and 
Private sectors 
Indefinite or 
fixed 
Public Private 
Rates 
Rates 
Mobilize 
capital and 
efficiency 
Private and 
Public 
Private and 
Public 
Private and 
Public 
Private and 
Public 
Outright Sale 
or Divestiture 
Private sector 
Private sector 
Private sector 
Indefinite 
Regulated 
private 
Rates 
Sale price 
Mobilize 
capital and 
efficiency 
Private sector 
Private sector 
Private sector 
Private sector 
3.13. Strategies for increasing PPPs in infrastructure 
Table 3.6 below summarises the strategies governments can take to enhance infrastructure 
provisioning through the PPP route by addressing the relevant risk issues concerned. The 
above paragraphs have analysed and illustrated some of the issues of risk analysis and 
mitigation using the concept of project finance as a model for private financing of 
infrastructure. As emphasized at the onset, this is not meant to be a model with universal 
applicability for infrastructure. The risks vary and with them vary the nature of contracts. 
The nature and sources of finance vary too. What the analyses hopes to achieve in this 
section is not an elucidation of the specifics, but a hint at the broader generalities. Some 
specifics do find mention, wherever it has been felt relevant. A typical structure of a PPP 
project can be figuratively constructed as shown in Figure 3.13. 
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Table 3.6 
Government Strategies for Encouraging Private Infrastructure 
Encourage Initial Private 
Entry 
Some Private Participation Extensive private 
Participation 
Prudent macroeconomic management, including currency convertibility, is a priority. 
An institutional/legal framework is necessary to ensure contracts can be implemented 
Overall 
Sectoral 
Size 
Sectoral and regulatory 
issues 
Privatization of SOEs 
Foreign Participation 
Sponsors 
Financial Issues 
Government and risk 
Demonopolize niche sectors, 
allowing entry to cellular 
telephones, power 
generation, ports etc. use 
concessions and BOOs as 
appropriate to sector and 
political acceptability. 
Focus initially on small 
projects Break large projects 
into components. 
Stan process of removing 
subsidies, preferably by 
announcing (and adhering to) 
a phased program. Allow 
tariffs to be automatically 
adjusted to reflect changes in 
costs. 
Consider (Partial, if 
appropriate) privatisation of 
most financially viable SOEs 
(eg. Telecoms) 
Remove or minimize barriers 
to foreign capital and 
expertise 
Ensure strong sponsors, 
technically and financially. 
Ensure that they make 
significant equity 
contributions 
Adjust regulations to allow 
foreigners to repatriate 
dividends. Allow use of 
escrow accounts if that gives 
extra comfort to foreign 
investors. 
Where really necessary, 
guarantee SOE contractual 
obligations, and build in 
buyout provisions for private 
sponsors. Do not subsidize 
finance to private or public 
enterprises. 
Broaden the scope of private 
entry and competition initiate 
overhaul of regulatory 
framework. 
Medium -- sized projects 
should be financeable. 
Assess regulatory options. 
Increase competition within 
and for markets, regulate 
natural monopolies. 
Privatize a broader range of 
SOEs. 
Encourage foreign 
participation in privatisation. 
Scope for greater 
participation by technically 
and financially sound local 
sponsors, and demonstration 
effects. 
Access international capital 
markets. Strengthen local 
capital markets; public share 
issues, investments by local 
pension and insurance funds. 
Assume less risk as private 
participation increases; adapt 
regulatory framework on the 
basis of experience. 
Extend private sector 
participation and 
contestability to sectors 
where regulatory issues may 
be inorc difficult. 
Project size should not be a 
constraint. 
Review regulatory 
experience. Convert BOTs to 
concessions by announcing 
that they will be re-bid. 
Maximize competition. 
Complete privatisation 
process. Make tariffs fully 
cominercial. 
Remove remaining 
constraints to foreign 
participation. 
Iinprove access to 
international capital through 
better country risk rating. 
Encourage private rating 
agencies, re-insurance 
industry, full use of foreign 
and local capital markets. 
Limit commercial presence of 
government. Focus 
government involvement on 
providing enabling 
environment. 
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Figure 3.13 
Typical PPP Project Structtirs 
caist(ucti.ji 
It is pertinent to analyse the financing of infrastructure sector where innovative financing 
techniques and instruments in increasingly sophisticated capital and insurance markets are 
allowing for more efficient means of risk allocation and management. Accompanied with the 
globalisation of financial markets, sponsors of infrastructure projects now find on offer an 
array of financing options to match debt-servicing obligations with revenue-generating 
prospects of the projects. The world bank estimates that of the amount spent each year in 
developing countries on infrastructure, only seven percent comes from private sources -the 
rest is provided by government and multilateral agencies; by the end of this decade, the 
share of the private sector is expected to double. Project finance has co-existed with 
traditional financing for the last 30 years. However, as a means of financing infrastructure 
projects, it took off only during the last 10 years, the impetus coming from the process of 
"deregulation" and increasing policy emphasis on private investment in the late 1970s and 
1980s, both in the USA under the Reagan administration and in the UK under Margaret 
Thatcher. The influence of it spread to South East Asia in the 90s, wherein currently 
majority of the projects are underway. 
3.14. BOT Approach to Project Finance 
While the subject matter of financing infrastructure projects is referred to as "Project 
Finance' in the financial lexicon (under whichever models; be it PPPs or otherwise), the 
build-operate-transfer (BOT) is an approach in Project Finance (could also be under PPPs) 
that has in recent years played a growing role in the implementation of industrial and 
infrastructure projects such as oil and gas fields, power plants, toll roads and water supply 
and treatment facilities in both industrialized and developing countries. Owing to the 
strategic importance of BOT projects for developing countries, organizations like United 
Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) and other multi-lateral organizations 
are increasingly being asked by member countries to provide information, advise and 
guidance on the elaboration of these projects. In response to this need, these organizations 
have taken the initiative of preparing detailed guidelines for infrastructure development 
through build-operate-transfer (BOT) projects and these guidelines apart from providing both 
the general overview of the conceptual, legal and financial issues associated with BOT 
projects have become practical guides in these spheres. 
The structure and content of the guidelines follow the usual path of BOT Projects, from 
identification of Project opportunities through feasibility studies, formation of a consortium, 
bidding procedures, contractual and financial packages, to the operation, maintenance and 
transfer of ownership. It also highlights the ways in which BOT projects can promote 
technology transfer and capacity building. They help developing countries to take advantage 
of the potential benefits of using a BOT strategy to implement infrastructure projects and 
make well reasoned decisions based on the particular objectives and requirements, and 
elucidate how projects can be made to attract financing from the private sector. 
There is no perfect BOT model for all infrastructure projects, and the host countries 
themselves have to shape the approach to suit the national requirements. Those countries 
that have had the most success in implementing BOT projects generally attribute it to 
creating a win-win situation: The BOT approach allows them to pursue their national 
interests while at the same time it encourages private sector investment. The guidelines 
should not be regarded as rigid and unchangeable. Infrastructure development is a dynamic 
process, and the BOT approach has evolved to suit the needs of projects/ programmes in 
individual countries. They would perhaps, serve as a comprehensive reference work, based 
on experience worldwide, for officials, managers and practitioners dealing with BOT issues. 
While our discussions hitherto have been on generic issues of Infrastructure and PPPs there 
is a need to come to the specifics - the BOT Structures wherein our subsequent analysis in 
the study would focus on. The focus of this research is also in this area. 
3.14.1. What is BOT? 
BOT is the terminology for a model or structure that uses private investment to undertake 
the infrastructure development that has historically been the preserve of the public sector. 
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"Project finance" is tlie cornerstone of the BOT approach. It means essentially that lenders 
took to the project's assets and revenue stream for repayment rather than to other sources 
of security such as government guarantees or the assets of the project sponsors. In a BOT 
project, a private company is given the concession to build and operate a facility that would 
normally be built and operated by the government. The facility might be a power plant, 
airport, toll road, tunnel or water treatment plant. The private company is also responsible 
for financing and designing the project. At the end of the concession period, the private 
company returns ownership of the project to the government, although this need not always 
be the case, and would depend on the variant used which are discussed below. The 
concession period is determined primarily by the length of time needed for the facility's 
revenue stream to pay off the company's debt and provide a reasonable rate of return for its 
effort and risk. Figure 3.14 briefly summarises the States involved in a BOT procurement 
procedure. 
Figure 3.14 Summary of stages in a BOT procurement procedure 
Source : UNIDO BOT Guidelines 
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3.14.2 Types / Variants to BOT 
The acronym BOT stands for "build, operate and transfer" or "build, own and transfer" (the 
terms are used interchangeably). The variants have been explained above under PPPs 
itself and could include forms like : BOO (build, own and operate, i.e., without any obligation 
to transfer); BOR (build, operate and renewal of concession); BOOT (build, own, operate 
and transfer); BLT or BRT (build, rent or lease and transfer); BT (build and transfer 
immediately); BTO (build, transfer and operate); possibly subject to instalment payments of 
the purchase price; DBFO (design, build, finance and operate); DGMF (design, construct, 
manage and finance); MOT (modernise, own/operate and transfer); ROO. (rehabilitate, own 
and operate); ROT (rehabilitate, own and transfer). For the purpose of this analyses the 
acronym BOT will include all these variations. 
Some commentators have written that the BOT concept has its historical roots in the 
concession systems of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Others believe that BOT 
projects differ so significantly from the old concession approach that their roots are much 
more recent. The old concessions normally entitled the private sector to virtually free use of 
the project -some authors have called it "exploitation"-of the project, with very little 
participation and control by the host governments. In contrast, in a properiy structured BOT 
project today, the host government decides on the need for the project and its scope, 
requires that the design, performance and maintenance of the project be tailored to the 
objectives of the country and selects the private sponsors by means of an appropriate 
bidding and evaluation process in order to arrive at a price that is fair to both the host 
government and the sponsors. 
Unlike the old concessions, modern BOT arrangements are designed and implemented as 
public/private partnerships, with private sector finance and efficiency truly serving the public 
interest. BOT projects offer significant potential for technology transfer and local capability 
building and for helping to develop national capital markets, as well as a variety of other 
benefits, all of which will be covered in this analyses. A properiy negotiated and drafted BOT 
project agreement limits the private sponsors to reasonable rate of return and ensures that 
the project serves the host country's national interests, economic and otheoA/ise. Most BOT 
projects are first identified by the host government. Through a published request for 
proposals the host government asks for bids to have a particular project delivered on a BOT 
basis. It is also possible, however, for a project opportunity to first be identified by a private 
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entrepreneur, who will propose it to the host government. A number of successful BOT 
projects have been realized in this fashion. 
Many developing countries have begun to promote infrastructure projects on a BOT basis. 
Such projects are financed on a limited recourse basis and built and operated as a private 
venture under a project agreement with the host government or one of its agencies. At the 
end of the operation period, the project is transferred to the host government, usually at no 
cost or only nominal cost. A number of BOT projects have now been successfully 
completed and put into operation, and many others are on the way. Thus this contract-
based route to financing projects, especially in infrastructure sector has come to stay. 
3.14.3. Characteristics of BOT Structuring 
The exact nature of the contract used- BOO, BOT, BOLT and their many variations vary 
across sectors and countries. A number of considerations come into play. One such is that 
the longevity of the assets created differ. Thus while the life span of a power plant is about 
25-30 years (with regular maintenance, and may be extended further by 10-15 years 
following a refurbishment), a road/highway may last a 100 years or more. This obviously 
creates a difference in the possible tariff, cash flow and rent characteristics of the project. 
Typically, a build-own-operate (BOO) contract, where the private operator owns all the 
assets, can be used for independent power plants (IPPs) and cellular networks while the 
build-operate-transfer(BOT)arrangement is widely used for longer-lived assets like roads 
and highways, airports, bridges and so on. Under a BOT arrangement, the private investor, 
also referred to as the concessionaire, builds and operates the asset for a specified period-
referred as the concession period - and earns a return on his/her investment and thereafter 
transfers the asset to the government. Such a structure works well for projects that can 
charge users and leaves the government with the option of imposing a tariff or not after the 
transfer has been made. Thus an erstwhile toll road can be converted to a freeway once the 
private operator transfers the ownership of the road/highway to the government. 
International Finance Corporation (IPC's) experience shows, that though typically Latin 
American countries do use a BOO structure for IPPs, Power Purchase Agreement (PPAs) 
contracts in Asian countries are structured like a BOT. In the case of Enron, for instance, 
the PPA is a 20 year contract with the possibility of either a transfer of the project to the 
state or the extension of the contract thereafter. Schedule 11 in the PPA lays out the 
procedure for valuation and transfer of assets after the concession period. The concession 
period for Cogentrix (another power project) is 30 years. If one takes the project life into 
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account, such concession periods extending to 20 - 30 years in effect is equivalent to a 
BOO arrangement. IFC analyses this structuring as a consequence of concern for 
"sovereignty" - a BOT structure provides the security that the assets ultimately belong 
home. It gives some room for political economy reasons not to undermine the project's need 
and viability. 
The build-operate-lease -transfer (BOLT) arrangement is just a financing technique without 
changing the modus operandi. This arrangement is presently being widely used for railways 
where the asset is created by the private sector and then leased out to the public sector for 
operation. The lease payments to the private sector are structured to amortize the debt and 
provide a fixed rate of return on equity. At the end of the lease, the assets are transferred to 
the government. 
The main differences between these modes are tabulated below : 
Arrangennent 
BOO 
BOT 
BOLT 
Ownership 
Of assets 
Private 
Government 
Private 
Operating the 
facility during 
concession 
period 
Private 
Private 
Private/government 
Transfer of assets 
at the end of 
concession 
period 
No 
Yes(to 
government) 
Yes 
3.14.4. THE BOT Mechanism 
During the operation period the project company will charge prices. Tolls, fees, etc., 
sufficient to pay back the project debt and to provide dividends to the shareholders of the 
project company. The financing is raised by the project company from commercial banks, 
sometimes backed by export credit agencies and by multilateral and bilateral lenders. The 
financing of BOT projects are normally on "a project financing "or "non-recourse" basis. The 
lenders are supposed to look at the cash flows and earnings of the project company as the 
only source of funds from which the loans will be repaid (and to the assets of the project 
company as collateral for the loans) . Relatively very few BOT projects, however are so 
completely self-supporting that they can be financed without any guarantees and safeguard 
undertakings by the interested parties, including the host government. Normally the 
governments will not provide sovereign guarantees or borrow any money on behalf of the 
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sponsors, but support from host governments may include assurance of minimum revenues, 
sharing of project risks, use of right-of-way, guarantees of the performance of government 
agencies involved in the project, etc. 
3.14.4.1 Government preparation for bidding 
The next step for the government is to decide the procurement procedure. Alternatives 
include competitive bidding, sole source procurement or some limited tender system. Most 
governments will want to pre-quaiify potential investors, whether they adopt purely 
competitive bidding or some other process. A large number of bidders may not be the 
government's first priority. Rather, the need to attract serious and quality investors should 
drive the design of the procurement process. If, as will usually be the case, competitive 
bidding is used, three, four or five serious competitors may be enough to achieve the host 
government's objectives. 
The request for proposals provides the detailed definition of the project. It normally sets 
forth criteria that must be met, including size, timing, performance and the nature and the 
range of project revenues. It is also advisable to include the project agreement in the 
invitation to tender documents. This phase is extremely important from the host 
government's point of view. If the initial project definition is impractical, or if the 
governments criteria for award are unrealistic or unclear, interested investors will have great 
difficulty in responding with realistic proposals. A quality bid package and a transparent, 
well-defined bid evaluation process are of critical importance for successful BOT project. 
Experienced bidders consider the bid package and evaluation process as an important 
indicator of the project's feasibility and of the host government's commitment to make it a 
success. The terms of the competition must be clear and consistently applied, or serious 
competitors will be discouraged from pursuing the process. All the issues involved in 
competitive bidding for BOT projects have to be adhered. From the host government's view 
point, it is the bidding and evaluation process that defines the terms of reference of the 
project and is largely responsible for the quality of the competition and investors. 
Experience suggests that choosing the most suitable project consortium is usually the single 
greatest determinant of the success or failure of BOT projects. 
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3.14.4.2. Sponsors preparation of a bid 
In response to the request for proposals, the group of interested investors or sponsors 
normally from a consortium put together a responsive bid. The consortium members reach 
a preliminary agreement at this stage on cost sharing, the role each expects to play in the 
project and the potential project structure. If confidential or proprietary information have to 
be shared among project participants, which is often the case. The preliminary consortium 
agreement includes appropriate confidentiality agreement, or the participants will separately 
enter into such agreements. The consortium carries out its own more detailed feasibility 
studies for the project, which are critical factor in its decision to proceed and in its ability to 
attract financing. It then seeks tentative loan commitments and preliminary contract prices 
from potential lenders, equity investors, contractors and suppliers in order to structure its 
proposal or bid. 
The consortium then prepares and submits its bid. The request for proposals should require 
that the bid containing credible financing plan, although not necessarily definitive financing 
commitments. In some instances, the bid should be allowed to suggest amendments or 
alternative solutions to one or more aspects of the project in order to better achieve the 
project's overall goal. For instance, the feasibility studies undertaken for the consortium or 
the consortium's expertise in project design and development may suggest an alternative to 
some feature of the project as originally outlined in the request for proposals. 
3.14.4.3 Bid Selection 
In the next phase, the government will evaluate the various bids submitted in response to 
the request for proposals and select the winner. It is critical that highly qualified technical, 
financial and legal advisers are available to the government entity evaluating the bids. Bids 
for any complicated project are never identical and are often very difficult to measure one 
against another no matter how clear their valuation criteria may be. The evaluation of bids 
for BOT projects will not ordinarily be based on price alone. It is, rather based on factors 
such as price, the reliability, experience and the degree to which the project as conceived 
and proposed will lead to other benefits for the host country, such as savings in foreign 
exchange, promoting technology transfer and providing employment and training to local 
employees and contractors. Having evaluated the submitted bids, the government invites 
the selected bidder to execute and sign definitive contractual documents. 
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3.14.4.4 Project development 
With the government's acceptance and signing of the project agreement, the winning 
consortium is in a position to make definite commitments among themselves to form or 
structure the project company if it is not already been formed. The equity contributions 
required for a project realisation will have to be made. Similarly, the sponsors will now be in 
a position to approach or go back to potential lenders, as well as to the contractors and 
suppliers, to obtain more definite commitments or terms and prices. When all these 
agreements have been negotiated by the sponsors and signed, the project will proceed to 
financial closing. Financial closing is the date on which the lenders and equity investors 
advance, or begin to advance, the funds for detailed design, construction, purchase of 
equipment and other steps necessary to conclude the project. 
These final steps after the award of the project and the signing of the project agreement are 
crucial in the development process of any BOT project. Although most of the onus is on the 
winning consortium, this final phase of project development may require some support from 
the host government and flexibility on its part. 
3.14.4.5 Project implementation 
Once the project reaches financial closing, the implementation phase will begin in earnest. 
Any particular project, of course, may not fall neatly into these distinct phase. Some site 
assembly or development and even some preliminary construction may take place before 
financial closing but the main construction work and the delivery of important pieces of 
equipment for the project normally take place only afterwards, when the project loan funds 
become available for disbursement. The construction agreement and processes follow. 
The implementation phase ends when the project has passed the specified completion tests 
and is finally accepted by the project company and in principle by the host government. 
3.14.4.6 Project Operation 
Next, the project enters the operation phase, which will continue for the period of the 
concession. During this phase, the project company, either directly or through an operator, 
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operates the project and maintains the facility in conformity with the criteria set forth in the 
project agreement and as required by the terms of the various loan agreements and 
agreement with the investors. The revenue or fees received during the operation of the 
facility allow the project company to recover the investments, serve that debt and make 
profits. To be sure that operation and maintenance (O&M) are being carried out as 
required, the lenders, investors and host government have extensive rights to receive 
reports and carry out inspection of the facilities. The issues associated with O&M has to be 
addressed some times innovatively and fully. In both the implementation and operation 
phases, the host government should seek to derive as much benefits as possible from local 
capability building and the transfer of technology from the project company and contracts 
into the local economy. 
3.14.4.7 Transfer to Host Government 
The final phase of a BOT project is the transfer of the project to the host government at the 
end of the concession period. As a rule, the project will have been designed to enable the 
BOT sponsors to pay off their project debt and to earn the expected return during the 
concession period so that the transfer to the host government will be for no consideration or 
only a nominal one. The interest of the host government at the transfer date will be to make 
sure that the project has been properly maintained and that enough training and technology 
transfer have taken place for the government to be able to continue to operate the project. 
Depending on the type of project and the degree to which it has decided to promote 
privatization of its infrastructure, the host government may find it advantageous to have the 
project company or the operator continue to operate and maintain the project and a 
negotiated extension of the concession or a new operating contract. This result might make 
sense if, for instance, the government believed operation of the project by private sector 
entity provided better and more cost-efficient service than its operation by the government 
itself. The host government may therefore wish to preserve this option in defining the terms 
of the project agreement. An alternative could be a new tendering process for a new 
concession period. The various options and considerations involving project transfer have 
to be explored. 
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3.14.4.8 Financing techniques and instruments 
A BOT project involves a private sector borrower who seei<s financing on either a limited-
recourse basis or a non-recourse basis. In theory, the lender in a non-recourse financing 
arrangement will look only to the project's assets and revenue stream for repayment, not to 
additional sources of security, such as the total assets or balance sheet of the project 
sponsors, in practice, as will be discussed elsewhere in this analyses, almost all BOT 
projects are financed on a limited recourse basis, as opposed to a purely non-recourse 
basis. 
Project finance techniques were applied in the United States of America to the development 
of commercial real estate and were further developed in the 1970s in the North Sea in 
connection with oil and gas projects. They are being used for numerous private 
infrastructure projects involving power plants, roads, railways, bridges, telecommunication 
facilities and water treatment plants. Infrastructure financing is different, of course, from 
financing an aircraft to that of a shopping centre. In equipment or real estate financing, the 
lender's primary security is the capital value of the asset. Toll roads or power plants, on the 
other hand, have uncertain capital value and a very limited potential for resale. The lender's 
primary security, therefore, is the contracts supporting the project and, most importantly, the 
certainity of the revenue stream set forth in the project agreement. 
Different types of infrastructure have different risk profiles. The revenue from a power plant 
project is relatively secure and predictable (bankrupt SEBs as in India to be excluded). The 
host government or public utility may enter a well-defined agreement with the project 
company to purchase the power output of the plant. Compare, however, the source of 
revenue from a power plant to that from a toll road: since the revenue from a toll road 
depends on the individual travelling decisions of tens of thousands of potential users, the 
terms of a project agreement for a toll road are based primarily on travel forecast by experts. 
Such forecasts are obviously less certain and the agreement less secure than a well-
drafted, long-term power purchase agreement with the credit worthy utility. Notwithstanding 
that different projects involve different risks, it should be mentioned that financial markets 
have become increasingly sophisticated in devising packages to finance almost any type of 
reasonably predictable revenue stream. 
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3.15 Contractual Structure of a BOT project 
BOT projects involve a number of elements, all of which must come together for a 
successful project. Figure 3.15 adapted from UNIDO's BOT Guidelines illustrates a typical 
BOT project structure and the inter-relationships between the various parties. It gives an 
overview of the structure of BOT projects and more detailed aspects are discussed 
elsewhere at relevant places. 
Figure 3.15 
The Contractual Structure of a typical BOT 
Government 
Agency 
Government 
agency 
The Project Agreement Lenders 
The 
Project Company 
Escrow Agre^ent 
Construction 
Contract 
Shareholders Agreement 
Insurance Policies 
Shareholders 
Contractors 
Operator 
The structure of a typical BOT project can be described through the building blocks of the 
BOT contract package as shown above. The primary contract is the project agreement 
(Implementation Agreement- Concession Agreement). This is the contract between the host 
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government and the project company. In entitles the project company to build and operate 
the project facility and imposes a number of conditions as to design, construction, operation, 
maintenance, etc. of the project. It fixes the operation period, the payment for the usage of 
the facility, the way in which payment should be effected and so on. In short: the project 
agreement is the key contract of a BOT project, and the contractual basis from which the 
other contracts are developed. 
The subscription of the share capita) and the contractual arrangements between the 
shareholders are contained in a shareholders agreement. The majority shareholders of the 
project company are normally the private project sponsors who in turn might be private 
construction companies, equipment suppliers, international trading companies and the 
lenders. The participation of the host government as shareholder (equity investor) is not 
unusual in some countries and in some fields such as the petroleum industry. The 
construction contract is normally a fixed price turnkey construction contract covering all the 
work. If the BOT infrastructure project involves large construction work and the supply of 
heavy machinery and equipment, the project company will negotiate the construction 
contract with a consortium of experienced building companies and equipment suppliers to 
assure the timely and proper completion of the project facilities. Effectiveness of the turnkey 
arrangement might be a condition precedent to lenders. 
In case the host government or a government agency is the only customer of the 
infrastructure project, the project company will negotiate a separate purchase agreement 
with the government. The agreement provides the company with an assurance of a 
minimum purchase by the government and arranges the price structure - often on a take or 
pay basis. That means that as long as the government pays the fees, the project company 
is assured of sufficient funds to service its debt, cover its projected costs and make a profit. 
The fifth major contract of a BOT project is the credit. Agreement between the project 
company and the lenders. There is an almost infinite number of conditions, type of loans 
and instruments used in BOT financing. The risk of non-repayment of the loans is usually 
covered in two ways. First, by standard types of safeguards, such as fixed price turnkey 
contracts, providing for performance bond and liquidated damages, real estate mortgage, 
default clauses, assignment of insurance contracts, etc. Secondly, by safeguards specific to 
BOT projects such as guarantees by governments for the performance of government 
agencies on contingency loan for a limited period, escrowing agreements and shareholders 
and sponsors support agreements . The loan security structure will be included in the credit 
agreement. 
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Normally the project company will enter into an operating/management contract with a 
professional operating company. The operating/management contract spells out operation 
specifications, maintenance standards, operating costs, incentives, etc. for the operation 
period. An adequate insurance programme (insurance policies ) must be arranged both 
during the construction and operation of the project. The project company usually has little 
to fall back on in the event of a casuality loss except for insurance proceeds. 
The contractual framework of a BOT project as outlined here, is of course not exhaustive. 
Escrow agreements, service agreements, energy supply agreements, supplementary loan 
agreements etc, can also be part of the legal framework governing a BOT infrastructure 
project. 
3.16 Challenges in the BOT approach 
A critical challenge for developing countries is to identify the factors that make projects 
financeable in the private sector. An exercise to that end should aim at helping 
governments to identify those factors, specifically as they relate to infrastructure projects. 
Since BOT entails the financing of infrastructure projects by the private sector, there is a 
common misconception that the "public" nature of the project can be largely ignored, and the 
host government often assumes that it has minimal involvement in BOT projects. It will be 
seen why this assumption is not well-founded and why governments must lead as well as 
provide support in most projects. 
Fortunately, the experience of the last decade makes clear the basic structure needed to 
make a BOT project viable. Standard solutions are being worked out for the problems that 
earlier seemed to present inseparable difficulties. Even if a government agency knows little 
about BOT, the knovyledge exists and is available from private advisers as well as 
organizations such as UNIDO, IBRD, IFC,ADB at the International level and IDFC,IDBI,ICIGI 
etc., at the national level that have built expertise and experience. Institutions like ADB have 
come out with Best Practices that can be followed by the stake holders. The advantages 
and challenges of BOT projects have been discussed in more depth throughout this report. 
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3.17 FIELDS OF APPLICATION-RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
The BOX concept is not a new financial mechanism. Variations on the BOT approach, often 
known as "concessions", have been in use for a long time in European industrial and mining 
sectors, especially France, Germany and the Scandinavian countries. More recently various 
models of project financing with BOT characteristics have been applied to infrastructure 
projects as different as the large EURO channel tunnel and great belt tunnel projects in 
Europe, Power plants in the United Kingdom, United States of America and Greenland, as 
well as projects in the petroleum industry. The capital intensive and high risk North sea 
projects of the Norwegian sector have all been successfully financed built and operated by 
private sponsors and are now in the process of being gradually transferred to a government 
agency. During the BOT process, national technology and skill has been developed to a 
fairly high and competitive level. 
From the early 1980s the BOT concept has been introduced in a number of developing 
countries as an alternative way to finance infrastructure projects. Such projects include road 
projects, power plants, port facilities, telecommunications, industrial estates, water supply 
and treatment systems, airports, metro railway systems etc. A pressing need for 
infrastructure facilities as a condition for driving economic growth in many developing 
countries, the third world debt crisis and the present trend to involve the private sector 
participation would only mean that the interest in the BOT concept in many developing 
countries is bound to go up. 
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Chapter 4 
An Empirical Analysis on the Population of 
PPPs and BOT Projects 
4.1 Introduction 
From the conceptualisations made in Cliapter 2 and 3 about the possible structures 
of tackling infrastructure financing issues, it would be amply clear that this can be 
achieved only in either of the three ways: selling assets; sweating existing assets; or 
undertaking PFPI (Private Financing of Public Infrastructure) arrangements for 
infrastructure projects. It is well understood that the first amounts to Privatization, the 
second to Commercialization and the third (where user charges are not feasible or 
possible) to Public- Private Partnerships or PPPs. While there is no fourth way 
besides governments continuing to provide services the spectrum of PPPs can take 
various forms and Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) is one such important form of PPPs 
where maximum developments have taken place in the infrastructure financing 
arena. Thus BOT structures are a sub-set of the larger scheme of arrangements in 
the PPPs that have become very popular. So much being the influence of BOT 
Projects in the sphere of infrastructure financing during the past two decades as an 
important new method of financing large-scale, high-risk domestic and international 
infrastructure ventures, the generic term Project Finance can't do without it. 
Project finance was first used on a large-scale to develop the North Sea oil fields 
during the 1970s, where the scale and risk of investment required far exceeded the 
capabilities of any single petroleum company, or even any single consortium of 
companies. Following the success of the North Sea development. Project Finance 
has been used extensively to develop natural resource, electric power, transportation 
and numerous other ventures around the world. Project Finance has been 
associated with many financial and operating success stories. These include the 
Teeside power project in the UK, the Ras Laffan LNG project in Qatar, the Hopewell 
partners Guangzhou highway in the southern China, and the Petrozuata heavy oil 
project in Venezuela, as well as numerous independent power generation projects in 
the United States. However, project finance is most closely associated in the public 
mind with the three spectacular recent financial failures-the channel tunnel 
(Eurotunnel), the Euro Disney theme park outside of Paris and the Dabho) power 
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project in India. In spite of these failures, total project finance lending worldwide has 
exceeded $36 billion every year since 1989, and reached a peak of $85 billion^ in 
1997 before dropping back to $54 billion during 1998 global economic turmoil. 
In fact, it can be said that the 1990s marked the re-emergence of private participation 
in infrastructure in the developing world, after decades of nationalization and public 
sector management. Between 1990 and 2000, 130 developing countries had 
infrastructure projects with private participation, and 54 of them introduced private 
participation in at least three infrastructure sectors. During that decade developing 
country governments transferred to the private sector the operating or construction 
risk, or both, for more than 2,300 infrastructure projects and attracted investment 
commitments of almost US$690 billion.^ Those projects were implemented under a 
range of schemes: management contracts, divestitures, and green-field facilities 
(build-operate-own contracts, build-operate-transfer contracts, and merchant 
facilities). 
4.2. Objectives 
So much being the stakes of infrastructure investments in the global economy there 
is a need to understand the PPPs and in that the BOT structures better with the 
principal objectives of: 
• knowing the level of private activity in infrastructure financing and 
estimating the quantum; 
• analyzing and comparing the financial characteristics, geographic, 
industrial, sectoral and regional trends; 
• understanding the type of approaches being followed and the 
concentration of different structures in different countries; 
• finding the determinants of loan pricing (spreads) for project finance and 
non- project finance loans to determine how borrower and loan specific 
factors are influencing credit spreads 
Data captured after analysis from the Loanware database provided by Capital DATA, London which 
records historical information on virtually the entire population of syndicated loans under BOT basis 
in the international market 
^ Data sourced from PPI Project Database of World Bank which records total investments in 
infrastructure projects with private participation 
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• - ^y 
To my knowledge, there has not been any full-scale empirical study^of^projept-'^ 
finance more precisely PPPs and BOT schemes done by analyzing the population 
data, that has yet been published. This research seeks to remedy the empirical gap 
and has four principal objectives mentioned above. Authentic and innovative ways of 
data collection by accessing international databases on the domain of infrastructure 
financing has been employed. 
4.3. Data Sourcing - The PPI project Database and Loanware 
Database 
The global databases in the most relevant and congruent areas to the research has 
been pursued and two principal data sources have been used in this study. 
4.3.1 PPI Project Database 
The first is the PPI Project Database provided by the World Bank which records 
total investment in infrastructure projects with private participation (not private 
investment alone). Investment commitments that find place in the database include 
expenditures on facility expansion, divestiture revenues, and license or canon fees 
paid by private sponsors to governments. The data include 47 projects that were 
cancelled by 2000, which account for US$19 billion in investment commitments. 
Infrastructure projects tracked by the PPI Project Database are: 
• Under construction projects for which assets are being built 
• Operational projects that have started providing services to the public 
• Cancelled projects from which the private sector has exited in one of the 
following ways: 
o Selling or transferring its economic interest back to the government 
o Removing all management and personnel from the concern. 
The Database classifies Private infrastructure Projects in four Categories: 
• Management and Lease Contracts. 
• Concessions (or management and operation contracts with major private 
capital expenditure) 
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• Greenfield projects 
• Divestitures. 
The Database has identified Sub-Categories for each of the four types of PPI 
Projects: 
• Management and lease contract - these contracts have two types 
arrangements, which are management contract and lease contract 
• Concessions - these contracts are classified as 
o rehabilitate, operate, and transfer (BOT) 
o rehabilitate, lease or rent, and transfer (RLT) 
o build, rehabilitate, operate, and transfer (BROT) 
• Greenfield - these contracts are classified as 
o build, lease, and own (BLO) 
o build, operate, and transfer (BOT) 
o build, own, and operate (BOO) 
o merchant 
• Divestiture - these contracts have two sub-types: 
o partial 
o full 
The Data available in the database have also been grouped as segments to 
represent the following infrastructure services sub-sectors. 
Electricity - Generation, transmission and distribution 
Natural - Gas Transmission and distribution 
Telecommunications - Fixed access, mobile access, and long distance 
Airports - Runway and terminal 
Seaports - Channel dredging and terminal 
Railways - Fixed assets, freight, intercity passenger, and urban passenger 
Toll-roads - Bridge, highway, and tunnel 
Potable water - Water treatment and water distribution 
Sewerage - Sewerage treatment and sewerage collection 
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4.3.2 Loanware Database 
The second is the Loanware database provided by Capital DATA, a London based 
joint venture company betv\/een Euromoney PLC and ComputaSoft Ltd. This 
database contains detailed historical information on virtually the entire population of 
syndicated loans and related banking instruments booked on national and 
international capital markets from Jan1 1980 through March 23 1999. The conpany 
informs that an updated Database is yet to be released but as this research car't wait 
it was decided to use the currently available one. While the Loanware Database file 
contains information on both signed and unsigned loans, the study examines only 
loans that are actually agreed to by contracting parties (signed loans), though it 
includes roughly one-eighth of all loans that are subsequently cancelled as to the 
passage of time. It also requires that the loan size (in dollar US millions) be 
available. After applying these two screens, it is able to examine the total of 90,784 
loans (worth $13 trillion), of which 4956 loans (worth $ 634.40 billion) have a loan 
purpose code of 'Project Finance'. As discussed earlier Project Finance, is usually 
defined as limited or non-recourse financing of a newly to be developed project 
through the establishment of a (separately Incorporated) vehicle company. Thus the 
distinguishing feature of project finance (PF) are, first, the creditors share much of 
the venture's business risk and second, that funding is obtained strictly for the project 
itself without the expectation that the corporate or the government-sponsor will co-
insure the project's debt-or at least not fully. The researcher cross checks with the 
database company Capital DATA' to verity that this screen refers to loan made to a 
Special Purpose Vechicle (SPV) company. After getting confirmation the study 
names this as "full project finance loan sample" while the larger dataset is named as 
"all syndicated loan sample". 
The Loanware database is slightly more detailed and using a comprehensive sample 
of over 90,000 syndicated loans (worth over $13 trillion) booked on international 
capital markets since 1980, it is possible to compare the financial characteristics, 
geographic and industrial distribution of 4956 project finance loans with various non-
project finance loan sub-samples and with the full sample of all syndicated loans. 
Being a comprehensive database on Project Finance lending it is more aligned to our 
research need. That apart with the detailed construct that are available in the 
database even spread analysis could be possible with the data, and for this 
statistical (OLS regression) analyses of the determinants of loan pricing (spreads) for 
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Project finance and non- project finance loans to determine how borrower and loan specific 
factors influences credit spreads liave been attempted. 
4.4 Analysis of Private Investment Flows 
The analyses with the help of the two databases throws up interesting observations. 
Analysis with PPI Project database on Investment flows shows that the infrastructure 
projects with private participation boomed in 1990-97, rising from US$17 billion a year to 
US$128 billion (Figure 4.1). They then declined by 15 percent in 1998 and 30 percent in 
1999 as a result of the 1998-99 financial crises in developing countries. Investment flows 
grew by roughly 19 percent in 2000. 
Region and sectoral analysis of investment flows shows that infrastructure investments in 
Europe and Central Asia accounted for much of the recovery in 2000 (Table 4.1). In that 
region investment flows grew from less than US$10 billion in 1999 to more than US$22 
billion in 2000, driven mainly by mobile telecommunications licenses and by large power 
plants in Turkey. Private activity in East Asia and Pacific also contributed to the recovery. 
Investment flows in the region increased from less than US$17 billion in 1999 to almost 
US$20 billion in 2000, driven mainly by electricity generation and transport projects. In Latin 
America and the Caribbean private activity dropped from US$38 billion in 1999 to US$37 
billion in 2000. 
Figure 4.1 
Investment in infrastructure projects with private participation in developing countries, 1990-
2000. 
{2000US$ billion) 
•Seriesi 
Electricity and transport, which suffered most from the financial crises of 1998-99, 
led the revival of private activity in 2000. After falling from US$24 billion in 1998 to 
US$14 billion in 1999, investment flows to electricity recovered to more than US$26 
billion in 2000, the third highest annual level in 1990-2000. In transport, investment 
flows plummeted from US$19 billion in 1998 to US$9 billion in 1999, then rose to 
US$13 billion in 2000. Private activity in telecommunications also recovered, 
although at a much slower pace. After falling from US$57 billion in 1998 to US$42 
billion in 1999, investment flows to the sector reached US$44 billion in 2000. 
Table 4.1 
Investment in infrastructure projects with private participation in developing 
countries, by region or sector, 1990-2000(2000 US$ billions) 
Region or Sector 
East Asia and Pacific 
Europe and Central Asia 
Latin America and 
the Caribbean 
Middle East and North Africa 
South Asia 
Sub- Saharan Africa 
Electricity 
Natural Gas transmission 
And distribution 
Telecommunication 
Transport 
Water and Sewerage 
Total 
1990 
2.6 
0.1 
14.2 
0.0 
0.4 
0.1 
1.2 
0.0 
6.0 
10.0 
0.0 
17.3 
1991 
4.1 
0.3 
12.4 
0.0 
0.8 
0.0 
1.3 
0.0 
13.1 
3.2 
0.1 
17.7 
1992 
9.3 
1.3 
15.8 
0.0 
0.1 
0.1 
8.7 
3.8 
7.6 
4.5 
1.9 
26.5 
1993 
14.2 
1.6 
18.6 
3.5 
1.3 
0.0 
10.8 
4.5 
10.6 
5.6 
7.7 
39.2 
1994 
18.0 
4.2 
18.7 
0.3 
3.3 
0.8 
14.3 
1.8 
19.7 
8.6 
0.5 
44.9 
1995 
24.4 
9.1 
19.2 
0.1 
4.3 
0.8 
20.3 
4.0 
20.3 
11.7 
1.7 
58.0 
1996 1997 
32.7 40.5 
12.1 15.3 
28.0 52.8 
0.4 5.4 
7.2 8.9 
1.5 4.6 
30.9 47.3 
2.9 3.3 
29.3 47.0 
16.9 21.1 
1.9 9.0 
81.9 127.6 
1998 
12.2 
12.5 
75.1 
3.5 
2.7 
2.6 
23.9 
6.3 
56.0 
19.4 
2.3 
108.9 
1999 
16.5 
9.8 
37.9 
2.7 
4.4 
4.6 
14.0 
3.6 
42.3 
9.2 
6.8 
76.0 
2000 
19.9 
22.2 
36.6 
4.3 
4.6 
3.1 
26.4 
2.2 
44.4 
13.2 
4.5 
90.7 
Total 
194.2 
88.6 
329.2 
20.3 
37.9 
18.2 
199.1 
32.4 
297.2 
123.6 
36.5 
688.7 
Data Source : PPI Project Database 
4.4.1 Regional Trends 
Latin America and the Caribbean and East Asia and Pacific led the developing 
regions charge in the private infrastructure activity in 1990-2000 as could be seen 
from Figure 4.2. Latin America and the Caribbean accounted for 48 percent of the 
investment commitments in infrastructure projects with private participation, while 
East Asia and Pacific represented 28 percent. Europe and Central Asia, in third 
place, captured 13 percent. The other regions also opened infrastructure sectors to 
private participation in 1990-2000. Investment flows to private infrastructure projects 
in South Asia added up to US$38 billion, 5 percent of the total in developing 
81 
countries. In the Middle East and North Africa investment in private infrastructure projects 
totaled US$20 billion, while in Sub-Saharan Africa it amounted to US$18 billion. Each of 
these regions accounted for 3 percent of total investment 
Figure 4.2 
Cumulative investment in infrastructure projects with private participation in 
Developing countries by region, 1990-2000 
(Total US$ 689 billion) 
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4.4.2 Sectoral Trends 
Telecommunications and electricity led the growth in private activity in developing countries 
in 1990-2000 (figure 4.3). During this period 108 developing countries opened their 
telecommunications sector to private activity, raising US$297 billion in investment, 43 
percent of the total investment in private infrastructure projects. And 79 developing countries 
introduced private participation in electricity, which accounted for US$199 billion in 
investment flows, 29 percent of the total. In transport, the third most active sector in the past 
decade, 64 developing countries awarded projects to the private sector. Transport attracted 
US$124 billion in investment commitments, 18 percent of the total. 
In water and sewerage — where technological change has been less pronounced, 
political barriers to reform can be strong, and sub-national governments often play a major 
role—private activity grew more slowly. Thirty-seven developing countries allowed private 
participation in the sector, which accounted for investment flows of US$37 billion, 5 percent 
of the total. In addition, eight developing economiesawarded 11 multi-sector projects that 
combined the provision of electricity and water services. These projects involved investment 
commitments of US$6 billion. 
Figure 4.3 
Cumulative investment in infrastructure projects with private participation in 
Developing countries by Sector 1990-2000 
(Total US$ 689 billion) 
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4.4.3 industrial and Geographic distribution of project finance loans 
A similar analysis with the full project finance and all syndicated loan samples from the 
Loanware Database are described in Tables 4.2 and Table 4.3. Table 4.2 presents the 
industrial distribution of the full sample of all loans and the project finance sample, while 
Table 4.3 presents the geographic distribution of both loan samples. 
Table 4.2 
INDUSTRIAL DISTRIBUTION OF PROJECT FINANCE AND ALL SYNDICATED LOANS 
Industrial 
category of 
borrower 
Commercial 
&industrial 
Chemicals, plastic 
& rubber 
Communications 
Construction 
/heavy engineering 
Forest 
products/packaging 
Hotels & Leisure 
Mining & natural 
resources 
Motorway operator 
Oil & gas 
Petrochemicals 
Steel & Aluminium 
Utilities 
Project finance loans 
Number 
of 
loans 
3,136 
105 
241 
222 
135 
298 
300 
117 
631 
147 
215 
1,063 
Total 
value of 
loans 
US$ 
million 
$386,862 
8,891 
51,126 
15,477 
15,219 
20,628 
28,030 
14,642 
119,513 
24,975 
23,488 
$140,609 
Percent 
of total 
value 
61.0 
1.4 
8.1 
2.4 
2.4 
3.3 
4.4 
2.3 
18.8 
3.9 
3.7 
22.2 
All syndicated loans 
Number 
of 
loans 
59,612 
2,340 
2,237 
1,434 
1,988 
1,992 
1,452 
342 
6,061 
470 
2,098 
4,644 
Total value 
of loans 
US$ million 
$8,391,648 
321,100 
510,242 
75,751 
299,979 
255,184 
191,219 
28,636 
1,165,320 
89,359 
199,275 
$808,306 
Percent 
of total 
value 
63.1 
2.4 
3.8 
0.6 
2.3 
1.9 
1.4 
0.2 
8.8 
0.7 
1.5 
6,1 
Electricity/ energy 
utility 
Financial 
institutions 
Transportation 
Transport (ex. 
Airlines, stilp) 
Government / 
Agencies 
Government/ 
Authority 
Ottier 
Total of All items 
1,009 
167 
143 
112 
399 
302 
48 
4,956 
136,520 
$21,828 
$48,677 
46,788 
$30,602 
23,333 
$5,844 
$634,422 
21.5 
3.4 
7.7 
7.4 
4.8 
3.7 
0.9 
100.0 
3,942 
14,051 
5,781 
1,870 
3,979 
2,463 
2,716 
90,783 
714,073 
$2,461,411 
711,028 
319,180 
674,869 
488,359 
251,211 
$13,298,457 
5.4 
18.5 
5.4 
2.4 
5.1 
3.7 
1.9 
100.0 
Both tables reveal striking differences between project finance lending and more 
traditional syndicated lending and these differences largely verify the standard picture 
of project finance. Table 4.2 shows that project finance loans are highly 
concentrated in five key industries, whereas the general population of syndicated 
loans reveals a far less concentrated industrial pattern. 
No less than 60.2% of all project lending (by value) and 46.3% of all project finance 
loans are made to borrowers in the communications, mining and natural resources, 
oil and gas, electricity and energy utility and transportation (excluding airlines and 
shipping) industries. These industries account for only 21.8% of all syndicated 
lending (value) and a mere 17.1% of all syndicated loans. 
Table 4.3 
GEOGRAf^HIC DISTRIBUTION OF PROJECT FINANCE AND ALL SYNDICATED LOANS 
Geographic 
location of 
borrower 
Supranational 
North 
America 
United states 
Western 
europe 
United 
kingdom 
Eastern 
Europe 
Middle east 
Turkey 
Africa 
Project finance loans 
Number 
of 
loans 
5 
850 
727 
673 
306 
276 
501 
198 
196 
Total 
value of 
loans 
US$ 
million 
$848 
$126,155 
106,561 
$157,223 
91,751 
$22,046 
$59,286 
14,468 
$12,563 
Percent 
of total 
value 
0.1 
19.9 
16.8 
24.8 
14.5 
3.5 
9.3 
2.3 
2.0 
All syndicated loans 
Number 
of 
loans 
313 
53,694 
51,401 
15,173 
6,109 
1,623 
2,094 
813 
930 
Total value 
of loans 
US$ 
million 
$31,896 
$8,623,762 
8,169,735 
$2,613,371 
1,230,149 
$156,291 
$217,619 
54,808 
$60,549 
0.2 
64.9 
61.4 
19.7 
9.3 
1.2 
1.6 
0.4 
0.5 
84 
Indian sub 
continent 
South east 
asia 
Cfiina 
Hong kong 
Indonesia 
South korea 
malaysia 
Thailand 
Australia 
Spacific 
Australia 
Latin America 
Caribbean 
Other 
Total, all 
items 
157 
1,503 
450 
134 
260 
120 
139 
154 
246 
227 
496 
52 
1 
4956 
$11,729 
$151,004 
29,810 
21,689 
33,210 
8,.15 
17,477 
17,748 
$37,500 
36,221 
$52,342 
$3,646 
$79 
$634,422 
1.9 
23.8 
4.7 
3.4 
5.2 
1.3 
2.8 
2.8 
5.9 
5.7 
8.3 
0.6 
0.01 
100.0 
967 
9,780 
1,467 
1,553 
1,392 
1,662 
841 
1,128 
2,266 
1,853 
3,303 
596 
44 
90,783 
$58,459 
$688,046 
89,719 
147,766 
91,912 
85,332 
64,965 
64,867 
$395,197 
349,251 
$370,542 
$78,816 
$3,920 
$13,298,457 
0.4 
5.2 
0.7 
1.1 
0.7 
0.6 
0.5 
0.5 
3.0 
2.6 
2.8 
0.6 
0.03 
100.0 
This finding is consistent with the received wisdom that project finance is used 
primarily to fund tangible asset-rich and capital intensive projects with relatively 
transparent (often hard-currency) cash flows. This conclusion is reinforced by the 
observation that all of the other "over-represented" industries for project finance 
lending (i.e., construction/ heavy engineering, hotels and leisure, petrochemicals) can 
be described similarly. While we can see lot of similarities in the industrial/ sectoral 
distribution aspects in the analyses with these two databases, the geographical 
distribution of the analyses throws up a very different picture as seen in Table 4.3. 
Table 4.3 presents a revealing difference between the countries which attract project 
finance lending and those where other types of syndicated credits are directed. 
Whereas the bulk of general syndicated lending is concentrated in the United States 
(61.4% by value and 56.6% of all loans), only 16.8% of project finance lending and 
only 14.7% of project finance loans go to US borrowers. The biggest recipient of 
project finance lending is South east Asia. This region accounts for 23.8% of the 
total value-and no less than 30.3% of the total number of project finance loans, 
whereas it accounts for a mere 5.2% of the value (and 10.8% of the number) of all 
syndicated lending. Closer analysis reveals that project finance lending to 
Southeast Asia peaked in 1996, and has fallen dramatically since then, but this 
region was the heart and soul of project finance lending for almost a decade 
prior to the date-with Indonesia and China being the two favorite target 
countries. Intriguingly, UK borrowers are more heavily represented in the project 
finance sample than in full syndicated loan sample (14.5% by value versus 9.3%), 
although the rest of western Europe accounts for an almost identical fraction (10.3 
85 
versus 10.4%) of both types of lending. This preference of project finance lenders for 
British borrowers is not merely an artifact of the disproportionately large Eurotunnel 
loans (discussed below). It also reflects the emphasis placed by the conservative 
Thatcher and Major governments (and now the Labour government of Tony Blair) on 
the private rather than public financing of large infrastructure projects-many of which 
have proven to be remarkably successful, both financially and operationally. As a 
whole, these geographic lending patterns are consistent with the widely held belief 
that project finance is a particularly appropriate method of funding projects in 
relatively risky (non OECD) countries. 
4.4.4 Differing Approaches 
It can be seen from the regional/ geographical analysis of the two databases, that 
while Latin America and the Caribbean led the developing regions charge in the 
private infrastructure as per PPI Project Database, it is the South East Asia 
which was the biggest recipient of Project Finance lending as per the 
Loanware Database. This marked difference can be attributed to the different 
approaches used for private participation in infrastructure. Figure 4.4 drawn 
from PPI data establishes that Latin America and Europe and Central Asia 
focused on divestitures and management and operation contracts with major 
capital expenditure (that is, concessions). These were part of deeper sectoral 
reforms aimed at redefining the role of the state and putting infrastructure on a more 
commercial footing. Divestitures and concessions accounted for 78 percent of total 
investment in private infrastructure projects in Latin America and 70 percent in 
Europe and Central Asia. 
East and South Asia emphasized creating new assets through greenfield 
projects (normally referred to as Project Finance through BOX schemes et a!) 
that serve or complement public sector providers, with less attention to deeper 
or broader sectoral reforms. Greenfield projects accounted for 57 percent of 
investment in private infrastructure projects in East Asia and 86 percent in South Asia 
in 1990-2000. 
4.4.5 Country Concentrations 
Further analysis reveals that Middle-income economies captured most of the 
investment flows to private infrastructure projects in developing countries. By 2000, 
29 of the 30 upper-middle-income countries had private participation in infrastructure; 
these accounted for 59 percent of total investment flows and 38 percent of projects in 
1990-2000. Lower-middle-income countries also had significant private participation, with 
44 of them attracting 30 percent of total investment over the period. 
Figure 4.4 
Investment In infrastructure projects with private participation In developing countries, by region and 
type of project, 1990-2000. 
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Private participation in infrastructure also spread rapidly among low-income countries. In the 
first half of the 1990s only 30 low-income countries opened their infrastructure sectors to 
private participation. By 2000, however, 57 low-income countries had awarded private 
infrastructure projects, and 16 had private participation in three or four sectors. In 1990-
2000 low-income countries accounted for 11 percent of total investment flows and 18 
percent of projects. But these numbers probably understate the private activity in low-
income countries. The data exclude small-scale private providers, which often play a 
relatively large role in these countries (for example, small power suppliers in Cambodia and 
Yemen and private water vendors in most developing countries). Despite the rapid spread of 
private activity in infrastructure, a few developing countries garnered most of the investment. 
4.4.6 Ranking as per PPI 
The top 10 ranked by investment in projects with private participation accounted 
for 68 percent of total investment and 48 percent of projects in 1990-2000. This top 10 list 
consists of the largest developing economies, such as Argentina, Brazil, China, India, the 
Republic of Korea, and Mexico (Figure 4.5). When investment is expressed in per capita 
terms, however, the top 10 list changes substantially. Measuring private 
participation in infrastructure this way ranks several small economies—such as 
Belize, Estonia, and Panama—among the most active countries. 
Figure 4.5 
Top 10 developing countries by total investment in 
infrastructure projects with private participation, 
1990-2000 
Total Investment 
Country (2000 UsS billions) Project 
Brazil 
Argentina 
Mexico 
China 
Malaysia 
Philippines 
Korea,Rep. of 
Indonesia 
India 
Thailand 
Total for 
top 10 
123 
78 
55 
51 
34 
32 
30 
27 
25 
21 
474 
195 
163 
128 
253 
59 
65 
24 
60 
110 
68 
1,125 
4.4.7 Characteristics of the largest project finance deals 
Table 4.4 constructed from the Loanware database presents key details of the 15 
largest project finance loan packages arranged since 1980. These are listed by the 
total value of the project, since some packages have as many as four separate loan 
tranches-which are listed separately, with their corresponding financial information, 
within each project's cell in the table. There are a total of 34 loans associated with 
these 15 project finance packages. The infamous Eurotunnel project has the 
distinction of being both the largest and second largest project financing in history, 
though the $13.2 billion loan in June 1990 was only a refinancing of the original $7.9 
billion loan package arranged in August 1987. These 15 deals reveal many of the 
key features commonly associated with the project finance. 
Project sponsors are usually well-known international operating companies, state-
owned enterprises, and/or governmental bodies that are joint together through 
ownership of the vehicle company and by the supplemental project financing 
contractual agreements. Further, the loans themselves tend to be relatively long-
term credits, and are priced at the fixed spread above a benchmark interest rate, 
typically the London inter-bank offered rate (LIBOR). Another distinctive feature of 
these loans is that they frequently include a loan tranche that is fully or partially 
guaranteed by credit worthy third party, usually a developed country's export credit 
agency (though the world bank is a frequent guarantor of smaller project finance 
loans in this database). 
Table 4.4 
FINANCIAL DETAILS OF THE FIFTEEN LARGEST PROJECT FINANCE 
DEALS SINCE 1980. 
Loan(s)launch date Loan(s) 
size/SUS 
M 
Borrower name(s) Project location Loan 
term(years) 
Spread 
LIBOR 
Basis 
points 
Third 
party 
guarantee 
Sponsor names Loan purpose 
Jun90 513,204 Eurotunnel 
plc/SA;durotunnel 
ltd;eurotunnel finance 
SA 
UK/france 20yrs 175.0bp None 
Refinancing &increased Rinding for cross-channel tunnel 
link 
Aug 87(canc 90) S6,3I9 
SI,580 
Eurotunnel ple/SA UK/france 18yrs 
18yrs 
108,3bp 
141.7bp 
Original eurotunnel financing 
Mar 93 $5,530 Formosa plastics 
corp.LISA;nanya 
plastics corp;formost 
chemicals &fibre; 
Formosa 
pharmaceuticals 
Taiwan 15yrs 75,0bp 
Constract petro-chemical project and port complex in 
yunlin province. Largest Taiwanese syndicated loan. 
Feb 93 $1,995 
$1,600 
$300 
S)70 
$100 
Qatar liquefied gas 
Co.ltd. 
Qatar 12yrs 
9yrs 
9yrs 
9yrs 
70.0bp 
165.0bp 
MITl 
COFACE 
Qatar general petroleum;marubeni;LNG project in 
Qalar.milsui; mobil corp;TOTAL 
Develop S6 bn north field Ras laffan 
Nov 95 $2,598 
$1,102 
Railtrackplc UK 5.5yrs 
5.5yrs 
27,5bp 
27.5bp 
General corporate purposes and construct thameslink 
2000 project. 
Jan98 $1,500 
$1,195 
$500 
NEXTEL 
communications 
USA 8yrs 
8yrs 
200.0bp 
200.0bp 
To build firm's nationwide digital mobile radio network 
and working capital. 
Sep 97 $2,168 
$642 
Hutchison 
telecommunication; 
UK 8yrs 
8yrs 
lOO.Obp 
lOO.Obp 
Refinancing of earlier project financing . 
Jan 97 $2,734 Bouygues telecom France lOyrs 130.0bp 
Bouygues decaux telecom;bouygues SA;cable &wireless; 
US west; faber;BNP-banexi 
Nationwide rollout of borrower's mobile phone 
franchise. 
Jul 96 51,281 
51,036 
Athens international 
airport 
Greece HERMES 
89 
1 $403 1 
-
AUG 97 $1,363 
$1,223 
Alliance pipeline LP 
IPL energy inc;weslcoast energy inc . 
JAN 97 
-
MAR 92 
$2,500 
$770 
$690 
$500 
$482 
Rossijkoje a/o gazprom 
Castle peak 
power CO. ltd 
China light &power (CLP power);Exxon corp. 
1 - 1 - 1 
CONSTRUCTION OF NEW ATHENS AIRPORT. 
Canada lOyrs 
lOyrs 
120.0bp 
120.0bp 
Construct pipeline to carry natural gas from british 
Columbia to Chicago hub. 
Russia 8yrs 200.0bp 
-
Construct pipeline linking yamal gas fields with europe 
Hong kong 20yrs 
13.1yrs 
20yrs 
20yrs 
62.5bp 
53.9bp 
75.0bp 
ECGD 
COFACE 
US EXIM 
Construct black point power station at castle peak in hong kong. 
NOV 93 
-
MAY 97 
Si,700 
$720 
$1,200 
$581 
$387 
$232 
Republic of lorea; 
seoul-pusan 
High-speed rail 
Loy yang power 
projects pty ltd 
CMS generation co; NRG energy Inc 
JUN90 $2,324 Midland 
cogeneration 
venture LP 
CMS Energy;dow chem.;fluor ;panhandle eastm; 
coastal Corp. 
i 1 
korea i7.5yrs 
15yrs 
75.0bp 
56.0bp 
COFACE 
Purchase TGV trains for seoul-pusan rail link 
Australia 15yrs 
lOyrs 
6yrs 
-
Purchase of loy yang power station. Coal mine&other assets 
from loy vang,.whoJlv-owned by state of viclora. 
USA 25yrs 
Construct 1,370 MW cogeneration facility in midland,MI. 
1 1 1 
Perhaps the most telling difference between the large project finance loans detailed 
in table 4.4 and more traditional syndicated credits is the use to which they are put. 
Whereas most non project finance loans are arranged to finance acquisitions or 
Leveraged By-Outs (LBOs), to refinance existing financing facility, or for general 
corporate purposes, all of the large project finance loan packages are associated 
with specific construction projects-though two are refinancing of earlier credits. 
Among the 15 project finance loans we find parallel to table 4.2, that the main 
applications of project finance is in communication, transportation and power. Once 
again, the received wisdom regarding project finance rings true: at least the largest 
such loan packages are complex, international financial deals involving a vehicle 
company owned by multiple sponsors, and are arranged to fund development of 
large, tangible-asset-based projects. The loans are often guaranteed by third parties 
(though the entire package rarely is-only individual loan tranches), and the projects 
are often located in relatively risky countries. We now turn to a direct comparison of 
project finance loans with various sub-samples of non project finance loans, 
categorised by their intended use. 
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4.4.8 Characteristics of project finance Vs non- project finance loans 
Panel A of Table 4.5 presents basic financial characteristics for the full sample of all 
syndicated loans, the full sample of the project finance loans, and four additional, non 
overlapping samples of syndicated loans classified by loan purpose. Those are : (i) 
The category of Corporate Control (CC) loans which are arranged to fund 
acquisitions, leveraged buyouts, or employee stock option plans; (ii) Capital 
Structure (CS) loans are those booked in order to repay maturing lines of credit or 
for re-capitalisation, share repurchases, debtor in possession financing, stand by 
commercial paper support, or other (unspecified) refinancing; (ill) Fixed Asset-
Based (FAB) loans are intended for mortgage lending or to fund purchase of 
aircraft, property or shipping; and the (iv) General Corporate Purpose (GCP) loans 
category which includes loans with that as their stated purpose, as well as credits 
with an empty loan purpose code. Loans with other purposes or not grouped here 
into a separate category, though they are included in the full sample of syndicated 
loans. This categorisation strategy, though admittedly ad hoc, effectively groups 
together loans having similar corporate purposes and provides a manageable set of 
loan type samples that can be directly compared to each other. 
Panel A of table 4 reveals striking-and highly significant-differences both between 
project finance and non project finance loans, as well as between the various 
categories of non project finance loans. One of the most dramatic findings is how 
much larger are CC and CS loans than other loan types. These credits have mean 
(median) values of $212 million ($59 million) and $209 million ($65 million), 
respectively, as compared to $146 million ($50 million) for the full population of all 
syndicated loans and a mere $88 million ($50 million) for FAB loans. The converse 
of this result, is the surprising finding that project finance loans are an average, $18 
million smaller than the general population of syndicated loans ($128 million versus 
$146 million), though the median for the finance loan size is $2 million greater ($52 
million versus $50 million). These relative size differences remain even when size is 
expressed as the total value of all loan tranches rather than as individual loans. 
While the size difference between project finance and CC loans can perhaps be 
explained away by stressing that the latter involves purchasing an entire company, 
the fact remains that the project finance loans or not abnormally large financing 
vehicles-but rather fall well within the mainstream of syndicated lending. 
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Table 4.5 
CHARACTERISTICS OF PROJECT FINANCE Vs OTHER SYNDICATED 
LOAN SAMPLE 
Variable of interest AIJ 
syndicated 
loans 
PANEL A:ALL LOANS WITH 
Number of loans 
Total 
volume,$USm:avg 
Loan size 
$USm:avg 
Median 
Minimum 
Maximum 
Average 
maturity,years 
Loans with fixed 
price (%) 
Loans priced vs 
LIBOR(%) 
Loans to US 
Borrowers(%) 
90,783 
13,298,457 
146 
50 
0.003 
15,000 
4.8 
5.9 
69.5 
55.8 
Project 
finance 
loans 
Corporate 
control 
loans 
General 
corporate 
purpose 
loans 
Capital 
structure 
loans 
Fixed 
asset 
based 
loans 
$US AMOUNT AVAILABLE 
4.956 
634,422 
128 
52 
0.011 
13,204 
8.6 
13.9 
38.8 
13.9 
10,795 
2,292,431 
212 
59 
0.067 
14,000 
5.1 
2.7 
84.6 
68.8 
PANEL B: HIGH-INFORMATION LOANS WF 
Number of 
loans* 
Total 
volume,$USm* 
Loan size, 
$USm:avg 
Median* 
Average 
number of 
tranches 
Avg spread 
over LIBOR, bp 
Average 
maturity, years 
Avg no. of 
syndicate banks 
Average fee 
levels, bp 
40,073 
8,120,791 
203 
70 
1.7 
134 
4.8 
10.7 
1,824 
322,870 
177 
70 
2.0 
130 
8.6 
14.5 
6,266 
1,709,683 
273 
85 
2.4 
195 
5.2 
11.9 
Initial | 30.8 | 36.9 | 39.5 
39,653 
4,275,803 
108 
39 
0.003 
7,737 
4.5 
4.9 
66.2 
50.3 
rn SPREA] 
15,617 
2,038,268 
131 
50 
1.4 
113 
4.6 
9.4 
28.0 
25,313 
5,289,793 
209 
65 
0.012 
15,000 
3.9 
3.9 
70.8 
74.0 
4,680 
410,175 
88 
50 
0.050 
4,330 
6.2 
6.2 
72.5 
20.4 
DS Vs LIBOR 
13,464 
3,759,693 
279 
100 
1.7 
135 
4.1 
11.5 
1,468 
130,824 
109 
60 
1.5 
86 
7.7 
9.6 
30.8 20.2 
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commitment fee 
Max 
participation fee 
Loans in US 
dollars (%) 
Loans to US 
borrowers(%) 
Loans with 
currency 
risk(%)' 
Loans with 
covenants(%) 
Average 
country risk 
score* 
Average 
country risk 
rank 
Loans with 
guarantees(%) 
Loans to 
collateralizeable 
Asset-rich 
borrowers(%) 
36.9 
86.8 
56.9 
33.1 
30.5 
90.0 
12.8 
13.3 
14.2 
56.3 
77.7 
11.6 
72.9 
3.4 
74.6 
31.8 
34.1 
27.7 
56.1# 
84.5 
76.8 
10.5 
41.6 
95.4 
5.2 
6.8 
8.5 
30.7 
85.6 
44.30 
45.3 
21.3 
87.3 
16.3 
1.43 
12.4 
31.6 
90.6 
74.3 
18.2 
42.4 
94.1 
7.4 
9.9 
11.9 
37.2 
78.9# 
13.4# 
7I.0# 
7.1 
82.7 
21.3 
34.5# 
69.5 
* indicates that the t-test has not been applied to these variables. 
# indicates that based on a two sample t-test assuming unequal variances, the 
difference between the value for this loan type and the value for project finance 
loans is not significant at the 5% significance level. All other values are statistically 
significant at the 5% level or higher. 
According to all four of the remaining variables in fable 4.5's Panel A, however 
project finance loans are substantially different financial instruments. The average 
maturity of project finance loans, 8.6 years is almost twice that of the full population 
of syndicated loans, and is comparable only to the 8.1 year average of FAB loans. 
Additionally, compared to the overall sample of syndicated loans and most of the 
sub-samples, project finance loans are more than twice as likely to be fixed rate 
credits (13.9% versus 5.9%). Further, those project finance loans that are priced as 
a floating rate use LIBOR as a pricing base far less frequently (38.8%) than the full 
syndicated loan sample (69.5%). Perhaps the single most remarkable difference 
between project finance and non project finance loans is how infrequently project 
finance loans are extended to US borrowers. Whereas American corporations (and 
occasionally, the governmental units) arrange 55.8% of all syndicated loans, by 
value and account for fully 74.0% of CS lending, US borrowers account for a mere 
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13.9% of PF lending. The only other category of loans with a similar non US flavour 
are the FAB credits, which can be seen to share many important characteristics with 
project finance loans. 
4.5 Loan Pricing Samples 
As mentioned initially one of the most important objectives of this study is to 
determine whether project finance loans are more or less expensive for borrowers 
than other types of loans. To address this issue, the study selects from the sample 
of all syndicated loans those credits which are both priced as floating rate loans and 
which use LIBOR as a base interest rate. It was also screened for complete data on 
borrower nationality and loan currency denomination. These screens yield a set of 
"highly information" loan samples with comparable pricing data expressed, in basis 
points, as spreads above LIBOR. These are presented in panel B of table 4.5, 
beginning with the full sample of 40,073 high- information syndicated loans. The 
various loan purpose sub-samples are presented next, beginning with the 1,824 
project finance loans priced as a spread over LIBOR. 
In addition to the variables discussed earlier, the table 4.5's Panel B presents several 
new loan structure variables as well as greater detail about borrowers and the use for 
which a loan is arranged. Most of these are self-explanatory (i.e., fee levels, number 
of banks in a syndicate, loans with guarantees), but a few require definition. For the 
analysis a loan has been defined as having currency risk if the denomination of the 
loan (and its currency of repayment) differs from the currency of the borrowers home 
country. Thus as Japanese borrower arranging a $ loan would be subject to 
currency risks, whereas the same borrower arranging Yen nominated loan would not 
be. Country risk rank and country risk score are taken directly from the semi-annual 
country risk tabulation in Euromoney magazine. A low risk country will have very low 
rank but a very high score. While both the risk rank and risk scores are presented 
in panel B, in the interest of space the later reports only empirical results using 
country risk rank, since this is the only risk measure reported by Euromoney during 
the 1980-1982 period. 
The variable loans with covenants indicates whether the loan agreement legally 
imposes any of the standard positive or negative covenants on the borrower. Since 
this variable suffers from a missing value problem (that is, an empty cell may mean 
94 
either that the loan as no-covenants or that that the data is unavailable), we report it 
simply as the fraction of each loan type with covenants included. Finally, the variable 
loans to collateralizeable asset rich borrowers is a dummy variable coded as 1 if the 
'borrower is operating in an industry generally believed to be rich in non-specialised, 
tangible (and thus collateralizeable) assets. Specifically, this means that the loan 
recipient has a business borrower code of airlines, apartment management, 
electricity utility, hotels and leisure, property, or shipping. Both the theoretical and 
empirical capital structure literature suggests that the companies with many such 
assets should be able to tolerate heavier debt levels than other companies. Panel B 
of table 4.5 also shows based on t-tests, comparing the values of each variable in the 
high-information project finance loan sample with the corresponding values in the 
(high-information) all syndicated loan sample and in the other four loan purpose sub-
sampies-that almost all differences between the project finance sample values and 
the corresponding values for loan categories are statistically significant. 
Most of the non-price variables detailed in Panel B clearly suggests that project 
finance loans are often similar to fixed asset based loans (FAB), but are otherwise 
fundamentally different financial instruments from other loan types. As before, a far 
lower fraction of both the project finance and FAB loans are arranged for US 
borrowers (11.6 and 13.4%) than is true for the overall sample and of all syndicated 
loans (56.9%), and these loans also have much longer average maturity (8.6 and 7.7 
yrs versus 4.8 yrs). Additionally, project finance loans and FAB loans are much more 
likely to be subject to currency risk than are other loan types (72.9 and 71.0% for 
project finance and FAB loans, respectively, versus 33.1% for all syndicated loans). 
Given the non-US nature of typical project finance and FAB borrowers, coupled with 
the fact that syndicated loans are overwhelmingly dollar-denominated, this high-level 
of currency risk is not surprising. Furthermore, a significantly larger fraction of project 
finance and FAB loans carry third party guarantees (34.1% and 34.5% respectively) 
than of the full sample of all syndicated loans (13.3%) or any other sub-sample. 
Project finance and FAB loans share one other intriguing (and surprising), common 
feature-they are far less likely to contain loan covenants than are all other loan types. 
Only 3.4% of project finance loans, and 7.1% of FAB loans have at least one positive 
or negative loan covenants versus 13.5% of all syndicated credits and 42.4% of 
capital structure loans. The researcher is frankly at a loss to explain why the FAB 
loans have so few covenants-unless these are primarily mortgages, specifically tied 
to individual assets, which give creditors senior enough position not to require 
95 
separate loan covenants. However, two possible explanations for the absence of 
covenants for project finance loans- from received wisdom suggests that it might be 
loaded with exquisitely detailed contractual provisions. First, since this database 
details project finance loans, rather than the full financial deals themselves, it is likely 
that the explicit debt covenants or project finance packages are covered by a 
separate contract (the project financing package). So the project finance loans 
themselves are simply one part of the much larger deal. No such separate contract 
governs a take over loan or a debt refinancing credit extended to an operating 
company, however so in those cases the covenants are included in the loans 
themselves. The second hypothesis really has greater implications for general 
corporate finance then for a project finance study, though the separate incorporation 
feature of project finance is central to its logic. Since loan covenants are designed in 
part to protect the creditor from assets substitution and other methods incl. 
expropriation by the borrower, it follows that these clauses are far less necessary for 
loans to a special-purpose vehicle company than they are for loans made to a 
complex, multi-divisional corporation. 
For three of the characteristics detailed in panel B, project finance and FAB loans 
differ significantly from each other-though they remain more similar than in 
comparison to other loan categories. The first two such features are the country risk 
measures, project finance loan borrowers are, on Average, located in far riskier 
countries than is the case for any other loan category. The average country risk rank 
for project finance borrowers (31.8) is significantly higher than the corresponding 
value for FAB loans (21.3), and the dramatically higher than the average risk rank for 
all syndicated loans (12.8). Using late 1998 Euromoney's scores for Country risk, 
this suggests that the typical syndicated loan is arranged for a borrower in, say 
Sweden, while a typical FAB loan would go to a borrower in Singapore, and a typical 
project finance credit would be arranged for a company in Bahrain. Average country 
risk scores for project finance, FAB and all syndicated loan borrowers (74.6,82.7 & 
90.0 respectively) tell a similar story, corresponding as they do to arranging loans for 
borrowers in Qatar, Cyprus and Australia. Clearly, project finance loans involve 
significantly greater political and economic risk than any other major category of 
syndicated credit. 
Perhaps one reason project finance loans can be made to relatively risky borrowers 
is because they are much more likely to be arranged for collateralizeable asset-rich 
project than is the case for the average syndicated loan. Over one-quarter (27.7%) of 
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project finance loans are extended for such projects, versus only 14.2% of ail 
syndicated loans. On the other hand, the fraction of FAB loans arranged for this type 
of borrower, 69.5%, is the highest of any loan category-but this is not surprising since 
this category is defined as rich in tangible assets. 
Finally, the relative pricing of project finance versus non-project finance loans is one 
of the most important and surprising, findings detailed in panel B of table 4.5 
Average loan spreads are statistically and economically significantly lower for project 
finance loans (130 basis points) than they are for CC loans (195 basis points),CS 
loans (135 basis points) and the full sample of all syndicated loans (134 basis 
points). Many observers might have predicted that project finance loans, have 
higher spreads than non-project finance loans, since loan repayment is not 
guaranteed by the projects sponsors (limited or non-recourse lending) and because 
of most projects higher perceived risk levels. 
Furthermore, the observed level of loan fees and the number of participating banks 
do provide indirect evidence that period ending may well be considered relatedly 
more risky than other types of lending or at least more difficult to arrange. The 
average levels of commitment and participation fees for project finance loans (36.9 
and 56.3 basis points, respectively) are significantly higher than the levels for the full 
sample of syndicated loans (30.8 & 36.9 basis points), as well as for a very sub 
sample except corporate control loans. Additionally, the average number of banks 
participating in project finance loans (14.5 banks) is significantly larger than the 
average for all loans (10.7 banks) and the average for every other loan sub-sample. 
These findings suggest banks must be compensated with a relatively high upfront fee 
payments to entice them to participate in project finance lending and they had 
apparently been unwilling to take as large a stake in project finance loan as they 
would be with other credits. It could also be that they wish to increase the number of 
banks participating in a project finance credit in order to spread risks over a larger 
number of banks or it could be some other reason, such as building political support. 
We will examine loan pricing more firmly in the next section, when we employ 
Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression to determine what factors influence loan 
spreads. 
Before proceeding further, the study briefly summarises the results of the Uni-variate 
comparisons between project finance loans and other loan types. Project finance 
loansr, on an average, are in the middle range of all syndicated lending in terms of 
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size and loan spreads (price). On the otiier iiand, project finance loans have much 
longer average maturity and are more likely to be fixed rather than floating rate 
credits (and are less likely to be priced relative to LIBOR if they are floating rate). 
American companies use project finance sparingly; whereas over half of all 
syndicated loans are arranged for US borrowers. One eighth of project finance loans 
are booked for American vehicle companies. In fact, the average project finance 
loan borrower resides in a much riskier country than is true for syndicated lending in 
general, and project finance lending are significantly more tikely to be arranged for 
tangible assets rich project. Finally, project finance loans show many similarities with 
FAB credits- in terms of borrower nationality, average loan size and maturity, 
frequent use of the party guarantees, and in frequent use of loan covenants. On the 
other hand, they also differ in being more expensive than FAB loans and in being 
extended to a relatively riskier and less tangible asset rich borrowers. 
4.6 Loan pricing regressions 
In this section of the chapter, we subject the various high information loan samples 
detailed in table 4.5, Panel B to OLS regression analysis. The purposes in doing this 
are two fold. First, the wish to determine which other variables detailed in table 4.5 
have significant, independent influences on loan spreads once the effects of other 
variables are accounted for; second, the wish to determine whether project finance 
loans are more or less expensive than other types of loans- after accounting for other 
factors. The academic literature contains numerous examples of loan pricing studies 
using both bank lending and publicly traded debt. The loan pricing tests employed 
here is a variant adopted from a study by J.R. Booth, both in the actual model 
estimated and in terms of the size of loans under examination. The samples used is 
however, many times larger than that used in Booth's and almost any other study on 
Loan Pricing. 
The study seeks to estimate the determinants of loan pricing using the model 
described in equation 1. The dependent variable is the loan spread above LIBOR, in 
basis points, and the independent variables are those presented and discussed in 
table 4.5. It employs standard OLS regression estimation. 
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The model estimated is: 
S p r e a d = cc+p i size+P2 maturity+p3 guarantee+P4 currency risk+Ps country risk rank+P6 
Collaterizeable assets—— > (1) 
Where: 
Size = Loan size, in US$ millions; 
Maturity = Loan maturity in years; 
Guarantee = dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the loan has a third party 
repayment guarantee and 0 otherwise; 
Currency risk (Abstract) = dummy variable taking the value of 1 if a loan is exposed 
to currency risk (the currency of the loan repayment cash flows differs from the 
borrowers home country currency), and 0 otherwise; 
Country Risk rank = An interior ranking of country risk provided by Euromoney every 
year; where low risk countries have low ranks and high-risk countries have high 
ranks; 
Collateralizeable Assets = is the variable taking the value "1 ' if the borrower is in an 
industry generally considered to be rich in collateralizeable (tangible, non-
specialised) assets, and "0' otherwise. 
The country risk rank has been used, instead of risk score, as it serves as a measure 
of country risk both because it is used for additional years, and also because it's 
measure increases with country risk perception -which lends itself to a more logical 
interpretation of the coefficient on the risk variable. For example, if rank's coefficient 
value is for this is 1.50, it implies that the loan book would be of a borrower in a 
country with the risk ranking of 40 and will on average have a spread of 15 basis 
points higher than a loan to the borrower in a country with a rank of 30. 
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Table 4.6 
LOAN PRICING REGRESSIONS FOR DIFFERENT LOAN SAMPLES 
Loan type 
Number of 
observations 
Adjusted R 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES 
Intercept 
Loansize 
(US$m) 
Maturity (years) 
Guarantee (0/1) 
Country risk 
rank 
Collateralizable 
assets (0/1) 
All 
syndicated 
loans 
39798 
0.17 
150.93 
(142.39) 
-0.04 
(-19.27) 
2.28 
(16.88) 
-9.26 
(-7.22) 
-103.88 
(-74.61) 
1.24 
(25,80) 
-14.45 
(-11.36) 
Corporate 
control 
6258 
0.16 
160.28 
(36.63) 
-0.04 
(-9.24) 
9.11 
(12.82) 
-19.54 
(-4.16) 
-62.11 
(-13.55) 
1.23 
(4.63) 
-17.42 
(-4.09) 
Capital 
structure 
13428 
0.17 
148.32 
(77,66) 
-0.05 
(-15.36) 
3.12 
(8.8-) 
-3.70 
(-1.41) 
-94.54 
(-37.36) 
0.76 
(7.23) 
-11.91 
(-4.63) 
Fixed 
asset 
based 
1449 
0.14 
104.07 
(20.54) 
-0.02 
(-4.07) 
0.11 
(0.21) 
-5.44 
(-1.68) 
-57.99 
(-1.52) 
0.59 
(4.09) 
20,50 
(5.05) 
General 
corporate 
purpose 
15429 
0.17 
140.13 
(85.20) 
-0.06 
(-12.62) 
0.68 
(2.47) 
-3.98 
(2.22) 
-98.87 
(-47.59) 
1.51 
(21.77) 
-6.59 
(-3.33) 
Project 
finance 
1803 
0.17 
131.37 
(20.94) 
-0.01 
(-1.33) 
-0.89 
(-2.00) 
-42.67 
(-11.27) 
-42.16 
(-6.95) 
1.5 
(10.87) 
15.99 
(3.75) 
It should be explicitly stated that this model does not have a variable measuring 
creditors in any direct way-such as borrower solvency, liquidity, or a leverage ratios-
despite the likelihood that such a proxy to prove useful. The two reasons for this: 
First the Loanware database does not provide a machine readable identification code 
(i.e., CUSIP or Datastream identification number) for borrowers, so there is no 
feasible method of matching borrowers to the corresponding accounting or stock 
price data. Second, it is not at all clear from the data that liquidity ratios for project 
finance entities would be comparable on similar parameters for borrowers over the 
syndicated loan. That is because the borrowers of all other types of syndicated 
credits is usually an operating company, which promises its entire faith and credit to 
repayment of the loan. In the project finance borrower case, by definition, a weighty 
company without external assets or so is the repayment obligant. Thus the implied 
corporate backing for syndicated loan to, say, Bachtel is fundamentally strong than 
backing for a loan by the weighty project company being sponsored by Bachtel-even 
if Bachtel is the sole project sponsor. Other things being equal, this lack of corporate 
guarantee of loan repayment should make the project finance loan, a riskier and thus 
more expensive than other types of loans. The key question no planned surveys 
have brought out is whether the project finance is a sufficiently good mechanism in 
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overcoming agency problems, and/or at reducing contract monitoring, enforcement 
costs etc, to overcome this lack of corporate backing. If so, project finance loans will 
not be more expensive than other loan categories-and may even have lower 
spreads. 
Table 4.6 presents the results of estimating equation 1 for all syndicated loans 
followed by separate regressions for each loan type. Please note that t-values for 
the independent variables are in parentheses. The regression results for each loan 
samples are comfortingly close to the uni-variate loan price (spread) average 
presented in panel B of table 4.5, and also show similar related patterns (highest for 
CC, lowest for FAB loans). The interceptor for project finance loans, 131.37 is 
slightly more from the average spread presented in table 4.5's panel B (130 Basis 
points). The project finance interceptor is also the second lowest of any loan 
samples. This finding, coupled with the uni-variate test results clearly establishes 
that project finance loans have significantly lower spreads than other loan groups. 
This possibly explains the advantages of other loan forms-at least for funding certain 
projects. 
The second line of table 4.6 details the influence of loan size on spreads, which is 
insignificant for project finance but negative and significant for all other loan samples. 
The coefficient values for size on non- project finance loans ranges from -0.02 to -0. 
06, with an average of -0.04 for all syndicated loans. This suggests that increasing 
the size of a non-project finance syndicated loan by $ hundred million actually 
reduces the required loan spread by an average of 4 basis points. This negative 
size/spread relationship would be due to the economies of scale in arranging non-
project finance syndicated credits, or it could be due to better known and more 
creditworthy borrowers being able to arrange other loans, or both. Since size has no 
significant influence on project finance loan prices, no further analysis have been 
attempted here. However, the stated finding merits attention. 
Loan term is the second variable that behaves differently for project finance than for 
any other loan type. Whereas spread and loan term are significantly positively 
related for all other loan categories, they have a significant negative relationship for 
project finance loans. The coefficient value for loan term indicates that booking a 
loan with an original maturity other than the median reduces the average project 
finance loan spread by 0.89 basis points. It could also been that a one-year increase 
in maturity of corporate control loans would increase spread by up to 9.1 basis points 
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as it has a high positive effect on spread. Since project finance loans have an 
average (and median) maturity that is more than twice that of most other loan types, 
this result is readily explainable (without a negative spread/term relationship, Long 
Term loans would be prohibitively expensive), though still surprising. 
While finding consistently significant negative relationship between spread and 
guarantee across all loan samples is not surprising, the dispersion in coefficient 
values definitely is. Whereas the presence of a third party guarantee reduces the 
spread down in capital structure loan by only 3.7 basis points, a similar guarantee 
reduces the spread on a project finance loans by almost 43 basis points. No other 
loan category other than project finance has nearly the same sensitivity to third party 
guarantees; the next highest value, -19.6 basis points for corporate control loans is 
less than half as large. This result also shows while project finance borrowers are so 
much more willing than most other borrowers to incur the costs (in time, effort and 
cash) required to arrange guarantees. The payoff, is reduced loan price. 
Another surprise, the currency risk has a significantly negative relationship with loan 
spreads for every loan category. This finding establishes that the mismatch in the 
currency of the borrowers home country and the currency of loan repayment 
significantly reduces the rate charged on an average loan-by 42 basis points for 
project finance credits and by up to 99 basis points for general corporate purpose 
loans. One obvious interpretation of this finding is that banks offer lower rates to 
international borrowers willing to accept the risk of borrowing in dollars or an other 
hard currency, though it is not clear why this would not be offset by increasing 
borrower default risk. 
The final variable in table 4.6, collateralizeable assets, is always significant-though it 
has a negative relationship with spread for CC, GCP, and CS loans, and has positive 
relationship spread for project finance and FAB credits. This means that, for most 
loans, the borrower in a collateralizeable assets industry will be charged the lower 
interest rate band while borrowers in another industry the reverse is true (roughly 
equal force) except project finance and FAB lending. The negative coefficient for 
most loans is because tangible assets should generally support lenders better than 
other types of assets. The positive relationship for project finance and FAB would 
have two explanations. First, it would result from the fact that these days, loans are 
already concentrated upon funding tangible asset risk projects, and that the specific 
industries chosen as "collateralizeable" happens to be relatively riskier than average 
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age. Alternatively, it could simply be that risk assessed can be funded using project 
finance or FAB loans than would othen/vise be arranged. This is consistent with other 
loan pricing studies, which document that the use of collateral is positively related to 
loan spreads. 
4.7 Summary and conclusions 
The study compared the financial characteristics of almost the entire population of 
large syndicated bank loans booked on international capital markets since 1980 a 
total of 90,784 loans (worth $13 trillion), of which 4956 loans (worth $ 634.40 billion) 
have a loan purpose code of "Project Finance'. As discussed earlier Project Finance, 
is usually defined as limited or non-recourse financing of a newly to be developed 
project through the establishment of a (separately Incorporated) vehicle company. 
The analysis establishes that project finance loans differ significantly from non-
project finance credits in that project finance loans have a longer average maturity, or 
more likely to have third party guarantees, and are far more likely to be extended to 
non-user borrowers and to borrowers in riskier countries. Project finance credits also 
involved more participating banks, have fewer loan covenants, and are more likely to 
use fixed rather than floating rate loan pricing, and are more likely to be extended to 
borrowers in tangible assets -rich industries such as oil and gas, transport, and 
electric utilities. 
Despite being non-recourse finance, floating rate project finance loans have more 
credits spreads (over LIBOR) than do most comparable non-project finance loans. 
This result, though surprising in some respects, is the striking evidence that the 
project financing structure reduces importer agency restrictions that are inherent in 
the creditor/ borrower relationship, and that project finance is a very effective method 
of providing monitoring for large projects with the relatively transparent cash flows. 
Also contrary to expectations, we find that project finance loans are not larger than 
non- project finance loans, but are in fact significantly smaller than CC or CS loans. 
Through statistical analysis and validation of project finance, (most) non-project 
finance loans and all syndicated bank credits, the uni-variate comparisons suggest 
that project finance loans differ rather fundamentally from non- project finance credits 
in almost every important aspect. 
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Chapter 5 
Project Evaluation Model for Private Infrastructure Projects 
5.1 Introduction 
Having analysed the population-wide characteristics of project finance and the status of 
investments in infrastructure, the next major objective is the fundamental question of whether a 
potential infrastructure project has the necessary characteristics of financeability from the 
lenders point of view, and if so how to evaluate it?. Focus group interviews and workshops 
conducted/ participated as part of this study has revealed the interest groups working in the 
sphere suggesting that the project evaluation of privately financed infrastructure projects (in 
what ever form - PPP or otherwise), calls for a comprehensive evaluation of not only the 
Project's attractiveness per se, but also the project finance company's (normally the SPV) 
capability in undertaking such projects. The considered view of most experts in the financial 
spectrum and outside, that emerged from the brain storming sessions was that the financial 
variables alone won't help much in evaluation and appraisal decisions of private infrastructure 
projects. It was suggested that the desirable measure shall provide for a logical, reliable and 
consistent procedure for the evaluation of potential infrastructure projects by analysing the 
project and the promoting company's wherewithal to undertake it. From the research study's 
point of view it is clear by now that the model that shall be developed has to be a 
comprehensive multi-attribute evaluation model that would look at project attractiveness and 
company (to mean the project company or SPV) competencies. Multi-attribute aggregation 
modelling is a mine field for a researcher even in the normal course, and in a nebulous and 
complex area like infrastructure financing it has to be mind boggling. But it has to be tried for the 
stakes and importance of it. Researching such an unexplored area would develop the body of 
knowledge as it exists today. An attempt is being made through this study. 
5.2 Project Evaluation Model 
A model named. Project Evaluation Model (PEM) has been developed as part of this study. 
PEM is a multi-attribute evaluation model composed of two modules: 
(a) Project Company Competencies (to be referred to as CC). 
(b) Project Attractiveness (PA). 
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The company specific module evaluates the capability of the private-sector infrastructure 
company to provide and allocate resources necessary to undertake an infrastructure project. 
The Project module tries to evaluate the attractiveness of a project for promoting and funding. 
Both have been considered from the lenders point of view. To this end the model was 
developed with the help of a series of dynamically designed questionnaires and interview 
schedules that provided feedback / responses. The institutions from whom data was collected 
were divided into two groups: Eight Insiders and Six outsiders. The 'insiders' were those 
experts whose institutional affiliation suggested that they would look at the project from the 
lender's point of view (i.e., they could be viewed as active members of the lending team). The 
insiders sampled comprised lending institutions in India, who are active in the Infrastructure 
sector^ and are as follows : 
Industrial Development Bank of India (IDBI) 
Infrastructure Development and Finance Company (IDFC) 
ICICI Ltd. 
Infrastructure Leasing and Financial Services Ltd. (ILFS) 
Industrial Finance Corporation of India (IFCI) 
Housing and Urban Development Corporation Ltd. (HUDCO) 
Housing Development Finance Corporation (HDFC) 
National Housing Bank (NHB) 
The "outsiders' are those companies actually involved in promotion of infrastructure projects or 
advising such companies (i.e., they could be viewed as active members of promoting team). Six 
such outsiders sampled for this study include: 
Maharashtra State Roads Development Corporation (MSRDC) 
Larson & Toubro Limited (L & T) 
Jog Engineering Limited 
Ideal Roads 
Konkan Railway Corporation Limited (KRC) 
GMR consultants 
Owing to the requirement that the confidentiality clause has to be maintained as per the undertaking given, except 
for listing the institutions names, no individual inferences to the institution/s or their views could be possible in this 
study. 
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The main reason for separating these two groups was to investigate whether experts within 
each group had similar perspectives and whether different role of each group in the promotion 
process of an infrastructure project would reflect differences in opinion. 
5.2.1 Model Structure 
The PEM has a three-level hierarchical structure. The highest level of the model consists of two 
classes: company competencies and project attractiveness (these correspond to the two 
modules). The second level consists of seven categories and the third level consists of 23 
attributes culled from the questionnaires after detailed analysis. Figure 5.1 illustrates the 
complete model and Appendix 5.1 at the end of the chapter provides the definitions for all 
attributes grouped by category. 
Figure 5.1 : Hierarchical Structure of Project Evaluation Model 
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Typically hierarchical multi-criteria decision models have more than one alternative to choose 
from, and the objective of the decision maker is to find the alternative that best fits the overall 
focus or goal of the situation being analysed. In contract, the objective of the PEM is to 
evaluate whether a particular project should be financed and whether the promoting company 
has the capability to undertake such a project. Therefore, the level 'alternatives', typically found 
at the top of the model hierarchy, does not apply to the PEM. The null alternative is simply not to 
proceed with the private promotion of the project by the company. 
The final outcome of the PEM are two indices that assess the capability of the company "f-*"^ ^ 
and the feasibility of the project "^^J'* . These indices are given by additive multi-attribute value 
functions that have the following general form: 
This functional form was chosen on the basis of the recommendations for multi-attribute 
aggregation procedures in Dawes and Corrigan (1974), Gardiner (!974), Einhorn and Hogarth, 
Keeney and Raiffa (1976), Dawes (1979), Dyer and Sarin (1979), and Von Winterfeldt and 
Edwards (1986). As shown in Figure 5.1, the CC index "f-'-*"" uses n = 9 attributes ^, whereas 
the PA index "^-^A uses n = 14 attributes. In both cases the overall contribution of each attribute 
is given by its worth score '-^ ^^ ^ multiplied by its composite weight *"'•. The worth score of an 
attribute ^'•'^<> reflects the one dimensional value of the performance level of the attribute as it 
exists for a specific project or company. The composite weight of an attribute *••" reflects its 
importance relative to the other attributes (for the same index) irrespective of any particular 
project or company. The factor ° equals either 1 or 0 depending on whether the dominant 
attributes for a project or company exceed certain minimum acceptable performance thresholds. 
5.2.2. One Dimensional Value Functions 
To determine the one-dimensional attribute worth score ''^'^' it is necessary to evaluate the 
performance (quality) level '• of the ' * attribute for a given project or company and then to use 
a value function '•'^  > to transform it into an equivalent worth score. The transformation from the 
performance (quality) level -^ of the '^ attribute into an equivalent worth score '^'•^>> requires two 
steps. Since the 23 attributes in the PEM hierarchy are qualitative in nature (Figure 5.1), the first 
step is to assess how well a given project or company performs with respect to a given attribute 
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' using a meaningful qualitative scale. This is essentially an "attribute measurement" step 
whose outcome is project- and company- specific. The second step is to transform this 
qualitative performance value into a one-dimensional worth (or value) score (from 0 to 100). 
This is a "preference measurement" procedure whose outcome depends on the preferences 
and judgement of the person doing the analysis. This two step procedure allows the dissociation 
between the tasl< of measuring the location of an attribute on the performance scale from the 
task of determining the worth of the attribute on the worth scale. That is, it separates qualitative 
judgements that are specific to a project or company from the quantitative transformation to 
value (worth) that can be reused from one project or company to another. The qualitative 
attribute measurement scale used to quantify the qualitative assessment for any attribute ' is 
shown in Figure 5.2. 
Figure 5.2 
Qualitative Attribute Performance Scale 
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This scale incorporates nine performance levels and has been adopted from Saaty (1980). Each 
qualitative descriptor at the bottom of the scale has been matched to a numerical index value 
*, <! -9) to allow a simple shorthand way to refer to any particular attribute level using a single 
number. This is particularly convenient when presenting attribute performance levels in table 
format. The one dimensional value (worth) functions for all attributes have the same generic 
form shown in Figure 5.3 below: 
Figure 5.3 
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This functional form consists of tiiree linear regions defined by two points P1 and P2, that are 
different for each attribute. It has been adopted from a similar study (loannou 1992) that used a 
multi-attribute evaluation system with more than 50 attributes to rank more than 1000 research 
proposals that competed for funding, out of a program budget of $34,000,000. 
PI , the minimum acceptable attribute performance level, reflects the highest point on the 
performance scale where an attribute has minimum value (i.e., 0 worth points). P2, reflects the 
lowest point on the performance scale where an attribute is worth its maximum (i.e., 100 worth 
points). These two points divide the performance scale into three regions: a low flat region (A), 
an intermediate region (B), and a high flat region (C). Region A ("low flat") indicates 
unacceptable performance. Thus the attribute being evaluated does not need to be a "complete 
disaster" in order to worth zero points. Region C ("high flat") indicates that the attribute's 
performance is high enough to have maximum worth. Thus, an attribute does not need to be 
"perfect" in order to be worth 100 points. Region B ("intermediate") represents the "gray" area 
between unacceptable and completely acceptable performance. The entire set of PI and P2 
values for all 23 attributes organised by group (insiders and outsiders) and by individual 
institutions are shown in Tables A.I and A.2 in Appendix 5.2 at the end of this chapter. Given 
an attribute performance level *' (assessed for a specific project or company), the pairs PI and 
P2 in these tables can be used to determine the worth (value) of this attribute '^•^"'^ for any of the 
14 institutions. 
It is interesting to note that for about 80% of the attributes P1(insiders)< P1 (outsiders) and for 
about 60 % of the cases P2(outsiders) < P2 (insiders). As a result, outsiders have, on average, 
steeper value curves than the insiders do. Also, region B (the "gray area") is larger for the 
insiders that for the outsiders. 
5.2.3. Decomposed Assessment of Attribute weights 
To arrive at an overall Project Evaluation Index, the worth (value) of each attribute '^^-^'^ must be 
multiplied by its "global" weight ""• ((1)). Two different decomposition methods were used to 
determine these weights: the Direct Rating Method (DRM)^ and the Eigenvalue Method (EM)'^ . 
This allowed the flexibility to investigate whether the two methods yield different weight, and in 
^ The DRM method was developed by Edwards (1971, 1977) to determine relative importance of weights 
of different attributes of a multi-attribute model. This method requires the decision maker to rank the 
attributes in decreasing order of importance. The value 10 is assigned to the least important (lowest 
ranked) attribute. The rest of the attributes are ranked upwards relative to the least ranked one. 
^ The Eigenvalue method (EM) is used by Saaty (1980) in the development of Analytic Hierarchy 
Process (AHP). The basic purpose of this method is to derive importance weights from pair-wise 
comparisons from different attributes of a multi-attribute model. 
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case of weight differences, to assess wiiether tiiese lead to differences in model prediction. 
The DRM was developed by Edwards (1971,1977) as part of the simple multi-attribute rating 
technique (SMART). The EM was developed by Saaty (1980) as part of the Analytic Hierarchy 
Process (AHP). Detailed encoding of these method can be referred and is beyond the scope of 
presentation in this report. A review of some of the multi-attribute models developed using 
SMART appears in Von Winterfeldt and Edwards (!986). A comprehensive evaluation of AHP 
applications appears in Zahedi (1986), Vachnadze and Markozashvili (1987) and Vargas 
(1990). Both these methods have come to stay and have been used extensively by other 
researchers as well owing to its methodological rigour and clarity. In principle, the direct 
determination of the "global" weights in equation (1) would require a large number of pair-wise 
attribute comparisons in order to assess their relative importance. For example, the 14 attributes 
for the PA index would require 91 such pair-wise comparisons. To minimize the assessment 
effort, both decomposition methods take advantage of the hierarchical structure of the model 
and encode separate "local weights", first for each category, then for each attribute within each 
category. Thus, for example, the number of comparisons required for the PA index is reduced 
to 24 (six for categories and 18 for attributes). The required 14 "global" attribute weights are 
then determined as "composite" weights by multiplying the 14 "local" attribute weights by the 
corresponding category weight. Besides the reduction in assessment effort, this approach has 
the additional advantage of providing weights for every level in the model hierarchy (in this case 
for categories). 
5.2.4. Category Weights 
The three category weights for the CC index and the four category weights for the PA index 
were obtained by performing pair wise comparisons among the model categories using both the 
DRM and EM. Table 5.1 shows the group weights for insiders and outsiders as determined by 
each encoding method. These form the basis for comparing the two groups. 
Table 5.1 
Attribute 
(1) 
Internal organisation 
characteristics 
Production capability 
Financial resources and 
constraints 
Promoting team 
Characteristics 
Technical evaluation 
Financial assessment 
Principal's qualifications 
and local conditions 
Insiders 
EM 
(2) 
(a) 
0.251 
0.171 
0.578 
(b 
0.121 
0.125 
0.532 
0.222 
DRM 
(3) 
Company compctencie 
0.304 
0.194 
0.502 
Project attractiveness 
0.178 
0.182 
0.386 
0.254 
Outsiders 
EM 
(4) 
> 
0.245 
0.229 
0.529 
0.220 
0.188 
0.352 
0.240 
DRM 
(5) 
0.292 
0.289 
0.419 
0.208 
0.241 
0.300 
0.251 
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For the DRM group category, group category weights were given by the average of the 
individual category weights. For the EM, the assessment of the groups weights was performed 
indirectly. The pair-wise comparison matrices (one for each individual institutions) were first 
consolidated into one group matrix by computing the geometric mean of the individual "category 
comparisons" (matrix elements) as suggested in Aczel and Saaty (1983) and McCarthy (1992). 
The resulting group matrix was then used to determine the group weights following the standard 
EM for any individual institution. 
The weights for the CC index in Table 5.1 indicates that both insiders and outsiders consider 
financial category as the most important, with the management and production categories 
coming in second and third. Thus, a company's ability to fund the procurement process and to 
provide equity to finance at least part of the project, coupled with the quality of the investment in 
terms of potential return, is of vital importance in the decision to get involved in private 
promotion of infrastructure projects. The relatively low importance attached to the production 
category indicates that companies are not constrained by the availability of their own resources 
and technical expertise as they can rely on third parties to supply the necessary resources and 
expertise to have the project developed and implemented. Similarly in the case of the PA index, 
both the insiders and outsiders rank the financial category as the most important. Thus it is 
essential for a project to have a favourable financial assessment to attract private promoters. 
The second most important category is the ability of governments to provide the necessary 
conditions for the project to materialize and to be operated. 
It is interesting to note that the insiders' weights for the managerial and technical categories are 
very close. Similarly, outsiders ranked the managerial category ahead of the technical category 
using EM, whereas the ranking was reversed when using the DRM. Nevertheless there is a 
notable difference in the weights of these categories, as well as in the weight of the financial 
category when one group is compared to the other. Insiders input money into the project and 
are liable to lose their investment if the project fails. They appear to be confident about their 
ability to manage and to provide technical solutions to the project, and hence place high 
importance on the project's ability to provide an adequate return on their investment and a 
relative low importance to the categories that they have more control over. In contrast, outsiders 
provide services, mainly management and legal expertise to principals and promoters. Thus, 
they attribute less weight to the financial assessment (although it is still the most important), and 
they emphasise more the management and technical categories, perhaps indicating their 
concern that promoting companies have in the past performed poorly when implementing 
privately promoted projects. Past projects, for example, have suffered from mismanagement (i.e 
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lack of owning company identity, poor interaction between pronnoters), project cost overruns and 
schedule delays. 
Two-tailed Student and paired t-tests were ran to verify if tine differences in group weights given 
by the insiders and outsiders were statistically significant. Four t-tests were performed for each 
model category. Two student t-tests compared the category weights given by the insiders 
against the outsiders (one test considered the DRM and the other the EM). Two paired t-tests 
were used to compare the weights given by the DRM against the EM (one for the insiders and 
the other for the outsiders). None of these tests rejected the hypotheses that the responses of 
insiders and outsiders were given by similar populations. Similarly none of the paired t-tests 
rejected the hypotheses that the two encoding methods provided comparable weights for the 
same category. 
5.2.5. Attribute Weights 
The "local" attribute weights were obtained by performing pair-wise comparisons between model 
attributes within each category. The "global" attribute weights were then determined as 
"composites" by multiplying each local attribute weight by the corresponding category weight. 
An attribute's composite weight represents its relative importance in determining the index it 
belongs to (CC or PA, as in equation (1)). Table 5.2 is a summary of these results and shows 
the composite group weights for insiders and outsiders as determined by each encoding 
method. These were obtained through the same procedure that was used to calculate the 
composite score for each institution i.e., by multiplying the group level attribute weights by the 
group category weights. The group weights shown in Table 5.2 are perhaps the most important 
numerical results in this analysis. 
Figure 5.4 displays the DRM weights for the 14 attributes in the PA index. In this figure every 
attribute is associated with two columns; the left column is for the insiders and the right column 
is for the outsiders. For each attribute, the bottom (top) of the two columns indicates the 
minimum (maximum) weight assigned by each group of institution. The line in the middle of the 
darker region reflects the attribute's group weight. The darker region gives an indication of 
variability within each group of institutions and represents one standard deviation of the 
individual attribute weights (one half of the standard deviation is placed above the group weight 
and the other half is placed below it). Similar figures for the EM weights as well as the DRM 
and EM weights for the CC index can be drawn. 
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Table 5.2 
At t r ibu te 
(1) 
1.1 Quality of management team 
1.2 Fitting of strategic planning 
1.3 Compatibility with potential 
partners 
2.1 Adequacy of spl. knowledge 
2.2 Overall quality of prod, resources 
2.3 Availability of productive 
resources 
3.1 Abil i ty to fund initial proj. costs 
3.2 Abil i ty to sup. capital for project 
3.3 Quality of profitability 
4.1 Char, of promoting team's mgmt. 
4.2 Strength of promoting team 
4.3 Adequacy of promoters 
agreement 
5.1 Abil i ty to provide quality design 
5.2 Abil i ty to provide feasible 
construction plan 
5.3 Abil i ty to provide adequate 
operation-transfer package 
6.1 Availability of adequate financial 
sources to raise financing 
6.2 Financial viability 
6.3 Certainty of construction and 
operational costs 
6.4 Certainty of revenues 
7.1 Overall quality of principal 
7.2 Level of community support 
7.3 Legal environment 
7.4 Political environment 
Group Composite Attribute Weights 
Insiders 
EM 
(2) 
DRM 
(3) 
8 
(4) 
Outsiders 
EM 
(5) 
a) Internai organization characteristics 
15.44 
5.03 
4.67 
13.81 
8.35 
8.25 
* 10.66 
3.93 
9.90 
(b) Production capabil ity 
10.98 
3.95 
2.IS 
9.22 
5.65 
4.51 
• 11.14 
6.75 
5.00 
(c ) Financial resources and constraints 
20.39 
7.50 
29.88 
18.82 
10.01 
21.37 
* 
• 
* 
13.18 
11.36 
28.07 
(d) Promot ing team characteristics 
3.08 
6.32 
2.69 
5.39 
7.53 
4.90 
* 
* 
6.86 
7.92 
7.23 
(e) Technical evaluation 
4.76 
5.31 
2.44 
6.61 
6.83 
4.76 
• 
7.66 
7.41 
3.73 
( 0 Financial assessment 
6.23 
20.66 
8.68 
17.63 
7.42 
12.69 
6.92 
11.55 
* 
* 
* 
3.00 
13.96 
9.34 
8.93 
(K) Principal's qualifications and local conditions 
6.16 
4.79 
3.81 
7.44 
6.99 
6.41 
4.89 
7.12 
* 
• 
5.18 
2.51 
5.06 
11.21 
DRM 
(6) 
12.29 
5.33 
11.56 
12.04 
10.11 
6.75 
11.70 
12.05 
18.18 
7.42 
7.01 
6.40 
10.11 
9.44 
4.60 
4.01 
9.85 
7.74 
8.36 
6.05 
4.34 
6.78 
7.89 
S 
(7) 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
• 
* 
* 
* 
* 
Figure 5.4 
DRIVI Group Weights and Range of Individual Weights for Attributes 
belonging to PA Index 
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5.2.6. THE DELTA FACTOR 
The delta factor, * jn equation (1), was introduced in the PEM to account for situations where 
the single dominant attribute's performance level is so low that it is sufficient to render a 
company incapable of promoting a project, or make a project un attractive for private promotion. 
Anderson (1993) gives an example of this situation by stating that there are many countries 
where the possibility of having a privately promoted infrastructure project is excluded, 
regardless of the project characteristics, because of the perceived general political risk. 
The delta factor is calculated by multiplying the delta of each of the m dominant model attributes 
5, 
That is, if the intensity of a dominant attribute falls below a certain threshold set by the decision 
maker{cut-off point), then its ^< - 0, otherwise *• - ^. Hence, the ^ of a project (or company) is 
equal to 1 only if all dominant attributes have intensities larger than their respective threshold 
levels. For the DM this threshold level is P1. Thus, '^ = 0, whenever a dominant attribute ' has 
a performance level '^i ^ ""^  (i.e., whenever ^•^•''> - ^>-
The dominant attributes identified by the insiders and outsiders are indicated with a (*) in Table 
5.2. For the insiders, 6/9 of the CC attributes and 12/14 of the PA attributes are dominant. The 
outsiders consider 8/9 of the CC attributes and all 14 PA attributes to be dominant. This clearly 
indicates that a project cannot be privately promoted if the performance of some of its attributes 
is very low, even if other attributes (including those with highest weights) have high performance 
levels. Projects must have some minimum performance levels across all attributes. The same 
applied to the characteristics of a company seeking to get involved in the private promotion of a 
project. 
5.3. Model Validation 
The use of external criteria to objectively assess the validity of decomposed evaluation models 
is a difficult issue as multi-attribute decision models are essentially subjective in nature. 
Therefore, past research has relied on indirect approaches, such as convergent validation. 
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predictive validation and axiomatic validation. The PEM has been validated using the first of 
these methods. Convergent validation consists of comparing the results obtained by a multi-
attribute decomposed model, such as PEM, with holistic (i.e., direct) evaluations made by the 
decision maker. Thus, several alternatives are defined (eg. Projects) and then evaluated by both 
the model and the decision maker. These evaluations are then compared as to how they rate 
and/or rank these alternatives. A high positive correlation between holistic and decomposed 
evaluations are expected to occur if, in fact, the decomposed model is capturing the decision 
maker's holistic evaluation preferences. Von Winterfeidt and Edwards (1986) and Gardiner 
(1974) provide a summary of multi-attribute decision models and show that typical correlations 
are in the range from 0.70 and 0.95. They interpret these findings as supporting the convergent 
validity of multi-attribute decomposed models. Furthermore, they point out that these 
correlations tend to decrease as the number of attributes increases because the reliability of 
holistic judgements decreases as the number of model attributes increases. Even though the 
PEM does use a large number of attributes, convergent validation of its results produced very 
high correlation that indicate its robustness and accuracy. Convergent validation was performed 
by defining nine hypothetical company profiles and 10 hypothetical project profiles that were 
subsequently evaluated holistically with the help of institutions on a scale of 0 to 100. The same 
profiles were also evaluated using both the DRM and EM and the results were subjected to 
statistical analysis. 
The hypothetical project and company profiles provided a performance level for all model 
attributes and were designed to vary the CC and PA indices through a wide range so that the 
model's performance could be evaluated for companies and projects of diverse characteristics. 
They also ensured that all experts started out with the same information as the performance 
levels for all attributes of the project and company profiles were already given. As an example, 
the project profiles used to validate the PA index are shown in Table 5.3. These profiles reflect 
the characteristics of 10 different projects from the viewpoint of one promoting company. The 
numbers in each project's column indicate the assumed performance level for the 
corresponding attribute using the qualitative scale in Figure 5.2. 
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Table 5.3 
Hypothetical Project Profiles 
Project atlracliveness attributes (1) 
Character of promoting team's mgmt. 
Strength of promoting team 
Adequacy of promoters agreement 
Abihty to provide a quality design 
Ability to provide a feasible 
construction plan 
Ability provide adequate operation-
transfer package 
Availability of adequate financial 
sources to raise financing 
Financial availability 
Certainty of construclion and operation 
costs 
Certainty of revenues 
Overall quality of the principal 
Level of community support 
Legal environincnt 
Political environment 
PI 
(2) 
6 
8 
5 
7 
5 
7 
7 
6 
6 
5 
7 
5 
7 
8 
P2 
(3) 
7 
8 
6 
9 
8 
9 
9 
8 
8 
7 
8 
7 
9 
8 
P3 
(4) 
4 
5 
4 
7 
3 
5 
6 
8 
6 
7 
4 
8 
5 
3 
P4 
(5) 
7 
8 
7 
8 
9 
8 
8 
8 
7 
5 
8 
5 
7 
9 
PS 
(6) 
8 
7 
8 
7 
6 
7 
8 
7 
7 
7 
8 
6 
8 
8 
P6 
(7) 
6 
7 
7 
6 
6 
6 
4 
5 
6 
5 
7 
4 
6 
7 
P7 
(8) 
8 
7 
8 
8 
7 
7 
3 
6 
6 
5 
5 
7 
4 
5 
P8 
(9) 
5 
6 
5 
6 
3 
3 
2 
5 
4 
5 
3 
6 
2 
2 
P9 
(10) 
6 
6 
6 
7 
5 
6 
6 
7 
5 
8 
6 
7 
3 
3 
PIO 
(II) 
6 
7 
7 
8 
7 
6 
7 
6 
8 
6 
8 
7 
8 
7 
For each institutions the decomposed evaluations »^^*. given by equation (1) \Nere calculated 
by transforming the performance level "> of each of the project profile attributes into worth "'^^>> 
using P1 and P2 in Appendix 6.2, and multiplying by the relative importance weights of the 
attributes *• (Table 5.2). Since, the sum of either the company or project attribute weights 
equals 1, and the worth scores are between 0 to 100, the calculated CC and the PA indices are 
also between 0 to 100. The decomposed (DRM and EM) and holistic evaluations for all profiles 
were compared using Pearson's product-moment and Spearman's rank-order correlation 
coefficients. 
The resulting correlations for each individual institutions range from moderate to strong and 
indicate that both decomposed models produce PA indices that are very close to the holistic 
evaluations. Group evaluations for the insiders and outsiders (for the holistic as well as the 
decomposed methods) were determined by averaging the individual PA indices and the CC 
indices for the institutions within each group. The results for each group, evaluation method, and 
project or company profile are shown in Figure 5.5. It is clear from this figure that the PA and 
CC indices given by both decomposed models are very close to each other and to the holistic 
evaluations. This is not surprising as the weights assessed by the DRM and the EM are very 
similar, indicating that the two decomposition methods are practically equivalent. 
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Figure 5.5 
Project Profile Evaluations - Comparison of Groups and Methods 
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The correlation co-efficients between the group weights encoded by using the DRM and ElVI are 
shown in Table 5.4. As expected, the high correlations between the weights given by DRM and 
EM also leads to high correlations between the CC and PA indices produced by the two 
decomposition methods across the company and project profiles (Table 5.5). 
Table5.4 
Correlation between group weights assessed using DRM and EM Methods 
Attributes 
(1) 
CC attributes 
PA attributes 
Insiders 
(2) 
0.972 
0.976 
Outsiders 
(3) 
0.930 
0.798 
TableS.S 
Correlation between Evaluations for Hypothetical Company and Project 
Profiles using DRM and EM 
Index 
(1) 
CC Index 
PA index 
Pearson's 
Insiders 
(2) 
0.978 
0.980 
Correlation Coefficient 
Outsiders 
(3) 
0.990 
0.927 
Spearman's Rank 
Correlation Coefficient 
Insiders 
(4) 
0.933 
0.997 
Outsiders 
(5) 
0.867 
1.000 
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In conclusion, the preceding results indicate that the DM captures the institutions' holistic 
evaluations quite well, and that either decomposition method could be used to assess the 
attribute weights. 
5.4. Group Comparison - Insiders Versus Outsiders 
The participating institutions were divided into two groups to investigate potential differences in 
their points of view concerning the involvement of private-sector companies in the promotion of 
infrastructure projects. Both the weights as well as the evaluations of hypothetical profiles were 
compared for the two groups. A comparison of the category and attribute weights showed a 
slight tendency for the insiders to pay more attention to the financial-related attributes, whereas 
the outsiders focused more on the management part. These differences, however, did not prove 
to be statistically significant. The PA evaluations for the 10 different hypothetical project profiles 
are shown in Figure 5.5, for each group and for each evaluation procedure. It can be seen that 
the project evaluations for both groups are very close and follow a similar trend. Similar results 
were obtained when comparing the CC evaluations for the nine hypothetical company profiles. 
The correlation co-efficients between the evaluations of the two groups are quite high and are 
shown in Table 5.6. Furthermore, for each of the three evaluation methods, and for every 
company and project profile, two-tailed student t-tests were performed to check whether the 
indices given by the insiders had an average that was similar to the average evaluation by the 
outsiders. For all 57 tests, this hypothesis could not be rejected. 
Table 5.6 
Correlation between Evaluations of Insiders and Outsiders for 
Hypothetical Company and Proiect Profiles 
Evaluation 
Method 
(1) 
Holistic 
Decomposed (EM) 
Decomposed (DRM) 
Company Profile Evaluations 
Pearson's 
correlation 
coefficient (2) 
0.969 
0.922 
0,980 
Spearman's rank 
correlation 
coefficient 
(3) 
0.952 
0.891 
0.988 
Project Profile Evaluations 
Pearson's 
correlation 
coefficient (4) 
0.897 
0.955 
0.965 
Spearman's rank 
correlation 
coefficienf (5) 
0.817 
0.900 
0.917 
The preceding statistical results lead to the conclusion that there are no substantial differences 
between the group of insiders and the group of outsiders with respect to category and attribute 
weights. The same is true for company and project evaluations when all company and project 
attributes are set to the same performance levels for both groups (as was the case for 
hypothetical profiles). This conclusion, however, does not necessarily imply that the two groups 
would assess the same attribute performance levels when faced with a real company or project. 
5.5. Example Project Evaluation : The Mumbai - Pune Expressway 
The Mumbai-Pune Expressway is probably the most publicised and well known example of 
privately promoted (though it cannot be strictly called so) project to date in India. As such, it is a 
good example of a real project that most of the institutions, where in the data was sourced for 
this study are familiar with and could evaluate without being given its explicit performance levels 
for the various project attributes. In fact, all outsiders and six of the eight insiders felt they knew 
enough about Mumbai - Pune Expressway project to perform a meaningful project evaluation. 
The individual institution's evaluations as well as the group evaluations for the Mumbai-Pune 
Expressway are shown in Figure 5.7. Even though no general conclusions could be drawn 
based on the evaluation results for a single project, it appears that the two groups evaluate the 
Table 5.7 
Attribute Performance levels and Holistic decomposed 1 
Attribute/Evaluation 
Method (1) 
1 .Character of prom. 
Icam's management 
2.Strength of prom, team 
3.Adq. of promoters agmt. 
4.Abil. to prov. qly. design 
5.Abih(y to provide a 
feasible construction plan 
6.Abi. to provide adq. 
operation-transfer package 
V.Avail. of adq.financial 
sources to raise financing 
S.Financial vilability 
9.Cert, of const. & op. cost 
lO.Ccrtainty of revenues 
11 .Overall qua.of principal 
12.Level of commu..supp 
13.Legal environment 
14.Political environment 
Holistic Judgement 
Decomposed. Eval-EM 
Decomposed. Eval-ERM 
I-Ol 
(2) 
6 
5 
3 
8 
7 
7 
5 
5 
2 
5 
2 
6 
7 
8 
40.0 
39.4 
43.0 
1-02 
(3) 
7 
7 
5 
7 
5 
7 
2 
5 
2 
7 
5 
6 
7 
6 
65.0 
43.8 
50.3 
Mumba 
1-03 
(4) 
5 
6 
5 
5 
3 
5 
4 
2 
1 
1 
3 
6 
4 
3 
40.0 
7.4 
14.7 
I-OS 
(5) 
8 
7 
5 
5 
5 
6 
6 
7 
4 
6 
7 
7 
7 
5 
60.0 
78.1 
73.7 
-Pune Ex 
1-06 
(6) 
4 
4 
6 
8 
8 
5 
8 
8 
7 
7 
3 
6 
5 
6 
70.0 
81.7 
76.5 
1-07 
(7) 
8 
8 
6 
6 
6 
6 
8 
9 
8 
8 
8 
7 
7 
7 
60.0 
94.8 
92.1 
presswav Project 
O-Ol 
(8) 
6 
8 
9 
7 
7 
9 
8 
9 
8 
8 
7 
5 
5 
5 
50.0 
89.5 
83.0 
O-02 
(9) 
4 
4 
4 
7 
6 
6 
5 
6 
3 
3 
7 
5 
7 
6 
50.0 
1.6 
2.9 
O-03 
(10) 
6 
6 
5 
6 
6 
4 
6 
6 
3 
5 
7 
5 
5 
6 
75.0 
43.2 
42.8 
O-04 
(11) 
8 
8 
5 
6 
8 
7 
8 
6 
4 
4 
9 
7 
9 
9 
75.0 
76.6 
74.6 
Evaluations for 
O-05 
(12) 
9 
9 
9 
9 
9 
7 
9 
9 
9 
9 
9 
9 
9 
9 
90.0 
99.6 
99.2 
O-06 
(13) 
9 
7 
7 
8 
9 
8 
9 
9 
7 
7 
8 
9 
9 
9 
80.0 
93.3 
91.2 
Gr.Of 
Insiders 
(14) 
6.33 
6.17 
5.00 
6.50 
5.67 
6.00 
5.50 
6.00 
4.00 
5.67 
4.67 
6.33 
6.17 
5.83 
55.83 
57.53 
58.38 
Gr. of 
Outsiders 
(15) 
7.00 
7.00 
6.50 
7.17 
7.50 
6.83 
7.50 
7.50 
5.67 
6.00 
7.83 
6.67 
7.33 
7.33 
70.00 
67.30 
65.62 
project from different points of view. Insiders seem to assume a more conservative position 
and rate the project lower, perhaps because they have more at stake than the outsiders do. The 
small differences between the group evaluations given by decomposed evaluations and the 
average holistic judgements confirm the previous conclusion that the PA index captures 
references of the decision makers. For the group of insiders, the differences between the PA 
index given by holistic assessment and each of the decomposed evaluations (EM and DRM) 
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were 1.70 and 2.55 (out of 100 index points), respectively. For the group of outsiders the 
differences were 2.70 and 4.38 index points. 
5.6 Sensitivity Analysis - Attn'bute Weights versus Worth scores 
The evaluations for the Mumbai-Pune Expressway project can also be used to investigate the 
sensitivity of the PA index ''^•^''f* to its constituents, i.e., the composite attribute weights "'• and 
the attribute worth scores '••'^''. Table 5.8, shows the PA index for the project as determined for 
each institution using one of three different computational alternatives. A, B or C. These 
alternatives are described at the bottom Table 5.8 (Note that alternative C should never be used 
to compute a PA or CC index as it is wrong to calculate group results by averaging the 
assessments of PI and P2 or by averaging the performance levels of each attributes given by 
each institution. This alternative is shown here only to illustrate the sensitivity of the PEM to 
different attribute importance weights). Alternative A (where both the worth scores and attribute 
weights vary from institution to institution) and Alternative B (were the worth scores vary but 
attribute weights are constant) show almost the same variability ' .^A' "^I- = *** for the insiders , 
and v* = 55% v, = 5A% for the outsiders). In contrast, alternative C (where the worth scores are 
constant but the attributes weight vary) has much smaller variability '*''• " '** for the insiders, 
and Vc=^% for the outsiders). 
These results indicate that the PA index is liable to be much more sensitive to the attribute 
worth scores '^ W (i.e., the assessment of PI and P2, and the attribute performance levels * for 
the given project) than to the attribute importance weights *••<• Stillwell et al.(1981) obtained 
similar evidence from their analysis of alternative sources of energy. The practical implication of 
this conclusion is that real-world evaluations of projects or companies need not duplicate the 
substantial effort to reassess the attribute importance weights *- given in Table 5.2. It is 
sufficient to establish the attribute performance levels ^i (which are project- and company-
specific) and the points P1 and P2 that reflects the preferences of the decision maker. 
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Table 5.8 
Alternative Computations of PA index for 
Mumbai-Pune Expressway 
(1) 
1-01 
1-02 
1-03 
1-05 
1-06 
1-07 
Average 
Standard deviation 
Coefficient of variation 
O-01 
O-02 
O-03 
O-05 
O-06 
O-07 
Average 
Standard deviation 
Coefficient of variation 
•Alternative A - individual at 
attribute performance levels. 
'Alternative B - group impor 
levels. 
'Alternative C - individual im 
perfornnance level. 
Computational Alternative 
A* 
(2) 
B* 
(3) 
C* 
(4) 
(a) Insiders 
43.0 
50.3 
14,7 
73.7 
76.5 
92.1 
58.4 
28.0 
0.48 
34.3 
51.2 
16.9 
65.7 
70.2 
89.6 
54.6 
26.2 
0.48 
44.8 
45.9 
44.4 
45.2 
39.7 
37.0 
42.9 
3.6 
0.08 
(b) Outsiders 
83.0 
2.9 
42.8 
74.6 
99.2 
91.2 
65.6 
36.4 
0.55 
85.2 
3.4 
45.9 
70.4 
98.9 
90.7 
65.7 
35.8 
0.54 
77.1 
81.3 
77.9 
85.8 • 
80.8 
78.8 
80.3 
3.2 
0.04 
ribute importance weigtits(using ttie DRM), individual P1 and P2 assessments, individual 
ance weights, individual PI and P2 assessments, individual attribute performance 
portance weights, group average P1 and P2 assessments, group average attribute 
5.7. CC and PA Index Thresholds 
Table 5.9 is a compilation of the responses given by sampled institutions as to what might be 
considered minimum acceptable thresholds for the CC and PA index. The decision to go 
forward, however, should not be based solely on these values as they have been developed 
from hypothetical company and project profiles and as such they represent only rough 
estimates. 
Table 5.9 
Rough Estimates for Index Thresholds 
Evaluation 
Method (1) 
Holistic 
Decomposed{EI\1) 
Decomposed(DRM) 
Company Competencies Index 
Insiders 
(2) 
80.3 
73.9 
78.7 
Outsiders 
(3) 
75.3 
75.5 
77.3 
Project Attractiveness Index 
Insiders 
(4) 
79.0 
71.0 
74.0 
Outsiders 
(5) 
75.3 
67.3 
69.8 
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5.8. PEM as Sensitivity Analysis Tool 
The purpose of calculating a PA or CC index for a project or company is not simply to verify if it 
surpasses a minimum threshold so that a company may be considered well suited to participate 
in the promotion of an infrastructure project or for a project to be considered attractive for private 
promotion. The calculation of an index provides valuable information as to where effort should 
be concentrated for improving the most promising attributes of a company or project. 
Using, for instance, the responses provided by institution "I - 06" and the performance levels 
defined in project profile "P-6" results in a PA index of 62.0. Figure 5.6 is a geographical 
illustration of the actual and maximum attribute contributions to this index that helps to clarify the 
information contained in the index value. Individual attributes can be ident(fied by their initials 
below the columns. The shaded part of each column represents the actual contribution of the 
attribute to the PA index. Each box at the top of a shaded column (shown with a dotted line 
border) represents the actual contribution provided by that particular attribute if its performance 
level increases by 0.5. The two numbers at the top of each column represent the attribute's 
incremental contribution (i.e., the height of each dotted-line box) and its maximum additional 
contribution if its performance level increases from the current level to point P2. 
Figure 5.6 
Sensitivity Analysis 
Eg. Attribute Conthbutions to PA index of P6 
CPT WT r« 00 rcp oip WW F» coo cw OQP ix« U « 
Sensitivity analysis can be used to investigate how different incentives and risk mitigation 
strategies influence the model attributes. The use of the model improves the understanding of 
the weakness and strengths of the project, and hence, allows for better decision making. From 
figure 5.6 it is quite clear that the attributes that can contribute the most to the improvement of 
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the PA index are financial viability, certainty of revenues, availability of adequate financial 
sources to raise the financing, level of community support and certainty of construction and 
operation costs. Therefore, efforts to improve the quality of the project should aim at increasing 
the performance level of these attributes. Some of the strategies that can enhance the 
performance of these attributes include : provision of a minimum-revenue guarantee, supply of 
long-term financing by the Development Bank, utilisation of the local companies (in order to 
build some rapport between the local community and the project owning company), and use of 
lump-sum construction contracts. 
5.9. Conclusion 
The result of this pain staking effort of involving many institutions, time and energy is evidenced 
by the interest, enthusiasm and generous contribution provided by many institutions which has 
helped in arriving at this Project Evaluation Model, a multi-attribute evaluation model that can be 
used to evaluate projects and project promoting companies. At the conceptual level the 
hierarchical structure of this model represents the institutions consensus and provides the 23 
attributes that must be evaluated for any promoting company or candidate project. 
The accuracy and robustness of the PEM has been verified by the good agreement of its results 
(irrespective of the decomposition method used to establish attribute weights) and the 
institutions' holistic evaluations for both projects and companies. This agreement also indicates 
that the two decomposition methods used to establish the composite weights for all attributes, 
the DRM and the EM, are essentially equivalent. Perhaps more important, is the conclusion 
that, at least in the initial stages, implementations of the PEM need not use either method to 
reassess composite weights for the 23 attributes. Sensitivity analysis has shown that the 
composite weights provided in Table 5.2 are quite effective in representing the consensus of the 
entire group of sampled institutions. Thus, it may be sufficient to establish attribute performance 
levels (that are project-and company-specific) and one-dimensional value curves for each 
attribute that reflect the preferences of the decision maker. The PEM forces the decision maker 
to structure and separate the important problem dimensions, and provides a clear 
representation of the underlying attribute levels and values. Furthermore, the decomposition of 
the overall company and project evaluation into more manageable components provides a 
mechanism for sensitivity analysis and the generation of alternatives for improvement. 
Appendix Continue in the next page 
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Appendix 5.1 
Attribute Descriptions 
Internal Organization Characteristics: 
• Quality of Management Team(QMT)- Assessment of the aptitude of the company's management team to 
handle the project. This includes{1) the presence of negotiation and political skills to negotiate and interact 
with the different partners; (2) the presence of the necessary skills to understand the complexity of the 
project and to select and acquire the right expertise; (3) past experience with similar projects; and (4)the 
existence of patience and resolve. 
• Fitting of strategic planning (FSP)- Adequacy of the project in fulfilling corporate interests and objectives 
such as industry positioning(e.g., access to new markets and enhancement of corporate image), business 
expansion (or business survival in case of a weak market), and diversification of business line. 
• Compatibility with potential patterns (CPP)- Existence of similarities and synergy among potential 
partners. 
Production Capability: 
• Adequacy of specialized knowledge (ASK) - adequacy of the in-house expertise (technical, legal and/or 
financial) to properly handle the complexity and scope of the project tasks assigned to the company. 
• Overall quality of Productive Resources(QPR) - Evaluation of the characteristics, qualification and 
features of the company's productive resources (e.g. labour and equipment ) to effectively perform the 
project tasks assigned to the company. 
• Availability of productive Resources(APR) - the company's ability to provide the necessary productive 
resources(e.g., labour and equipment) to be used during the project either by using its actual available 
capacity or by expanding its capacity level. 
Financial Resources & Constraints: 
• Ability to Fund initial project costs(FIC) - The company's ability to share with other promoting partners 
the expenditures that incur during the initial stages of the project(e.g., feasibility studies, preliminary design, 
proposal preparation, and bid submission). 
• Ability to supply capital for the project (SCP) - the company's ability to commit and provide its own 
financial resources to (1) help fund the project, normally through equity infusions; and (2) back its project 
operations (e.g.,"fund" incurred costs that have not been paid or billed). 
• Quality of profitability (QP) - Assessment of the quality of the project return on the company's investment 
in terms of its expected amount its certainty( risk profile), and its timing(dividend and sell-out policies). 
Promoting Team Characteristics: 
• Character of promoting Team's Management (CPT)- promoters' ability to create a management team that 
acts as an "owner" and is capable of identifying strategies and pursuing objectives that enhance the 
project's likelihood of success rather than making decisions based on what is best for individual promoters. 
• Strength of promoting Team (SPT) - the capability of the promoting team to handle the project based on 
its engineering talent and expertise, facility-operating experience, in-country knowledge, local contacts, 
negotiating and political skills to interact with the principalC'client"), financial strength and expertise, 
knowledge of competition, and the ability to identify and allocate risks to the participants best able to 
manage them. 
• Adequacy of promoters agreement (PA) - adequacy of the promoters agreement as a vehicle through 
which promoting partners work in cooperation to define the specific functions of each promoter and to 
structure the policies that govern the contract policies(e.g., transfer of shares, voting rights, dividend policy) 
and the operational details of the project(e.g., which project management system to use). 
Technical Evaluation: 
• Ability to provide a quality design (QD) - promoters' ability to develop a design that (1) is compatible with 
the terms of the privatisation or concession agreement(e.g., project capacity, life expectancy, and quality of 
services), with local legislation (i.e., meeting local standards and regulations), and with existing associated 
facilities; (2) is functional; and (3) uses known proven and reliable technology. 
• Ability to provide a feasible construction plan (FCP) - promoters' ability to provide a construction plan 
that is sensitive to the duration of the construction period while considering the final quality of the facility, the 
availability of labour, materials, and equipment for the construction of the facility. 
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• Ability to provide an adequate operation-Transfer package (OPT) - Promoters' confidence in tlieir ability 
to offer(1)operational methods that are simple and efficient and that consider the availability of skilled 
personnel to operate the facility, training programs, the availability of raw/ materials necessary to run the 
facility, and the planning of time allowances for major maintenance work; and, in "and, in "finite-concession" 
projects,(2) a transfer strategy that considers the training of client personnel, the quality of the facility at the 
time of transfer, and optional provisions that allow the client to sell the facility to the promoters or to further 
extend the concession period. 
Financial Assessment: 
• Availability of adequate Financial sources to Raise the Financing (SRF)- Assessment of the availability 
of adequate financial sources to fund the project. It considers (1) the existence of a well-developed local 
capital market (e.g., possibility to raise long-term funds from local commercial sources); (2) the availability of 
loans and export credits from international commercial lenders and internat/orra/ financing institutions(e.g., 
the worid bank, EBRD, and international credit agencies) to supplement equity and local debt; and (3) the 
availability of the necessary financial instruments used to stmcture the financial package. 
• Financial Viability (FV) - Assessment of the project's capacity to service principal and interest payments 
on the project debt over the term of the various loans and to provide a return on equity that is 
commensurate with whatever development and long-lenn project risks the equity investors are being asked 
to take. 
• Certainty of Construction and operational costs (COC) - Assessment of the certainty(i.e., risk profile) of 
the construction, operational, and maintenance costs. It considers the promoter's cost exposure to (1) 
uncertainties in the scope of work;' (2) construction and operational risks(such as construction delays, cost 
overruns, contractor performance, unforeseen physical and weather conditions, accidental damage, and 
failure of equipment); (3) the conditions of existing facilities that have been transferred to the promoters; and 
(4) alterations on macroeconomic factors (such as inflation, interest rates, and currency exchange rates) 
• Certainty of Revenues (CR)- Assessment of the certainty (i.e., risk profile) of the project revenues. It 
considers the project's income potential and uncertainty based on (1) demand forecasts; (2) the duration of 
the concession; (3) the identification of specific revenue streams; (4) the availability of revenues before 
construction completion; (5) the availability of commercial freedom to set and adjust utility(toll) prices; (6) the 
existence of other competing facilities; (7) the provision of contract led revenues; (8) the quality of 
receivables(i.e., the creditworthiness of the future users/tenants of the facility); (9) the elasticity of utility (toll) 
prices; and (10) alterations on macroeconomic factors(such as inflation, interest rates, and currency 
exchange rates) 
Principal's Qualification & Local conditions: 
• Overall quality of the principal (OQP) - Assessment of the overall quality of the principal (i.e., client) of the 
project. It considers(l) the ability of the principal to provide financial (e.g., guarantees and standby 
financing) and logistical support; (2) the creditworthiness of the principal; (3) the integrity of the "procurement 
process" (e.g., the existence of an unbiased evaluation of the different proposals, the timeliness of the 
agreements that spell out in detail the support to be provided by the principal and the rights and obligations 
of the project-owning company); and (4) the existence of a body formed by high rank (principal's) personnel 
that have the will and determination to "get the job done" and the necessary authority to commit their 
agencies/companies to the terms of the negotiation with the promoting team in a timely manner. 
• Level of Community Support (LCS) - assessment of the public support and acceptance of the project and 
its implications regarding user-pay policy(e.g., user resistance to pay tolls or user ineptitude to pay non-
subsidized utilities),foreign ownership of assets, and environmental concerns. 
• Legal Environment (LE)- Assessment of the maturity and reliability of the local basic legal and regulatory 
systems (e.g., labour and tax laws) and also of the particular legal and regulatory systems that regulate 
concession-financed projects and enforce concession contracts(e.g., legislation regarding the private 
ownership of assets, land acquisition, investment rules, toll and tariff indexation an-angements, and 
environmental concerns). 
• Political Environment (PE) -Assessment of the political stability of the host country. It considers(l) the 
possibility of govemments to take actions that directly affect the profitability level of the project(e.g., changes 
in environmental laws, taxation and controls on equity, repatriation of funds, fiscal and monetary controls, 
and exchange mechanisms; interference in operations and tariff policy; nationalization; and expropriation): 
and (2) the likelihood of having significant changes in the political regime or significant levels of political 
inspired violence(e.g., possibility of riots, terrorism, general strikes, and wars). 
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Appendix 5.2 
Points P1 and P2 for Attribute Value Functions 
TABLE A.1 Points P1 and P2 for All Attributes-Insiders' Assessments 
Attribute 
(1) 
1-01 1 1-02 
PI 
(2)_ 
P2 
(3) 
PI 
(4) 
P2 
(5) 
1-03 
PI 1 P2 
(6) m 
1-04 
PI 
(8) 
P2 
(9) 
1-05 
PI 
(10) 
P2 
(11) 
1-06 
PI 
(12) 
P2 
(13) 
1-07 
PI 
(14) 
P2 
(15) 
1-08 
PI 
(16) 
P2 
('7 
(a) Internal organization characteristics 
Quality of 
management team 
Filling of strategic 
planning 
Compatibility with 
potential partners 
6.0 
4.0 
5.0 
7.5 
6.5 
7.0 
3.0 
3.0 
3.0 
8.0 
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7.0 
3.5 
5.0 
4.0 
7.0 
5.5 
6.0 
7.0 
4.0 
7.0 
9.0 
6.5 
9.0 
4.0 
2.0 
2.5 
7.0 
6.0 
6.0 
3.5 
3.0 
3.5 
7.5 
7.0 
7.5 
4.0 
3.0 
3.0 
8.0 
7.0 
7.0 
35 
3.5 
4.0 
6.5 
5.5 
7.0 
(b) Production ca|)abilitv 
Adequacy of 
specialized 
Itnowledge 
Overall quality of 
productive 
resources 
Availability of 
productive 
resources 
6.0 
3.5 
2.5 
7.5 
6.5 
6.0 
3.0 
3.0 
3.0 
8.0 
7.0 
7.0 
3.0 
4.0 
3.0 
7.0 
5.5 
6.5 
5.0 
7.0 
4.5 
8.0 
9.0 
7.5 
3.5 
2.0 
2.0 
6.0 
7.0 
7.0 
3.0 
2.5 
2.5 
7.5 
7.5 
7.5 
3.0 
3.0 
3.0 
8.0 
7.5 
7.0 
6.5 
3.5 
7.0 
7.5 
5.5 
8.0 
(c) Financial resources and constraints 
Ability to fund 
initial project costs 
Ability of supply 
capital for project 
Quality of 
profitability 
4.0 
3.0 
6.5 
7.0 
7.0 
8.0 
4.0 
3.0 
5.0 
8.0 
7.0 
9.0 
2.0 
3.0 
3.0 
8.0 
7.5 
7.0 
5.0 
6.0 
5.0 
7.5 
9.0 
9.0 
4.0 
3.0 
4.0 
8.0 
8.0 
6.5 
2.5 
3.0 
2.5 
7.0 
8.0 
8.0 
2.5 
2.5 
4.0 
6.5 
6.5 
8.0 
3.0 
3.0 
7.0 
7.0 
5.5 
8.5 
(d) Promoting team characteristics 
Character of 
promoting team's 
management 
Strength of 
promotei^ 
agreement 
Adequacy of 
promoters 
agreement 
4.0 
6.0 
4.0 
7.5 
7.5 
7.5 
3.0 
3.0 
3.0 
7.0 
7.0 
7.0 
3.0 
4.0 
4.5 
6.0 
7.0 
8.0 
6.0 
6.0 
5.5 
8.5 
8.5 
8.0 
4.0 
4.0 
2.0 
7.0 
7.5 
6.0 
2.5 
3.0 
3.0 
8.0 
7.5 
7.0 
3.0 
3.5 
3.5 
7.5 
8.0 
7.5 
3.0 
6.5 
4.5 
6.0 
8.5 
5.5 
(e) Technical evaluation 
Ability to provide 
a quality design 
Ability to provide 
a feasible 
construction plan 
Ability to provide 
adequate 
operation-transfer 
package 
4.5 
4.0 
4.0 
7.0 
7.5 
7.5 
4.0 
4.0 
3.0 
8.0 
7.0 
7.0 
4.5 
4.0 
2.5 
7.0 
7.5 
7.0 
5.5 
4.0 
5.5 
8.0 
7.5 
8.5 
2.5 
2.5 
2.0 
8.0 
7.5 
8.0 
2.0 
2.5 
2.5 
8.0 
7.5 
7.5 
3.0 
3.0 
3.0 
7.5 
7.5 
7.5 
6.5 
7.5 
4.5 
8.5 
8.5 
5.5 
(0 Financial assessment 
Availability of 
adequate financial 
sources to raise 
financing 
Financial visibility 
Certainty of 
construction and 
operation costs 
Certainty of 
revenues 
5.5 
6.5 
5.5 
5.5 
8.0 
8.0 
8.0 
8.0 
5.0 
5.0 
4.0 
4.0 
8.0 
8.0 
8.0 
8.0 
4.5 
4.0 
4.0 
4.0 
(E) Princi 
Overall quality of 
principal 
Level of commu-
nity support 
Legal environment 
Political environ-
ment 
5.5 
3.5 
5.5 
5.5 
8.0 
7.0 
8.0 
8.0 
3.0 
4.0 
3.0 
4.0 
7.0 
8.0 
7.0 
8.0 
4.0 
4.5 
3.5 
3.5 
8.0 
8.5 
8.0 
8.0 
7.0 
7.0 
7.0 
7.0 
9.0 
9.0 
9.0 
9.0 
3.5 
3.5 
2.5 
3.0 
8.0 
8.5 
6.5 
7.5 
1.5 
2.0 
1.5 
1.5 
8.0 
8.0 
8.0 
9.0 
3.0 
4.0 
3.0 
3.0 
8.0 
8.5 
7.0 
7.5 
7.0 
7.0 
6.5 
7.0 
8.5 
8.5 
7.5 
9.0 
pal's qualification and local conditions 
7.0 
8.0 
6.5 
6.5 
7.0 
4.5 
4.5 
4.5 
8.0 
7.0 
7.0 
7.0 
3.0 
2.5 
4.0 
4.0 
8.5 
7.0 
7.5 
8.5 
1.5 
2.5 
2.5 
2.5 
8.0 
8.0 
7.5 
7.5 
3.5 
2.5 
3.5 
3.0 
8.0 
6.5 
8.0 
8.0 
3.5 
5.5 
6.0 
6.5 
7.0 
S.O 
8.0 
8.5 
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Table A.2. Points PI and P2 for all Attributes-outsiders' Assessments 
Attribute 
(1) 
O-Ol 
PI 
(2) 
P2 
(3) 
O-02 
PI 
(4) 
P2 
(5) 
O-03 
PI 
(6) 
P2 
(7) 
O-04 
PI 
(8) 
P2 
(9) 
O-05 
P) 
(10) 
P2 
(11) 
O-06 
PI 
(12) 
P2 
(13) 
(a) Internal organization characteristics 
Quality of 
management team 
Fitting of strategic 
planning 
Compalibilily with 
potential partners 
4.5 
4.5 
4.5 
6.5 
5.5 
5.5 
6.5 
4.0 
5.0 
8.0 
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7.0 
2.5 
3.5 
3.5 
7.5 
7.5 
7.5 
4.0 
3.0 
3.0 
8.0 
6.0 
7.0 
4.0 
2.0 
3.0 
8.0 
6.0 
8.0 
6.5 
4.5 
7.5 
7.5 
6.5 
8.5 
(b) Production capability 
Adequacy of 
specialized 
knowledge 
Overall quality of 
productive 
resources 
Availability of 
productive 
resources 
3.5 
4.5 
3.5 
6.5 
6.5 
4.5 
3.5 
3.5 
3.5 
6.5 
6.5 
6.5 
3.5 
3.5 
3.5 
7.0 
7.5 
7.5 
3.0 
3.0 
2.0 
7.0 
7.0 
6.0 
4.0 
3.0 
3.0 
8.0 
8.0 
8.0 
5.5 
5.5 
4.5 
7.5 
7.5 
6.5 
(c) Financial resources and constraints 
Ability to fund 
initial projcci costs 
Ability of supply 
capital for project 
Quality of 
profitability 
4.5 
4.5 
6.5 
6.5 
5.5 
7.5 
7.5 
5.0 
7.0 
8.5 
7.0 
8.0 
3.0 
3.5 
3.5 
7.0 
7.0 
7.0 
4.0 
2.0 
4.0 
7.0 
6.0 
8.0 
4.0 
4.0 
3.0 
8.0 
8.0 
8.0 
7.5 
7.5 
6.5 
8.5 
8.5 
8.5 
(d) PromotinK learn characteristics 
Character of 
promoting team's 
management 
Strength of 
promoters 
agreement 
Adequacy of 
promoters 
agreement 
4.5 
4.5 
6.5 
5.5 
5.5 
7.5 
7.5 
6.0 
6.5 
8.5 
7.5 
8.0 
3.0 
3.0 
3.0 
7.0 
7.5 
6.5 
4.0 
3.0 
4.0 
8.0 
7.0 
8.0 
4.0 
4,0 
4.0 
8.0 
8.0 
8.0 
6.5 
5.5 
4.5 
8.5 
7.5 
7,5 
(e) Technical evaluation 
Ability to provide 
a quality design 
Ability to provide 
a feasible 
construction plan 
Ability to provide 
adequate 
operation-transfer 
package 
5.5 
3.5 
4.5 
7.5 
4.5 
5.5 
8.0 
8.0 
7.0 
9.0 
9.0 
8.0 
4.5 
4.5 
4.0 
7.0 
6.0 
8.0 
3.0 
3.0 
3.0 
8.0 
8.0 
7.0 
4.0 
4.0 
4,0 
8.0 
8.0 
8.0 
5.5 
7.5 
5.5 
7,5 
8,5 
8,5 
(0 Financial assessment 
Availability of 
adequate financial 
sources to raise 
financing 
Financial visibility 
Certainty of 
construction and 
operation costs 
Certainty of 
revenues 
4.5 
2.5 
2.5 
1.5 
5.5 
3.5 
3.5 
2.5 
8.0 
8.5 
6.5 
9.0 
9.0 
8.0 
6.5 8.0 
4.5 
5.0 
5.0 
7.0 
8.0 
9.0 
7.0 
9.0 
4.0 
5.0 
3.0 
40 
7.0 
8.0 
7.0 
8.0 
4.0 
4.0 
4.0 
4,0 
8.0 
8.0 
8.0 
8.0 
5.5 
4.5 
4.5 
4.5 
7,5 
8,5 
7,5 
7,5 
(g) Principal's qualification and local conditions 
Overall quality of 
principal 
Level of 
community 
support 
Legal environment 
Political environ-
ment 
3.5 
4.5 
4.5 
4.5 
4.5 
6.5 
6.5 
5.5 
7.0 
7.0 
6.0 
6.5 
8.5 
8.0 
8.0 
8.0 
5.0 
4.0 
3.5 
5.5 
7.0 
8.0 
7.0 
7.5 
3.0 
4.0 
3.0 
4.0 
7.0 
7.0 
6.0 
7.0 
4,0 
3,0 
3.0 
4.0 
8.0 
7.0 
7.0 
8.0 
7.5 
7.5 
7.5 
7.5 
8,5 
8,5 
8,5 
8,5 
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Chapter 6 
Best Practices and Status of adoption in India 
6.1 Introduction 
The analyses in the past three chapters of this study has covered the industry and 
sectoral aggregates (in Chapter 3), followed by Structural issues (BOT structures) in 
Chapter 4), and finally the analyses of project level attributes (in Chapter 5). From 
these discussions it would be clear that the challenges of the infrastructure sector 
underscores that the structures evolved for each project are unique, which will call for 
tremendous depth of appraisal and risk evaluation competencies within the financing 
institution. Furthermore, it is derived that risk mitigation measures followed in normal 
corporate financing are not be easily adaptable to infrastructure project finance. 
6.2 Status of Infrastructure sectors in India 
6.2.1 Power 
This part of the research study tries to identify practices that would lead to the 
benefits that private sector participation (PSP) could achieve for consumers of power 
and other infrastructure sectors in the context of the major research objectives of 
Risk Management stated at the outset. In light of the difficulties being experienced in 
a number of countries with their Independent Power Producer (IPP) contracts, due to 
the devaluation of their currencies, this work is quite timely, and several of these 
practices relate to ways in which to mitigate or avoid such situations in the future. 
Many India specific material apart from global literature have been scanned for this 
analysis. In addition to power generation, where there has been by far the most 
private sector investment and competition to date in developing countries, this report 
evaluates an area that is only minimally present in the developing countries, namely 
private sector investment in power transmission and distribution (T&D). This review 
also covers the important distinction in emerging competitive markets between 
distribution (what has come to be called "the wires business') and retailing (marketing 
to customers). 
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T&D investments by the private sector, and the emergence of competition involving 
these segments have tremendous potential for increasing the efficiency of the power 
sector, creating a financially viable industry, and benefiting all consumers. 
Privatizations of T&D around the world are just beginning to grow. Analysis of data 
indicates the prices that have been paid over time, in constant dollars, for some 
distribution company investments in both developing and developed countries. 
Nearly 80 such transactions have been identified to date worldwide, including 56 in 
developing countries for which investors have paid a total of about US $26 billion. 
Clearly, much higher prices per customer have been paid in some countries (e.g., 
Argentina and Brazil) than in others (e.g., Hungary). However, private T&D 
investment hasn't really picked up in Asia, a topic that is causing concern in India as 
well. 
To identify the practices to stimulate investment and competition in T&D markets, the 
researcher drew upon extensive contacts and carried out research worldwide, and 
also tapped into the knowledge of professionals in the power sector and a good 
number of researchers in Latin America, California and Eastern Europe through 
Internet chats and tele-conferencing. At least fifteen experts who have first hand 
knowledge in the field have been spoken to for this research, and the practices have 
been drawn from a wide spectrum that can be characterized as government and 
legislative practices; regulatory practices; economic; labor; and financial practices; 
and practices relating to the privatization process and competition in general. Most 
of these are discussed extensively in this chapter. 
Figure 6.1 demonstrates the different levels of progress in power sector restructuring 
in various countries, and provides an indication, though imprecise, of the country's 
progress towards a competitive market. First, the vertical axis shows the present 
degree of private sector ownership allowed in the country. This is an indication of the 
government's willingness to utilize private sector investment, even if full privatization 
has not yet been realized. 
For example, the government in Argentina has made a policy decision to divest much 
of the generation, transmission and distribution (T&D) segments of the power sector, 
and has already sold much of it, so Argentina is placed high on the chart by this 
measure. Indonesia, which has to date allowed private sector participation (PSP) in 
the generation sector only, is ranked towards the lower end of the scale, and France, 
which is completely bundled, is at the bottom. 
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The horizontal axis reflects the present degree of vertical dis-integration or 
unbundling. As discussed elsewhere in this report, unbundling is one of the key 
practices or precursors leading to the potential for investment and competition in the 
power sector. Those countries in which the segments of generation, transmission, 
and distribution have been separated into different organizations are ranked higher 
on the scale than those that have not been unbundled. For example, Chile and the 
United Kingdom have completely separated the various industry segments; while in 
the People's Republic of China (PRC), most of the provincial utilities are fully 
integrated, except for some national power plants, so PRC is further to the left on this 
scale. Similarly, in Pakistan, even though one of the two major state electrical 
companies is being sold to investors, most segments of the power industry have not 
yet been unbundled and so the power sector remains a largely vertically integrated 
one. 
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While the measurements along these axes are judgmental, it is in-general true that 
the farther a country is located towards the upper right hand corner of the chart, the 
more unbundled and potentially competitive is the country's power market. 
6.2.1.1 Process of Restructuring in the Power Sector 
There is a raging debate in the domain of reform and restructuring as to the 
sequence adopted my many countries in following through the process of reforms 
and expert analysts are of the opinion that 'jumping up sequences' have many times 
played havoc with the results. In India also at the time the infrastructure sectors were 
opened up for private investment, governments did not recognize the need to 
establish an independent regulatory framework to facilitate the orderly entry of the 
private sector, and create a level playing field between the new entrants and the 
dominant incumbents. Regulatory reforms were thus not contemplated as part of the 
initial reform process. Other East Asian countries were no better, in India, 
infrastructure regulation was first established in the state of Orissa through the 
enactment of Orissa Electricity Regulatory Commission Act, 1996. The Telecom 
Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) was set up only as recently as 1997 through the 
Telecom Regulatory Authority of India Act. The Central Electricity Regulatory 
Commission was established thereafter in 1998 through the Electricity Regulatory 
Commission Act 1998. Thus, in both the telecom and electricity sectors, the 
regulators came into being much after the sectors were opened up for private 
investment. It was only in the port sector that the Tariff Authority for Major Ports 
(TAMP) was established in 1997 just when the sector was opened up for private 
investment. 
Clearly, the sequencing of reforms has not been correct in India. The consequence of 
opening up infrastructure sectors for private investment without an independent 
regulator in place to ensure the smooth entry of new players is a situation where the 
licensing conditions were onerous, the incumbent public enterprise was free to create 
hurdles for the new entrants and the Government had a vested interest in protecting 
the public enterprise. This has resulted in innumerable problems in inter-connectivity 
and revenue sharing, thus providing a rationale for the continuance of the regulator, 
though in a redefined role. 
Though there are differences even among experts of the relevant sectors on the 
correct sequencing (steps to be proceeded in the order of precedence), many 
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workshops and discussions conducted by Financial Institutions, Government 
Departments/ Ministries and Multi-lateral Institutions like ADB and World Bank have 
tried to narrow this and establish a logically relevant and a clear sequence to be 
adopted by functionaries. The ADB's regional assistance team covering Asia had 
done one such workshop co-ordinated by their sectoral experts in 1998 and involving 
experienced senior government and private sector individuals together with 
restructuring consultants and the findings / final outputs of the study suggests a 
prioritization, involving five major steps in order of precedence. To some extent, 
these steps may proceed in parallel, but they are best to consider as sequential 
actions that will lead to the implementation of a competitive power market (see Figure 
6.2). 
These steps are: 
1. Getting the investment framework right. 
2. Deciding on the goals of restructuring and the ideal industry structure. 
3. Preparing the players to participate in a competitive market. 
4. Privatizing existing and new assets. 
5. Ensuring that the competitive market is implemented properly. 
First, a government should put in place a rational investment framework. This 
includes actions such as: (i) establishing a government commitment to a competitive 
power markef; (ii) ensuring ministry and utility compliance with that commitment; (ill) 
passing a law for restructuring the power sector to be implemented over a fixed 
period of time; (iv) ensuring that the currency is convertible and foreign exchange is 
available; (v) strengthening local capital markets; and (vi) setting up a credible legal 
frame work. 
Figure 6.2: The 5-Slep Restructuring Process 
1 
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TENDERS-
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Second, a country should determine how they want the power sector to be 
structured, both over the near term and long term, and why. To paraphrase Lewis 
Carroll in Alice in Wonderland: "it is much easier to get there if you know where 
you're going." For example, a developing country may decide that they will ultimately 
structure the power sector with: 
• an independent regulator that oversees power T&D; 
• a number of privately owned, competitive generating plants; 
• a single regulated transmission system that includes private ownership; 
• a number of power distribution companies with incentives for performance; 
and 
• Competition for retailing power to end-use customers. 
If the country has committed to the above structure, they are in a much better 
position to take the steps necessary to achieve those ends, including interim steps as 
a transition to that final structure. Thailand, for example, is working on a privatization 
plan identifying the final structure of its power sector and the three transition steps 
required to achieve that structure. Also, if a country knows what benefits it expects 
from restructuring (e.g., lower losses in distribution, higher collections, greater plant 
reliability, iov*er prices, money for the treasury, and consistency in regulatory 
decisions) they will be able to design the restructuring process to maximize the 
likelihood of achieving these goals. In this context, it is critical that the country identify 
the structure they intend to adopt for both new and existing assets. Often, some of 
the greatest gains to customers will be realized from PSP in existing assets, though 
politically, these may be harder to sell. 
Third, it is important to prepare the players to participate competitively. This includes 
such actions as; training the regulators so they can operate effectively; establishing 
clear regulatory rules; reducing or removing subsidies; enlisting public support for 
the restructuring process; re-organizing and preparing the state-owned utility for the 
new structure and incentives for performance that will emerge; developing draft 
tender documents and contracts; and defining a new role for the ministry. 
Fourth, the developing country must carry out the restructuring or sale of assets. In 
Asia, most private sector investments in the power sector to date have been in new 
assets (e.g., to build a new power plant). As mentioned above, to achieve the most 
benefits of private sector investment and competition, the country involved must be 
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willing to sell the existing assets as well, especially in power distribution. The 
tendering process must be carried out in a transparent and open manner, and should 
be carried out in a short period of time. 
Finally, it is critical that the developing countries implement all these changes 
effectively. It is not sufficient just to have a regulator in place, for example. In 
addition, that regulator must act according to the principles set out in the legislation 
that set it up (e.g., performance-based rate making) and this may mean not always 
going along with the state-owned utilities' position. If there is legislation requiring that 
the utilities reduce their distribution losses according to certain deadlines (as in the 
Philippines), those requirements must be enforced. If an independent system 
operator (ISO) is responsible for transmission access and system reliability, then that 
organization must be properly staffed, funded and managed. Good intentions, and 
even good legislation, will not achieve the goals of competition in the power sector on 
their own — good follow-through is necessary as well. 
6.2.1.2. Power Sector Reforms in India 
India's power sector, which is dominated by public utilities, suffers from inadequate 
investment on the one hand and poor shape of Electricity Boards on the other all of 
which ultimately resulting in shortage of power supply. The power ministry has 
firmed up an action plan to double the electricity generation capacity in the country to 
over 2 lakh MW by the end of the Eleventh Five Year Plan (2008-12). Projects 
aggregating 1,07,000 MW generation capacity had been identified by the ministry for 
completion during the Tenth and the Eleventh Five Year Plans. While 43,000 MW 
additional power generation capacity has been planned for the Tenth Plan, 64,000 
MW target has been fixed for the Eleventh Plan. The institutional and policy changes 
to realize even half of these are challenging. Many are doubtful, about the 
achievement of these targets, but need not presume failure that would be inevitable. 
Under the action plan, the power ministry has envisaged large-sized thermal units 
such as 3 X 660 MW Sipat (NTPC) and 6 x 660 Hirma (IPP) to reap economies of 
scale. The Plan would target 35,000 MW additional generation capacity in the hydel 
sector as against the existing capacity of 25,000 MW. The likely problems in land 
acquisition and in management of environmental problems, and rehabilitation and 
resettlement, do not find adequate mention. Under the Tenth Five Year Plan, the 
Power Ministry hopes to operationalize the mega power policy with a set of fiscal and 
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other incentives (such as customs duty exemption and ten year tax holiday) extended 
to large-sized inter-state projects of over 1,000 MW for thermal, and 750 MW for 
hydro. The ministry hopes that these steps would ensure off-take of power from 
identified mega projects to beneficiary states and bulk consumers on the basis of 
long-term power purchase agreements. While the prospective entrants have been 
examining the feasibility of setting up new projects, the main concern has been the 
problems related to transmission and distribution.(T&D). As the transmission and 
distribution network is owned by the SEBs the private generating companies building 
projects will be selling their power to them. In view of the poor financial performance 
of SEBs in the recent past in terms of irrational tariff, low plant load factor (PLF), high 
T&D losses and high level of receivables, prospective promoters have been insisting 
upon guarantees from the state governments and counter guarantees from the 
central government. Escrow cover for the settlement of their dues for sale of 
electricity to SEBs. Infact, the flaw in the policy with regard to electricity was the 
failure to recognize that the root of the problem lies in the financial unviability of the 
state electricity boards. This has made independent power projects (IPPs) look for 
temporary solutions such as escrow arrangements and central government 
guarantees which simply do not address the core problem. True reform is awaited in 
the power sector. The single buyer model of private generation of electricity could 
never have taken off with the SEBs in near bankrupt conditions. The process was 
started with the Deepak Parekh Committee Report which questioned the suitability of 
escrow account of SEB receivable and escrow capacity of KSEB (Karnataka State 
Electricity Board). The Committee also suggested that funding should be done on the 
strength and viability of the project itself. Important suggestions were made in the 
expert group reports (GOI, 2001a and 2001b), the energy review committee reports 
(GOM, 2001a and 2001b) popularly known as the Godbole Committee Report. The 
key process in reform seem to be Distribution reform in the power sector and unless 
otherwise we tackle it, involving the private sector in generation is going to be 
meaningless. 
Settlement of SEB Dues 
The chief ministers' conference, held on 3 March 2001 under the chairmanship of the 
Prime Minister deliberated on the Power sector. They agreed to meet the challenge 
of restructuring head-on. The Union Minister of Power constituted an expert group 
under the chairmanship of Montek Singh Ahluwalia to recommend measures for 
onetime settlement of outstanding dues of SEBs to the central public sector 
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undertaking (CPSUs) like the NTPC, Coal India, Railways, NHPC etc., and the dues 
from CPSUs to SEBs. The group was also entrusted to suggest a strategy for capital 
restructuring of SEBs to make them operationally viable. The expert group's 
recommendation includes a package of incentives and disincentives linked to 
commercial discipline and initiation of a process of reforms. The group emphasized 
that the recommendations have to be accepted in toto. For the states participating in 
the scheme, the group recommended 50 percent waiver of the surcharge/interest on 
delayed payments. The rest of the dues, including the full principal payment 
amounting to Rs 33,600 crores was to be securitized through tax-free bonds bearing 
an interest rate of 8.5 per cent and issued by the respective state governments. The 
group recommended that if a state defaults in current payments for power /fuel, there 
should be a graded reduction in the supply of power from central power stations and 
coal supplies to the state. Further, SEBs should accept reform-based performance 
milestones such as setting up of SERCs (State Electricity Regulatory Commissions), 
metering of distribution feeders and improvement in revenue realization. Several 
states including MP, Orissa and West Bengal have objected to the severe penalties 
proposed by the panel against defaults. The government has accepted the first part 
of the report. 
SEB Restructuring 
In the second part of the report (GOI, 2001b), the group has proposed a 
comprehensive restructuring of the sector to make it viable. The causes of failures 
are in line with other reports. The committee has suggested that market borrowings 
and private investments should be tapped to finance expansion and modernization 
plans in the sector. It has also recommended waiver of loans provided by the states 
to the SEBs and central assistance for bridging the revenue gap, meeting the costs 
of the work force rationalization and adjustment costs for shifting to open access. The 
group has recommended that the adjustment costs of the transition would have to be 
funded out of the budgetary support. Further, it has recommended central assistance 
equal to 5 per cent of the total sale revenue of an SEB in 2000-1, subject to a ceiling 
of Rs 100 crore per year for allowing 'open access' of electricity. It has also 
suggested that the assistance should be provided to the SEB or its successor entities 
for a period of three years after 'open access' is guaranteed. 
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The group has recommended that during the first year of direct sale by any private 
generator to bulk consumers, the SEB or the transmission company should receive 
central assistance of 50 paise per unit of power wheeled, subject to a ceiling of Rs 
250 crore. The panel has recommended that 'this assistance should be reduced to 
25 paise per unit during the second and third years, the ceiling remaining 
unchanged', it has estimated that the central assistance on this count would not 
exceed Rs 10,000 crore during the Tenth Plan. The second part of the report has not 
yet been accepted by the government. 
The Electricity Bill 2001 
Undoubtedly, the precarious financial health of the state electricity boards (SEBs) 
can hardly be conducive for any investment. Promoters and investors have shied 
away from the sector. Policy risks continue to be high. The Electricity Bill drafted by 
the NCAER (National Council of Applied Economic Research) had gone through 
eight drafts before it was cleared by parliament and has come in place of the Indian 
Electricity Act 1910, the Electricity (Supply) Act 1948 and the Electricity Regulatory 
Commission Act 1998. The objective is to bring about comprehensive reforms in the 
power sector. 
The salient features of the bill are: 
• No techno-economic clearance for generating stations and no state licencing 
• Non-discriminatory and open access to the transmission system 
• iVlajor role for the regulators, SERCs and CERC (Central Electricity Regulatory 
Commission) in licencing, tariff, grid rules, and access rules 
• Provides for power trading, and the eventual creation of a spot market 
• Graduated reduction of subsidies; and 
• Mandate for the regulator to cover tariff in all segments. 
6.2.1.3. POWER SECTOR REFORMS AND STATES 
Reforms at the state level have been moving slowly. Administrative changes have 
not been easy to bring about. Table 6.1 succinctly captures the progress of reforms 
in various states. 
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Karnataka 
The expansion of the generation capacity at the Raichur Thermal Power Station 
(RTPS, Unit 7) by the Karnataka Power Corporation Limited (KPCL) became the first 
project where financial closure is subject to reforms. The government of Karnatal<a, 
KPCL, Karnataka Power Transmission Corporation Limited (KPTCL) and IDFC 
signed a multipartite agreement which specifies milestones for reforms to be met by 
Table 6.1 
Parameter 
Andhra Pradesh 
Assam 
Bihar 
Challisgarh 
Delhi 
Goa 
Gujarat 
Haryana 
Himachal Pradesh 
J & K 
Jharkhand 
Karnataka 
Kerala 
Madhya Pradesh 
Maharashtra 
Orissa 
Punjab 
Rajaslhan 
Tamil Nadu 
Ultar Pradesh 
Uttaranehal 
West Bengal 
North East States 
Power Sector' 
SEB 
Restructuring 
V 
-J 
Reform law approved 
by GDI 
•J 
•J 
The state has proposed 
to reorganize SEB into 
3 profit centres. 
Reform Law passed in 
the Assembly. 
•J 
•J 
•J 
• 
• 
Reforms': A 'Score Card' for States* 
Conslitulion 
Of SERC 
V 
V 
-J 
-J 
* 
V 
V 
V 
Notified; yet to be 
constituted 
V 
•J 
-
V 
willing to constitute joint Electricity Regulatory C 
Commercialisation of 
Distribution 
Strategy being finalized 
Committed-proposal to 
bo done during 2001 
Strategy being finalized 
Strategy being finalized 
To be completed by Dec 
2002 
-J 
•J 
Committed 
Strategy being finalized 
-
' 
MoU with 
Government 
-
•J 
•J 
* 
-J 
• 
•J 
-
Jmmission 
Central 
* These constitute reforms in a formal sense. In content restructuring is not uniform across SEBs. Gujarat has 
trifurcated on paper, the GEB purely to meet certain targets set by the ADB (Asian Development Bank) while the 
sector continues as before. It is hoped that the Reform Law would make a difference 
Source : Cll (2001), Press Release. 
the State government and KPTCL such as privatization of distribution within a 
specified period, commitment to financial discipline and creation of a dedicated 
power fund. Encouraged by this development, the Union Finance Minister has 
suggested a conditional lending programme for IPPs by financial institutions, in line 
with the multipartite agreement in Karnataka, as an alternative to escrow based 
lending. 
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Orissa 
Power sector reforms initiated in Orissa six years ago have come to a halt. AES 
Corporation, the US power major has a 49 per cent stake in the Orissa Power 
Generation Company (OPGC) and a 51 per cent stake in Central Electricity Supply 
Company (CESCO), distribution company for central Orissa. The AES has initiated 
arbitration proceedings against GRIDCO for non-payment of dues and has 
threatened to pull out of CESCO if tariffs are not increased. CESCO is losing several 
crores every month in high costs and low tariffs. The power corporation is in red after 
six years of operation. The public, too, is not appreciative of slow and halting manner 
of the reforms process. From being a model in power sector reforms, Orissa's 
experience is now a lesson on how not to go about privatizing the power sector. 
Andhra Pradesh 
Andhra Pradesh (AP) has provided major boost to the power sector reforms. The 
Rural Electrification Corporation (REC) has almost doubled the disbursement amount 
to the state to undertake rural electrification programmes last year. Under its lending 
programme for AP, the corporation has decided to disburse Rs 800 crore to the 
Transmission Corporation of Andhra Pradesh (APTransco) in 2001, which is 
substantially higher than Rs 420 crore during the previous year. 
Rajasthan 
The Rajasthan government has decided to spend Rs 2,000 crore on power sector 
reforms in the next two years in an attempt to make the energy sector self-reliant by 
2005. Jhunjhunu, Jodhpur, Alwar and Jalore districts of the state have been identified 
under the Accelerated Power Development Project of the central government. 
Rajasthan, facing power shortage, has decided to work more on non-conventional 
resources like solar and wind energy. The first wind power project has been set up by 
an iPP in the border district of Jaisalmer. The state has already achieved a record by 
setting up 9,900 domestic light connections based on solar energy. According to the 
Renewable Energy Development Authority (REDA), three demonstration wind power 
stations are already functioning in Jaisalmer, Phalodi and Devgarh. All the three wind 
units have generated more than 7 million units of electricity so far. 
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Jharkhand 
Recognizing the need to open up the power sector to private investment, Jharkhand 
has decided to privatize electricity supply in the state. Power supply as well as 
revenue collection will be first privatized in the state capital, Ranch!, on an 
experimental basis. If successful, it will be implemented in Jamshedpur, Bokaro, 
Dhanbad and other towns. 
Delhi 
The Delhi Vidyut Board (DVB) has invited financial bids for privatization of three 
distribution companies and Tata Power was shortlisted finally. The distribution 
privatisation of New Delhi is a courageous move and therein lies the ingredients for 
future initiatives. Under the scheme, the balance 49 per cent would be held by the 
government but the strategic partner would be given complete freedom in running the 
distribution companies. 
Tamil Nadu 
US based power major CMS Energy has threatened to pull out of the US $ 1.4 billion 
Ennore power project if the Union government does not agree to provide a counter 
guarantee on payments. The state government has strongly advised the Centre not 
to agree to a counter guarantee. The corporation has demanded that the government 
modify the payment security mechanisms for the Ennore project. CMS Energy holds 
26 per cent of the equity in Dakshin Bharat Energy Consortium (DBEC), which is 
executing the 1,850 MW project. The central government is working to provide a type 
of counter guarantee under a new terminology called 'termination guarantee'. Serious 
doubts are being raised as to whether the multi-million dollar integrated liquefied 
natural gas (LNG) import terminal-cum-power project proposed in Tamil Nadu will 
take off. 
The DBEC was willing to sell the entire power generated from the Ennore project to 
the PTC. Tamil Nadu Electricity Board (TNEB), however, decided that it will buy only 
750 MW of power on long-term basis. The MoU stipulates this and states that PTC 
will buy the power generated from Ennore as per the PPA terms agreed to between 
PTC and the developer, namely, DBEC and in consultation between TNEB and other 
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beneficiary states. Tiie company lias drawn the Prime Minister's attention to the 
signing of the Joint Development Agreement on 14 September 2000 in Washington, 
giving the Ennore project special status by both the American and Indian 
governments. 
Alternative Sources 
The government is targeting to generate 10 per cent of the pov\/er requirement from 
renevi/able energy sources and plans to set up additional generation capacity of 
10,000 MW and a target for electrifying 18,000 remote unelectrified villages by 2012. 
Andhra Pradesh leads in power generation from bio-mass such as bagasse, rice 
husk and agricultural waste. Fifty plants of 6 MW range each had been sanctioned, of 
which five had been commissioned and 25 had been sanctioned loans. All the plants 
are expected to be fully operational in two years, accounting for a total of 300 MW of 
additional power. Private entrepreneurs now produce wind electricity in nine states. 
Together, they have a total installed capacity of over 1100 MW — Karnataka has 40 
MW, Andhra Pradesh over 90 MW and Tamil Nadu over 800 MW. During the 2000-
01 fiscal year, the 40 MW installed capacity in the state produced 71.1 MW 
electricity, 8 per cent of the 882.6 million units from renewable sources (solar, bi-
product steam from sugar companies, biomass and small hydel). 
Multi-lateral Institutions and other Financier's strategy in the power sector has been 
to leverage its assistance to support comprehensive reform of the institutional and 
regulatory frameworks at the state level, within an appropriate national power policy, 
by emphasizing restructuring and commercialization of the SEBs; rationalization of 
power tariffs; establishment of independent regulatory commissions; and 
improvement in demand management and efficiency, assistance for capacity 
building, focusing particularly on improving the capacity for undertaking power 
system, least cost development planning and tariff studies; improving the public-
private sector interface, including preparation of power purchase agreements 
between state agencies and independent power producers; and the 
commercialization of distribution operations have also come to the top of the agenda. 
These reform efforts, particularly at the state level, is expected to assist in improving 
public resource management and lowering subsidies, thereby freeing resources for 
enhanced social sector allocation and poverty reduction. Recent experience has 
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shown that the process of reform and restructuring will take time and require support 
over a longer period. Hence, in addition to continued support for policy reforms, the 
projects are expected to support the upgrading and privatization of distribution 
including in rural areas, and, in the case of Madhya Pradesh, an extension of rural 
electrification. At the national level, support for power sector reforms is expected 
through loans from ADB etc., to the Power Finance Corporation. Given the ability of 
companies such as National Thermal Power Corporation to raise funds, and the 
significant potential interest of the private sector for investment in power generation, 
(more so on thermal power generation) it is expected that much of the activity will be 
through Private Sector window. 
The Hydrocarbon Link 
Much of the fortunes of India's Power Sector is tied to the performance of the 
Hydrocarbon sector. The hydrocarbon (oil and gas) sector is critical to India's 
economic growth as it meets direct energy needs, fuels power generation, and 
provides the raw material for downstream industries. India now depends on 
petroleum products and natural gas for over 50 percent of total final energy demand, 
compared with about 35 percent in the 1980s. The country is increasingly dependent 
on imported crude oil and petroleum products, accounting for 20-25 percent of total 
imports in the last few years. In keeping with the thrust of Government's overall 
deregulation and liberalization efforts, significant reforms were introduced in the 
hydrocarbon sector including deregulation of imports and marketing of certain 
petroleum products; greater marketing autonomy for gas distribution companies; 
private investment in development of oil and gas fields as well as in refining; 
development of a more transparent pricing structure for oil and gas producers; and 
creation of the Directorate General of Hydrocarbons (DGH), which has regulatory 
and supervisory responsibility over public and private sector exploration and 
production. Another significant development was the reform of the pricing of 
petroleum products and natural gas. In 1997, the Government decided to dismantle 
the administered price mechanism for petroleum products in a phased manner by 
FY2002. The Government also revised the gas pricing by linking the consumer price 
for natural gas to a percentage of the prevailing prices of a basket of fuel oils, and 
further review of the pricing formula will be undertaken to bring the price of gas on full 
parity with fuel oil. However, further structural reforms in the hydrocarbon sector, 
particularly within the natural gas sub-sector, are needed. These include the 
operationalization of the Gas Regulatory Authority; move to a market-based structure 
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for gas pricing; development of an adequate domestic gas infrastructure such as a 
natural gas grid and LNG facilities to ease transport and delivery bottlenecks; the 
opening of gas transmission to competition; and the adoption and enforcement of 
environmental regulations. 
Multi-lateral Institutions like ADB have played a lead role in supporting policy and 
institutional reforms within the hydrocarbon sector, particularly through the 
Hydrocarbon Sector Program Loan, and in the institutional strengthening of the 
Directorate General of Hydrocarbons through technical assistance on Hydrocarbon 
Exploration and Production Database and Archive System. The program loan aimed 
at developing an efficient and competitive hydrocarbon sector in India through policy 
reforms and structural changes focusing on increased private sector participation; 
enhancement of the regulatory framework; removal of price distortions; and 
divestment of government equity in public sector enterprises. Most of the elements 
of the reform agenda were achieved, including the partial divestment of the 
Government's holding in the Oil and Natural Gas Corporation very recently. Given 
the progress in policy and regulatory reforms, the private sector is expected to 
increasingly take the lead role in meeting investment requirements in the 
hydrocarbon sector. To this end, investment through its private sector window, would 
focus on projects in the liquefied natural gas (LNG) sector within the gas sub-sector. 
Some public sector investment in selected areas may still be needed over the 
medium term in accordance with the ADB-funded National Gas Development Master 
Plan. Though analysis of many of these projects for the impact it has created is 
possible only in the long run, the importance of it and the recognition of the fact that 
the journey has only begun for the broader objective of Energy Sector Reform in 
India cannot be undermined. 
6.2.1.4. Views of Committees / Reports 
The Deepak Parekh Committee Report on Escrow Cover (Government of Karnataka, 
2000) unequivocally raised the question of unsustainability of escrow accounts and 
brought out the importance of privatization of distribution in power sector. The 
Dabhol Power Company Report {DPC Report) that went into the failed Enron project 
by the Energy Review Committee headed by Madhav Godbole found a complete 
failure of governance of various governments at the state as well as the central 
government level in their dealings with DPC (GOM, 2001a). In the report (part I) the 
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committee found that the Enron power purchase agreement (PPA) had built in 
excessive payments to Enron from the Maharashtra State Electricity Board (MSEB) 
as a result of undue burden of the re-gasification facility, high recovery charges of 
shipping and harbour and O&M, and inflated claims of fuel consumption. Based on 
these findings the committee recommended a reduction in tariff. 
The committee drew up a blueprint for restructuring the Maharashtra State Electricity 
Board (MSEB). The committee emphasized two elements essential to the success of 
the reforms: a reliable estimate of how much power is consumed by each user group; 
and an organizational structure, which devolves the responsibility to measure 
consumption and it has suggested trifurcation of the MSEB. There is to be a set of 
independent generation companies formed by clubbing the existing facilities into sets 
of six. Some are to be open to privatization, others not. Likewise, there will be a set 
of independent distribution companies which may be offered for private ownership. 
In keeping with the natural monopoly characteristics of this activity, the transmission 
company will continue to be under a single operator. The company will be kept under 
public ownership, with wheeling charges to be determined by the state's power 
regulator. Over time, it may be handed over to a private operator, but private 
ownership of the transmission company is not envisaged by the report. 
The committee has rationalized that the overriding aim of power sector reforms is 
getting people to pay for the power they use at the rates which are set for that 
particular category. If the provision of power at below cost to specific categories of 
users, for example farmers, is deemed socially desirable, then it is incumbent on the 
government to reimburse the distribution company the difference between the price 
charged and the cost incurred. So far, this subsidization has been done by 
underwriting the losses of the SEBs, but under the reform blueprint, it now needs to 
be done by an overt transfer from the government to the private distributor who will 
then buy power at the regulated rate from the generators. For the system as a whole 
to be viable, the distributor needs to know precisely who is to be thus favoured and 
how much this group collectively consumes. Without an accurate estimate of 
consumption, rates cannot be set with any degree of precision. Distribution 
companies making plans based on erroneous estimates of paid-for consumption run 
grave risks of financial non-viability. Interestingly, the committee has recommended 
that the proceeds of privatization be deposited in the Power Sector Reform Fund, a 
state level fund. According to the report, 'the essential feature of the model (defined 
as the Maharashtra model) is to avoid the problems of persisting with government 
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ownership, mixed zones, tlie single buyer approach and an annual regulatory 
process, while at the same time phasing in the transition to a full-fledged market 
system, as envisaged in the Electricity Bill, in an orderly manner'. (GOM 2001b, p. 
88). 
One could hardly disagree with the prognosis of Jack Welch that India cannot be a 
'software superpower' if she does not produce enough power. 'Everyone thinks the 
internet shows up here, on the computer, and it doesn't use power. It's a wonderful 
new industry. But the fact is every basis bit of information uses electronics. And if you 
don't have power, nothing happen.' (Singhal et al. 2000). The Enron saga came to 
full boil and has spurred many tumultuous changes in the sector which has to teach 
us how to shape up which will alone bear fruit in the years to come. Villages continue 
to suffer incessant power cuts. The failure of the northern grid which plunged a large 
part of northern India into darkness for a couple of days, brought home the 
importance of the transmission business. 
6.2.2. Roads and Bridges 
Indian road network is the second largest in the world. It spans 3.3 millions kms. Of 
this network only 45.7% of the roads are paved & only 20% are in good condition. 
This is in contrast to countries like U.S. U.K, Germany, Thailand, and Singapore who 
have more than 50% & close to 100% paved roads. Several Indian roads are 
characterized by congestion, poor maintenance, low safety, all of which result in slow 
traffic movement. 
Road network in India: 
Broadly the entire road network can be classified into three categories: national 
highways, state highways and other roads including district roads and rural roads. 
The 58,000 km national highway network comprises less than two percent of the total 
length of roads. Despite being the lifeline of the nation, as little as 5% of the national 
highways are four laned. It is only recently that some initiative has been taken in the 
form of Golden Quadrilateral. The Golden Quadrilateral project connecting the 
metropolitan cities, is making a steady progress. Approzimateiy 3,218 km of the 
highway have already been four laned and 1,492 km are under implementation & is 
expected to be substantially completed by December 2004. Similarly on the North-
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South and East - West corridors, 817 km length have already been 4- laned and 671 
kms length is under implementation. At present, NHAI is operating 430 civil works 
related contracts for the Golden Quadrilateral and North - South & East - West 
Projects. Out of these 84 are with domestic contractors, 11 with foreign contractors 
and 35 with joint ventures between India and Foreign companies. The total value of 
these contracts is approximately Rs 25,000 crores. NHAI has grown dramatically 
from near zero expenditure in 1999 - 2000 to roughly Rs 10,000 crore per year 
today. 
The Constraints: 
• Despite being the lifeline of the nation, as little as 5% of the national highways 
are four laned. 
• Government spending on the sector has been steadily decreasing from 6.9% 
of the total investment in the first five year plan to 3% in the eighth five-year 
plan. 
• In contrast the vehicular traffic has witnessed a meteoric rise of 22 fold since 
1995-96. 
• Considering the international scenario the percentage of paved roads in the 
countries like Germany, Thailand, Singapore and Malaysia are higher than 
that of India. 
Need for private sector participation: 
The inadequacy of road network provides enormous opportunities for the private 
sector. Some 14,000 require four laning while 5,500 km widening from single lane to 
two lanes. Several new roads are required to be built. Since the early 1990's 
government has tried attracting private investment in the road sector. The 
government has also taken the initiatives to expedite the Golden Quadrilateral project 
and in the process of more than a decade of experience of PPPs in the sector all 
stake holders have learnt their bit and that has augered well for the road sector 
development of the country. 
Besides telecom, construction activity of arterial roads has been the most visible sign 
of the 'new' infrastructure. The road widening (four lane) projects on the Golden 
Quadrilateral are being expeditiously implemented by NHAI with funds being raised 
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from a variety of sources—budgetary resources, multi lateral borrowings (World 
Bank/ADB), market borrowings by NHAi and private participation, in the logistics field 
little has been envisaged until the Prime Minister's Task Force on Roads and Airports 
was constituted under Mr. N.K. Singh (then Secretary of the PMP) of which the IDFC 
was made the Secretariat. Tortuous debates on the single concession model was 
dragging for two years then. It was after the Task Force formation the going got the 
momentum and the Annuity Financing Concept for Roads (the first such concept 
applied to Roads anywhere) was implemented in eight roads projects in the Golden 
Quadrilateral project with great success. 
The first major BOT project on national highways using the annuity approach, four 
laning of the Panagarh Palsit stretch on NH 2 received better response. Six other 
four laning projects have been offered to the private sector on the annuity format. 
Several applicants have qualified to bid for these projects. IDFC has involved in this 
initiative as an advisor to NHAI from the onset, defining the concept, finalization of 
the evaluation parameters for qualification and final selection, procuring 
documentation, managing the procurement process, finalizing the BOT concession 
structure and concession agreement, and negotiating with bidders. 
The first major BOT project on National Highways using direct tolling approach—six 
laning of the Jaipur Kisangarh stretch on NH 8 received poor response with only one 
bid. Moradabad bypass, implemented by a wholly-owned subsidiary of NHAI, started 
functioning in 2001. The recently commissioned first phase of the Moradabad bypass 
has received enthusiastic response from users, with toll collections over Rs 1 lakh 
per day in less than a month since the road was opened to the public. A few more 
BOT projects which became operational were the Delhi-NOIDA toll bridge, 
Wainganga bridge project near Nagpur, and Baroda-Halol four laning project. 
Several state governments, such as Maharashtra, Karnataka, Kerala and Punjab, are 
pursuing initiatives for road development, some of them through dedicated road 
development or infrastructure development corporations. Motorists will now have to 
pay for driving on newly-upgraded Indian highways. The government plans to toll the 
entire NHDP in perpetuity. This means that BOT roads are likely to be tolled even 
after the end of the concession period. The government has fixed a rate of 40 paise 
per kilometer for cars and an upper limit of Rs 1.40 for heavy vehicles. NHAI is to 
finalize the toll for different stretches, including bridges. It is estimated that NHAI will 
mop up annual revenues worth Rs 20 lakh per km through tolling of every completed 
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kilometre of highway along the Golden Quadrilateral linking the four metros of Delhi, 
Mumbai, Kolkata and Chennai. Taking into account a construction cost of Rs 4 crore 
per km, this works out to an average recovery of about 5 per cent of the total funds 
invested for developing the Golden Quadrilateral. 
The SPV route appears to be the new buzzword fuelling India's great highway 
dream. This new financing route is fast catching the fancy of the NHAI. The authority 
is considering the option of taking up projects through the SPV route on the 
Ahmedabad-Vadodara Expressway and plans to connect 12 ports including KandIa, 
Cochin, Paradip, Tuticorin, Haldia, JNPT, Vizag and Marmugao. In future SPV 
projects, NHAI proposes to invest 30 per cent of the equity of the project with the 
EPC contractor contributing a minor 5-10 per cent so that there is a sense of 
ownership towards the project. However, the success of the SPV route, would 
depend upon identification of commercially viable projects. NHAI hopes to take up 
projects worth Rs 2,500 crore via the SPV route. 
6.2.2.1. The Central Road Fund 
It is hoped that the Central Road Fund will ensure funds raised through the cess on 
petrol and diesel will be used for road development. The act, however, does not 
provide for complete ring fencing of the cess fund. Establishment of a road board to 
manage funds professionally is not mandatory in the act. The government has lost 
the opportunity to ensure that 'users' get the quality of roads they pay for. The 
Central Road Fund Act, 2000 gives statutory power to establish a Central Road 
Fund for development and maintenance of national highways and state roads, 
development of rural roads, construction of under- or over-head railway bridges, 
erection of safety works at unmanned rail-road crossings and other acts prescribed. 
The cess on petrol and high-speed diesel (HSD) at the rate of rupee one per litre to 
start with is being levied and collected. The proceeds of the cess shall first be 
credited to the Consolidated Fund of India; the central government may credit 
proceeds to the fund extend grants and loans. Any fund provided by the central 
government for the development and maintenance of state roads is also to be 
credited to the fund. The balance to the credit of the fund is not to lapse at the end of 
the financial year. The fund is to be administered by the central government and is to 
allocate and disburse money to concerned departments. Projects of state roads, 
approved by the central government using set criteria to be financed out of the share 
148 
for state roads shall be monitored by the central government. Fifty per cent of the 
cess on HSD is to be allocated for the development of rural roadsand the balance as 
follows: 7.5 per cent shall go for the development and maintenance of national 
highways; 12.5 per cent for the construction of under- or over-head railway bridges; 
27 per cent on development and maintenance of state roads; and 3 per cent on 
central government approved specific state road projects. 
The salient features of the Act are: 
• Cess collected from users shall be spent on development and maintenance 
of roads. 
• All the central government funds earmarked for road sector shall be 
channelized through the fund. State road projects financed from the fund 
shall follow established criteria. 
• Regulation and control of motor vehicles throughout the country come within 
the jurisdiction of the central government. 
• There is no provision for a cess drawback for off-road usage of HSD which 
will keep the administration of the fund simple. 
• Money from the fund cannot be allocated for the maintenance of an 
expressway. 
CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE ACT 
• The administration of the fund remains with the central government and 
there is no statutory provision for an oversight board having user groups 
representation. 
• The proceeds of the cess are not completely ring-fenced; the central 
government is required to credit the proceeds to the fund from time to time 
after deducting the expenses of collection. 
• The fund has no budget constraint as the government may credit money by 
way of grants or loans. The government has powers to disburse funds to 
any prescribed project. 
• The fund remains under political control except that proportion of money to 
be spent on development and maintenance of national highways is fixed. 
• The act provides a weak legal basis to the fund but it will have published 
financial rules and regulations. The fund shall not be subject to 
independent, technical and financial audits. 
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6.2.2.2. Annuity vs EPC 
In public-private partnership for infrastructure financing, received wisdom is that the 
contract should be such that risk ought to be borne by the party that is best able to 
mitigate it. Annuity is one such instrument. Soon after NHAI received the bid for the 
first annuity project, it received extremely sharp criticism from financial circles and 
analysts. Criticism of the popular press was based on prices quoted by the 
Gaumuda-WCT combine of Malaysia for Rs 69.8 crore (half yearly payments) for the 
Panagarh-Palsit pilot project. This was for a stretch of only 65 kms. They compared 
the annuity to the cost of four-laning a two lane highway at approximately Rs 4 crore 
per kilometer. However, one needs to consider the price to be paid for implementing 
a pilot project. It was expected that the prices would be lower once private 
entrepreneurs gain confidence in the concept. The annuity method is considered the 
most risk-free variant of BOT highway projects with private sector participation. 
However, analysts objected to annuity concept on the following grounds (Haldia, 
2000): 
• Annuity payments essentially entail budgetary funding on a deferred basis. 
Tight budget constraint, implies that only a fraction of the development 
programme can be sustained. 
• Price at which a private company can raise funds from the market will be 
higher than that of the government. 
• Dichotomy arises when user pays toll only on some roads. Political 
justification for a toll road at one place and annuity payment at another 
place will be difficult to sustain. 
• To support annuity payments by the state government for state roads, it is 
not easy to impose another cess to support a state road fund. 
• The developer demands a traffic guarantee or even a revenue guarantee 
which goes against the philosophy of private enterprise. 
• The annuity programme is a logical way of getting better management 
control into the public sector. The government still manages virtually the 
entire road sector and has the option to collect toll on these roads. 
Subsequent bids for annuity based projects have countered criticism from the 
popular press. The annuity prices quoted by the Hyderabad based G. Mallikarjun 
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Rao (GMR) group for three projects has suggested that this is a viable alternative. 
The GMR group has quoted Rs 29.48 crore for the Tuni-Ankapalle project, Rs 37.59 
crore for the Dharwad-Belgaum project and Rs 41.85 crore for the Tindivanam-
Tambaram project. The internal rate of return (IRR) works out at about seven per 
cent. In conclusion, whereas the BOT route tilts the burden of project risks and 
responsibilities towards the private developer, the annuity route provides for a more 
balanced approach to risk and responsibility allocation between the project 
participants. The government has been able to strike the right balance so far by 
adopting the annuity scheme on seven stretches totaling nearly 450 kms. 
6.2.2.3. Toll Roads 
The first BOT project (Rs 673 crore six lane highway project between Jaipur and 
Kishangarh on NH 8 in Rajasthan) under the direct tolling method was awarded to 
Larsen & Toubro and Joannou & Paraskevaides (Overseas) Ltd of Cyprus. The bare 
construction cost of the project is estimated at around Rs 493 crores. However, the 
total project cost is expected to rise to Rs 673 crore after factoring interest during 
construction (IDC). The successful bidder would develop the highway and recover 
costs by collecting tolls from the users directly during a concession period spanning 
15 years. The agreement provides for a 100 per cent indexation to the wholesale 
price index (WPI) while revising the toll fees annually. Accordingly, increase in 
inflation will be passed on to the users fully at the time of annual revision in toll. Ever 
since that project many new toll roads have become a reality in the country and many 
new methods of tolling are being invented/ implemented. A list of BOT projects in the 
India's Road sector development has been included in the Appendix in the end. 
6.2.2.4. Rural Roads 
The Pradhanmantri Gram Sadak Yojna was launched in August 2000. The Prime 
Minister has reiterated the government's commitment to this programme. The 
scheme, expected to connect 1.4 lakh habitations with the highway network, has a 
total outlay of Rs 58,200 crore over the seven year period. Approval from the 
Planning Commission has been waived for this scheme. The programme would be 
fully funded by the Centre on the basis of state government project reports. Under 
the programme, unconnected habitations in rural areas with a population of 1,000 or 
more is planned to be connected with all-weather roads in three years. In the second 
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stage all habitations with a population of over 500 persons are to be covered by the 
end of Tenth Plan. The third stage extends to northern-eastern states, Sikkinn, 
Himachal Pradesh, Jammu and Kashmir, Uttaranchal and the desert areas. The 
objective is to connect habitations with a population of 250 persons and above. 
The roads constructed under this programme would be maintained by panchayati raj 
institutions. The ministry of rural development will be the nodal implementation 
agency to raise additional financial resources from the World Bank and the Asian 
Development Bank to complete the programme by 2007. The ministry of rural 
development has been asked to set up a Rural Road Development Agency to 
provide advice on technical, quality control, and management aspects of the projects. 
The present source of funds comes from the 50 per cent share of cess on high-speed 
diesel totaling over Rs 17,500 crores during the seven-year period. 
6.2.3. Water 
The deliberations on National Water Policy and Report of the Sukthankar Committee 
were two important policy initiatives in the Water and Irrigation sector. Whereas the 
first raised the important issue of sharing of water resources—mainly surface water— 
among different states for different usage, the second one detailed the complexity of 
drinking water in urban and rural areas. The latter also highlighted complex 
institutional mechanisms required to make any success of the plans. 
The National Water Resources Council did not accept the Draft National Water Policy 
in its meeting held in July 2000. The working group, set up to study the draft, 
consisted of water resources ministers from all states. It discussed the draft and 
guidelines for water allocation among states. The states were vertically divided with 
regard to River Basin Organizations (RBOs). The issues remained unresolved for the 
following reasons: 
• Participants did not want RBOs with statutory powers as they did not find 
them in consonance with the constitutional provisions and the spirit of the 
federal structure. 
• Some states felt that the priorities with regard to water allocation should be 
drinking water, irrigation, hydel power, aquaculture, agro-industries, non-
agricultural industries and navigation and other uses. They felt that the 
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Inter-State Water Disputes Act 1956 could be suitably reviewed and 
amended to provide for conciliatory powers in Section 4 (1), timeframe for 
constitution of tribunal, completion and adjudication by the tribunal and for 
publication of award by the union government. 
• A few states are of the opinion that the policy and guidelines appeared to 
have been drafted to accommodate the narrow interests of a few privileged 
states. 
• Some states felt that the centre was trying to take control over the rivers 
and other water resources through this policy. 
The working group eventually decided to constitute a core group of ministers under 
the chairmanship of the Union Minister of State for Water Resources to go into the 
details of water allocation and the setting up of an RBO. The final definition of 
provisions coined by the core group relating to water sharing is: "The water sharing 
/distribution amongst the states should be guided by a national perspective with due 
regard to water resources availability and needs within the river basin". This 
statement is open to several interpretations. The group also decided not to empower 
the proposed RBOs with statutory powers. 
Water conservation, its importance and limitations: One of the main proponent of 
water conservation, Rajendra Singh, who strongly believes in community rights of 
water, water harvesting and water conservation received the Magsaysay Award in 
2001 for his work in Alwar, Rajathan. His work is a good example of integrated water 
system at village/ community level which is also an economically efficient solution for 
drinking water. It has proved that systematic development of village level watershed 
can change the economics of the village community. The strategy of water harvesting 
and surface water development was through a series of check weirs and earthen 
dams, soil conservation through series of gully plugs, afforestation and agro-forestry 
to meet the requirement of fodder, fuel and fruit as well as for soil conservation. 
There are many other successful examples of water harvesting in Madhya Pradesh, 
Andhra Pradesh and Maharashtra at village/community level. 
A few state governments have extended the concept of water harvesting to a city 
level and have passed resolutions that all new dwellings should have water 
harvesting devices on their roof or on ground to collect rain water. These are simple 
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devices. The seasonal availability of water limits its use but this will help in 
recharging the groundwater table. 
Development at state level: The chosen method adopted by states to build urban 
infrastructure is 'partnership' with the private sector. State governments short of 
funds have taken initiatives to establish infrastructure fund/project development 
companies in partnership with private sector financial institutions. The role of these 
institutions is to bridge the gap of risk perceived by a private promoter and the risk 
perceived by the present provider of the service. These are developments in the right 
direction. Not all the institutions are of the same genre, nor is it proposed that they 
have similar functions. Generally, these institutions are referred to as Infrastructure 
Initiative Funds (IIF). On the whole though some progress is there in the Irrigation 
front it is established that PSP initiatives in the water sector has been very luke 
worm. 
6.2.4. Port 
About 6,000 kilometers of Indian coastline is serviced by 153 ports (Table 6.2) . Of 
these ,11 have special status as major ports under the central government's purview. 
State governments oversee the remaining ports. The major ports are currently 
operated as Port Trusts, which exercise both statutroy and commercial functions, 
following what is commonly known as the service port concept. When the Major Port 
Trusts Act was enacted, six ports were named (Calcutta, Mumbai, Chennai, Cochin, 
Kandia and Vishakhapatnam) .Since then, five ports have been added (Paradip, 
Tuticorin, New Managalore, Mormugao, and Jawaharlal Nehru) . States administer 
their ports either through state maritime boards, as in Gujarat, Maharashtra, and 
Tamil Nadu, or through government departments. Maritime boards of trustees of a 
major ports. 
The government has introduced legislation that will permit gradual corporatization of 
the major ports through an amendment to the Major Port Trusts Act. This amendment 
will allow the Port Trusts to invest in equity in companies established to provide 
operating services at the ports . A parliamentary committee is examining the 
legislation. The Ministry of Surface Transportation (MOST) has indicated that 
corporatization through this route could be considered for some of the newer ports, 
such as Jawaharlal Nehru and Haldia. Corporatization is less likely for older ports 
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such as Mumbai, which are substantially overstaffed and have less favorable 
commercial prospects. The government also has approved schemes allowing joint 
ventures between Indian ports and private companies (both foreign and national ) to 
improve productivity and efficiency at the ports. 
The government also plans to establish the Ennore Port (which is under construction) 
along different lines from Port Trusts. The aim is to create a corporatized venture, 
with the government initially owning all the equity in the controlling company. A 
portion of this equity would be divested to strategic operators. However, the 
corporation would have both regulatory and operational roles . Under the landlord 
port scenario, the port authority only owns land and basic infrastructure , which is 
leased to operators who provide services. 
There is concern at the national level that there has been a lack of coordination in 
developing new port facilities and perhaps a lack of strategic oversight in bring the 
states and the central government together. A National Maritime Council was 
recently established to provide coordination among government bodies concerned 
with port development, particularly among state and central government agencies. 
6.2.4.1. Current Operational Performance 
India's total port throughput was 287 million tons in 1997-98 (April 1- March 31); 251 
million tons (88 percent) went through the 11 major ports, The Government estimates 
that the current capacity of the major ports is overstretched by 217 million tons, 
substantially below throughout levels. India's ports have struggled to keep up with the 
increase in demand .Average ship turnaround time increased 1990 and 1996, 
reflecting a 30 percent increase in the number of vessels sailing from the major ports 
and only a 10 percent increase in capacity. 
Table 6.2 Productivity in Container Handling International Comparisons 
Chennai 
JNPT 
Bangkok/Laem 
Chabang 
Colombo 
Handling Productivity(moves per ship 
hour) 
-
15 
35 
38 
Throughput per day 
(TEUs) 
310 
800 
1300 
1400 
Source : Fairplay 1996a, 1996b 
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Significant productivity gains could be achieved at major Indian ports by moving 
close to average world standards on cargo-handling operation (table 6.2) The total 
costs of moving a container through a terminal are on an average 70-80 percent 
greater in India than in Japan and the United States, where labor costs are much 
higher. Low handling productivity rates mean that ships spend a long time at berth. 
The shipping Corporation of India reports that its ships spend 52 percent of their time 
in ports .Consequently ,ship trun around time in Indian ports is commonly between 
five and six days, compared to one day or less in other ports in the region 
.Additionally , waiting times to get alongside the berth are considerable. Waiting time 
for a berth in Chennai in October 2000 was five or six days. As a result , regional 
feeder operator recently decided to impose a surcharge ($ 30 per laden container 
and $ 10 per empty container) on inbound and outbound containers between 
Chennai and Singapore. An acceptable standard is 2 to 4 days . Customs clearance 
can take up to five days in Indian Ports. The average is three or four. 
6.2.4.2. Meeting the Growing Demand for post Services 
In 1997 total traffic was 251 million tons-an apparent use rate of 115 percent. 
However, this figure accounts for wide differences in traffic segments. For containers, 
current capacity is assessed at about 15 million tons, while total traffic in 1997 was 
more than 20 million tons , showing an apparent use rate of 133 percent. 
Table 6.3 Growth in Container Traffic 
Port 
Calcutta 
Chennai 
Mumbai 
JNPT 
Total 
90-
91 
664 
1132 
4286 
657 
8043 
91-
92 
804 
1003 
3462 
1314 
7627 
92-
93 
1009 
1253 
3884 
1712 
9009 
93-94 
1339 
1606 
5413 
2077 
12189 
thousand of tons) 
94-95 
1761 
2019 
6268 
2929 
15358 
95-96 
1814 
2308 
6748 
4069 
17618 
96-97 
1951 
2564 
7632 
5078 
20590 
97-98 
2122 
3002 
8097 
6050 
23120 
The government envisions demand growth for port services of around 200 million 
tons, with estimated throughput of around 415 million tons in 2001-2 . it is therefore 
planning to add 122 million tons of port capacity over the Ninth Five-Year Plan 
period ( Approximately 45 million tons , or around one -third of capacity is expected 
from the private sector, in addition to 31 million tons from captive schemes). The 
government also anticipates productivity increase around 11 million tons. In the 
longer term, minor ports are expected to play an increasingly important role in 
meeting India's transport needs. The planning Commission estimates total capacity 
of the major ports at about 550 million tons a year : by 2020 MOST projects that 
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demand is likely to be about 1,200 million tons, indicating the important role tiiat 
minor ports will play. 
6.2.4.3. Private Provision to Date 
The Major Ports Act of 1963 allows private provision of services at the major ports. 
The legislation already permits private sector intervention in port operation in the 
form of leasing of port assets , construction and operation of facilities, leasing of 
equipment for cargo handling, Pilotage, and captive facilities for port-based 
industries. The central government has adopted policy measures aimed at opening 
the port sector to private investors and operators . Based on the Major was 
strengthened at the federal level by the 1996 "Guideline on Privatization" which 
provides a more precise framework for private participation in the major in the major 
ports. At the state level maritime states have issued policy statements in the form of 
infrastructure policy or port policy papers. Gujarat was the first to publish a port policy 
statement in 1995. Private sector participation in development and operations of port 
infrastructure is the prominent feature in each document. The government of Andhra 
Pradesh had decided to Privatize the operations and maintenance of three existing 
berths at Kakinada Port and is pursuing development of number of greenfield sites as 
well. 
Table 6.4 Private initiatives in the ports sector 
Project 
Pipavav Port, Gujarat 
Gujarat Chemical Port 
Terminal Ltd. Dahej .Gujarat 
Essar Shipping limited 
Vadinar, Gujarat 
P&O Australia Container 
Terminal, Nhava Sheva, 
Maharashtra 
Reliance Ports and Terminals 
Ltd, Jamnagar Gujarat 
Nature 
State Port 
Multi-purpose facility 
State Port 
Liquid Cargo 
State Port 
Liquid cargo, serving Essar 
Refinery 
Major Port 
Container Terminal 
POL /petrochemical port. 
Serving Reliance refinery and 
Reliance industries. 
Status 
First 400 meters berth ready 
.Another 325 meters under 
construction 
Under construction 
Financing Completed 
Operationalised 
Under construction 
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6.2.4.4. State Initiatives 
Gujarat, Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh, and Karnataka have introduced contracts 
that are more favorable to investors. The BOOT format adopted in Gujarat, for 
instance, includes full tariff flexibility in both level and currency. Gujarat's policy is 
clearly to attract investments in ports to foster regional economic development . In 
Karnataka private investment in infrastructure , including ports should "contribute to 
economic growth and public Welfare" with the objective of "rapid economic 
development of the State." Fiscal incentives to enhance the financial attractiveness 
of development projects. The main weakness of these contractual frameworks for 
developing new state ports may be the often limited physical connections between 
the project site and the main inland transport networks , Under the BOOT format 
being finalized in Gujrarat, road and rail linkages for new port developments may be 
structured as separate BOT packages to be offered to the private sector. It is unclear 
whether a private port developer would commit investments in a port facility without 
assurance that mission or inadequate land connections would be built or upgraded in 
time. On the other hand, it is unclear whether the private sector will be willing to 
upgrade road facilities without substantial public support. It is the entire connectivity 
or logistics that has become important in port development. 
6.2.4.5. Risk Allocation under the Concession Framework 
Concessions awarded for projects at major ports follow the 1996 "Guidelines on 
Privatization" in establishing the allocation of risks between the private and public 
sectors and the incentives for efficiency provided under the contract. So far, 
concessions have been awarded as license agreements. Some key provisions of the 
concessions are as follows: 
• Projects are currently defined under the build-operate -transfer (BOT) 
format, with asset ownership vested in the concessioning authority due to 
legal constraints linked to public domain legislation. Although a build-own-
operate-transfer (BOOT) format would allow assets to be assigned to 
guarantee commercial debt, existing deals by-pass this difficulty and 
mortgaging rights were granted to investors (for example, at the 
Jawaharlal Nehru container terminal developed by P & 0 Austrailia) 
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• Assets terminal under a BOT basis will revert free of cost to the Port 
Authority , a possible deterrent to continuous upgrading and modernizing 
of facilities and equipment throughout the lifetime of the concession. 
• The lead partner in a consortium is required to keep its full shareholding in 
the port development company throughout the concession period and 
may not sell part of it. 
• The fee structure includes an up-front fee, lease rent, and royalty per ton. 
The "Guidelines on Privatization" also add the concept of a free based on 
an annual minimum of guaranteed traffic. 
• There is no compensation in case of failure by the concessioning 
authority to deliver agreed services.(Such as power). 
• There is no provision for extending the duration of a concession to 
compensate for force majeure events. 
• There are no provisions allowing an amicable settlement process before 
resorting to court action to settle contractual disputes 
Concessionaires must assume all labor liabilities attached to an existing facility. 
Significant overstaffing and low productivity will favor the creation of new facilities 
with little or no labor liability attached as with P&O Australia in Jawaharlal Nehru and 
Possibly the PSA Corporation in Tuticorin. The provision will create a bias toward 
investing in new facilities rather than expanding or improving operations at existing 
facilities. 
6.2.4.6. Sector Regulation 
The Tariff Authority for Major Ports (TAMP) was established in 1997 as a distinct 
body under the umbrella of MOST to regulate port tariffs independently from the Port 
Trusts. TAMP has responsibility for setting the tariffs of the major ports. It can also 
set tariffs for private licensers operating at a major port, where TAMP's tariffs rulings 
will take precedence over charges outlined in a Contract between a Port Trust and a 
Private operator. TAMP was created in response to protects by private partners in 
the port system that they could not expect fair treatment on tariff matter from the Port 
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Trust, which is their commercial competitor. TAIVIP guidelines, adopted in Chennai in 
February 1998, state that "TAMP's overall objective shall be to move towards 
competitive pricing. TAMP is supposed to promote rationalization of the tariff system, 
applying uniform principles ports to develop a pricing methodology that will 
encourage improvements in operational efficiency and the introduction of innovative 
practices. TAMP is developing tariff formulations for the Port Trusts. It has already 
issued a ruling on tariffs to be charged by the Nhava Sheva International Container 
Terminal, which is being established by P & 0 Australia at JNPT. TAMP allowed the 
operator to have a tariff ceiling based on container handling charges currently levied 
at JNPT and the Cargo- related charges will be specified in rupees. In this ruling 
TAMP held that port operators should not be allowed to charge or calculate tariffs in 
foreign currency for cargo -handling services. It Is established practice that only 
vessel -related charges can be based on foreign currency. However, the Mumbai 
Port Trust which already charges a tariff based on US dollars for container handling 
services. Most other port trusts would like to do the same. TAMP is considering 
reviewing the legal basis for the Mumbai Port Trust's tariff and also undertaking a 
broader review of the issue. 
6.2.4.7. Modernizing the Ports Sector. 
Although there has been progress in bringing the private sector into port 
development and operation, reforms are needed to provide greater commercial 
autonomy to all the port trusts, enhance competition among ports, and provide the 
institutional structure for a modern ports sector. In the long run, India will have to 
reply increasingly on throughput from minor ports. This fact increase the urgency of 
developing an overarching transport strategy. A three -tiered structure could separate 
policy, regulatory, and commercial roles and will help reduce conflicts of interest 
(such as uneven access to ship services managed by Port Trusts and berthing 
priorities) that the Port Trusts face. This raises the issue of the appropriate role for 
TAMP . If statutory authorities are created at each major port, these bodies could 
assume TAMP's regulatory functions. Reform is unlikely to be rapid, and TAMP will 
need to continue in its current role in the term. Because its authority extends to tariff 
setting, however, it may need enhanced authority to handle predatory behavior form 
port Trusts against private schemes. MOST and the Ministry of Railways have a 
shared interest in finding a common approach to creating inter-modal platforms that 
would reduce transport costs and increase trade competitiveness and establish much 
needed connectivity. Dry ports are mainly railway-based and developed under the 
160 
Ministry of Railways Umbrella. A common approach is required which is likely to 
enhance the impact of such developments and help integrate them into the inland 
transport network as a whole. At the port level, improved cooperation between actors 
such as Indian Railways, Container Corporation of India, and the Central 
Warehousing Corporation would Improve the climate for investment in the Ports 
system. Currently in many cases, cargo transfer between Indian Railways and the 
local port results in in-ordinate delays. Improving the interface between railways and 
ports should be a priority, possibly using agreements such as the one at JNPT as a 
model. 
6.2.4.8. Inland Waterways 
India has 14,500 km of navigable waterways of which 5,700 km are navigable by 
mechanized vessels. There are three national waterways. These include Allahabad-
Haldia, Dhubri-Sadiya over Brahmaputra and Kottanad-Kollam on the west coast 
canal. The cabinet has approved the Inland Waterways Authority of India (IWAI) 
Amendment Bill 2001 to enable it to constitute the IWAI. The policy package for the 
sector will allow the authority to form joint ventures with private sector companies. 
The new policy also allows equity participation for joint ventures upto 40 per cent for 
BOT projects and grants tax exemption as offered in the infrastructure sector. Major 
private and public sector companies, including Hindustan Lever Ltd, Indo Gulf 
Corporation, NTPC, Numaligarh Refineries and Concor, have evinced interest in 
developing inland water transport facilities in the country. 
6.2.5. Telecommunications 
The Process of introducing the private sector into telecommunications service 
provision began in 1991 with the tendering of licenses to provide cellular services in 
the metropolitan areas of Delhi, Mumbai, Calcutta, and Chennai. India then needed 
to achieve a rapid expansion in the coverage, quality, and range of services 
available. The National Telecom Policy issued in May 1994, introduced the private 
provision of basic fixed telecommunications services and proposed private provision 
of cellular services in non-metropolitan areas .The more lucrative inter-state long -
distance and international services remained in the public sector. The introduction of 
competition and the need for interconnection with the Department of 
Telecommunications (which was later corporatised and now called BSNL) and MTNL 
networks led to the formation of a regulatory authority and Telecom Regulatory 
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Authority of India (TRAI) was estabiisiied in Marcii 1997. Tine revenue sharing 
regime to replace the high license fee regime were instrumental in guiding the sector 
on a growth trajectory. For a number of years after the revenue sharing has come 
into being the telecom industry has witnessed rapid growth and investment with 
substantial equity investments from international players. Going forward, 
'convergence' is going to be the norm and the telecom sector should be able to 
address this issue. That is the reason why even the derailed negotiations of the 
Cable operators under the "Conditional Access System' (CAS) is being handled by 
TRAI. Many challenges are foreseen and when we look back the road we have 
travelled this far, not many can deny that it was worth the decision to have gone 
down that path. 
The main responsibilities of TRAI are: 
• Determining the need for and introducing new service providers. 
• Recommending the conditions of licenses. 
• Ensuring Compliance with license terms and conditions and recommending 
revocation of licences. 
• Facilitating competition and efficiency in the sector. 
• Protecting consumer interests. 
• Ensuring technical compatibility and effective connection among service 
providers and regulating revenue-sharing arrangements. 
• Announcing the prices at which telecommunications services can be provided 
within India. 
6.2.5.1. Private Sector Participation 
The government originally sought to establish a duopoly in basic and cellular 
telecommunications, with private service providers paying substantial license fees for 
the right to provide services. The policy commenced in December 1991 with the 
tendering of licenses to provide cellular services in the metropolitan areas. Eight 
cellular licenses- two in each Metro-were awarded in October 1994 for 10 years. The 
licenses could be extended for five years. Cellular licenses for the state circles, which 
broadly correspond to States , were awarded for the same term by competitive 
sealed bidding in December 1995. Private companies have been allowed to provide 
radio paging, voice- and e-mail services, and video text services since 1992. 
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A total of 39 cellular networks (covering both metropolitan and circle areas) have 
commenced operation. The number of cellular customers has increased since 
services began, with about 1.1 million customers by early 1999. However, the 
number of consumers in the metropolitan areas peaked in mid- 1998, as figures 
revealed. The substantial reduction after 1998 may be partly related to the shedding 
of non paying consumers. Although it has not yet reached the level of November 
1997. 
The Number of subscribers is broadly in line with operator's forecasts. However, 
revenues in the metropolitan areas are only around 60 percent or less of projections. 
The revenue shortfall is due to lower-than-expected phone use and lower airtime call 
charges than the maximum amounts allowed by licenses. Metropolitan operators also 
saw a decline in average revenue per subscriber as the customer base expanded. 
Metropolitan cellular licensers pay an annual fee per subscriber to the government. 
This fee, indexed to the ceiling unit call rate, has risen to 6.023 rupees (Rs) per 
subscriber in !998 .Around 50 percent of subscribers generated annual revenues 
below this fee in Mar 1998. 
For the State circles, the later rollout makes it harder to access the situation. 
Indications are that consumer numbers are close to anticipated levels in the 
metropolitan areas, but use per consumer is also well below forecasts. Although use 
varies by State. Also, some licenses for the "B" circles , deemed to be less attractive 
at the time of auction, earn revenues per user similar to those of the "A" circles. 
Although there was considerable variation in the bids for each circle, most bids for 
basic and cellular circles have proven to be much higher than their markets can 
sustain. This overbidding was due partly to mis-estimation of market potential and, in 
some cases, to hope that the license terms could be renegotiated. Bharti Telenet 
became the first basic operator to start operations . The company first rolled out its 
network in Madhya Pradesh using bridge financing. Bharti Telenet has been joined 
by the basic services licenser in Maharashtra which is Hughes Tele.com. 
Although the introduction of the private sector has meant some increase in service 
expansion, particularly through the availability of cellular telephones, paging, and 
Internet services , the roll-out of services has not begun as quickly as many hoped. 
This delay is largely due to the difficulties license holders have faced to date in 
achieving financial closure because of the high cost of license payments. 
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Licenses to provide basic services witliin state circles for 15 years (which could be 
extended by 10 years) were also awarded by competitive bidding. Bids were received 
for 13 circles. The license was awarded to the bidder who offered the highest net 
present value of license payments. Of the 13 licenses awarded, 6 basic operators 
have signed license agreement with the Department of Telecommunication and paid 
the first -years fees. 
6.2.5.2. Interconnection Terms 
Interconnection terms have been largely favorable to the Department of 
Telecommunications or the BSNL as it is called currently. Although access charges 
are in principle reciprocal for basic service operators, private operators are not 
allowed to carry calls outside their licensed circle, Consequently, inter-circle calls 
originating in the private network must be connected to the department; in these 
cases, callers pay an access charge to the department ; The department is able to 
carry a call originating from any of its subscribers into the destination circle by 
connecting the call to the private operator within the local calling area of the 
subscriber and the department incurs no access charge. Arrangements for 
connecting cellular operators to the department's network have been colored by its 
treatment of cellular network as customer, rather than as "co-carriers." There are 
several other artificial restrictions on interconnection, including direct connection to 
VSNL. These restrictions initially meant that private operators are forced to use 
government -owned networks, rather than choose the most cost-effective solution for 
their consumers. Ever since TRAI's intervention in the matter much has been sorted 
out. Calling party pays concept has come in. 
6.2.5.3. Moving to a Competitive Telecommunications Market 
The New Telecom policy, 1999 was a clear step toward modernizing India's 
telecommunications. The government first publicly committed to separating the 
Department of Telecommunication's policy and operating functions and has 
announced a date for corporatizing the department's operations with new entry of 
private players and competition. This was subsequently acted upon and now DoT is 
corporatised and called BSNL. The VSNL- the International carrier has been 
privatized and Tatas hold the majority in the company. The policy also addresses 
some of the implications of convergence. The new Telecom Policy reaffirms the 
government's commitment to a "strong and independent regulator with 
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comprehensive powers and clear authority to effectively perform its function". TRAI 
will be involved in key decisions about markets, license fees, and interconnections 
The fact that, despite political controversy, TRAI's pricing order of March 1999 has 
held seem to have strengthened the regulatory regime. Though the public sector still 
dominates telecommunications service provision in India as the BSNL is the one that 
provides local fixed services through out non-metropolitan India, the most visible 
PSP has happened in this sector and the commitment to reform has held ground in 
this sector. 
6.2.6. Airports 
The government has introduced an integrated civil aviation policy which incorporates 
guidelines on transport and tourism. It has been decided to club transport and 
tourism with aviation policy as good road and rail connectivity with airports would 
help both tourism and trade. The Centre is also considering the appointment of an 
independent economic regulator for airports to fix airport tariff and safeguard public 
interest. An autonomous statutory Airports Economic Regulatory Authority (AERA) 
has been proposed as a long-term measure for the limited economic regulation of 
airports in view of the inherent monopoly characteristics of airport services. The 
regulator will be delinked from government control. 
The issue of setting up a regulatory authority has come in the wake of the 
government initiative of permitting complete foreign investment in airports. The 
government has approved the construction of new airports at Devenhally in 
Bangalore, Shamshabad in Hyderabad and Mopa in Goa, with majority private sector 
participation. The government decided to give major airports on long-term lease to 
private operators. There still needs to be the requisite amendment to the Airports 
Authority Act 1994. The aviation establishment has broadly come to an 
understanding that it would adopt a dual-component scheme of leasing. The first 
would be a one-time, fixed payment for the entire duration; and the second, a 
variable annual payment. It is estimated that the revenue from the leases of the four 
major airports would be sufficient to sustain the development and maintenance of the 
remaining 119 airports across the country. The Airport Authority of India (AAI) 
presently earns an annual revenue of approximately Rs 1,800 crore; of which nearly 
Rs 1,000 crore is generated by the airports at Delhi, Mumbai, Chennai and Kolkata. 
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The AAI has been privatizing other airport services as well. The operation, 
maintenance and management of the centre for perishable cargo for exports at the 
Indira Gandhi International Airport has been given to a private operator last year. 
Though many such PSP Options are possible it hasn't taken of in a huge way due to 
legal, regulatory and operational glitches. 
6.2.7. Urban Infrastructure 
Urban infrastructure is particularly neglected. The deteriorating infrastructure for 
drinking water compelled the Eleventh Finance Commission to sound a cautionary 
note on the inadequate maintenance of civic services and the need for rationalization 
in pricing of urban services. It has called for increase of tax revenue and user 
charges to cover operation and maintenance expenses. The commission also 
mentioned the need for speeding up devolution of funds and a concomitant transfer 
of staff from state governments to local bodies in line with the 74th Amendment. 
Progress along better quality private participation and investments has been slow 
due to inadequate revenue streams. However, a few states have been attempting 
innovative ways of construction and financing. The progress in municipal bond 
markets has been very little. The credibility of urban local bodies (ULBs) which had 
raised money earlier has come under cloud as ULBs lack financial management 
skills. Their accounting is not in line with generally accepted practices. For example, 
the Nashik Municipal Corporation failed to open an escrow account (a key bond issue 
condition) even two years after the bond issue, setting back the nascent market. The 
credibility of many such entities are in doldrums. The urban infrastructure seem to be 
the most un-happening infrastructure sectors in the country and proven reform 
successes are rare. 
The above paragraphs have explained the status of various infrastructure sectors in 
India and the way they are placed in the overall reform agenda. With all the given 
constraints the challenge for governments is to encourage an appropriate form of 
private sector investment in infrastructure and for the lenders it is to ascertain the 
financeability . it is here that arriving at Best Practices from the experiences gained 
over the years by countries and institutions in the infrastructure sector makes sense. 
Benchmarking to best practices is a global norm today to enhance productivity, 
competitiveness and quality. It is understood that in Infrastructure sectors, which are 
so vital and is an underlying lynchpin for a vibrant economy, adopting best practices 
is indispensable. Best practices addresses many risk management issues as well. 
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Fortunately, multi-lateral lending institutions like the Asian Development Bank (ADB) 
and World Bank have by leveraging their past experiences, brought out Best 
Practices guidelines to be followed by governments and institutions. The ADB has 
in the year 2000, studied many of the vital infrastructure sectors like Power, Road, 
Water, Ports, Airports etc., and has identified significant differences among the 
infrastructure sectors concerning the appropriate balance between private and public 
participation in ownership of assets and provision of services. ADB found that only 
some of the sectors have well defined models for PSP\ Other best practices are still 
evolving and the menu will continue to develop as experience grows. 
The many sectoral experts and review mission experts at ADB have identified the 
following as some of the core issues in arriving at Best practices for Private 
infrastructure investments: (!) size and complexity of the infrastructure sector; (ii) rate 
of growth in demand and the competitiveness of the market; (iii) options for 
unbundling by function or geography; (iv) legal regime regarding ownership of land 
and other critical assets; and (v) capacity for economic regulation. The established 
mechanisms, which range from management contracts to unregulated competition, 
are not new and have proven effective. The key is to have a vision of where the 
sector is going, and to carry through the reforms as quickly as possible so as not to 
allow the interim change to become the final state of affairs. The findings of the 
sectoral experts which have been taken in as the Best Practices for each sector by 
ADB are summarized below. 
6.3 Best Practices - Power 
In the electricity sector, IPPs provided a quick solution (in the Philippines, for 
example) by offering generation capacity needed for rapid econornic growth. 
However, the costs were often high because the new capacity was not consistent 
with the least-cost expansion path and the private sector required high rates of 
return. However, these costs have been decreasing as the IPP market has matured. 
The focus on production rather than efficient distribution put the public sector in the 
position of retaining that activity in which it was least effective and restricting the 
private sector from performing the customer focused activities (distribution and 
supply) where it had real expertise. At the same time, it isolated the private sector 
' Private Sector Participation (PSP) is another generic term lil<e Public Private Partnerships (PPP) in the 
infrastructure financing arena, to mean involvement of private sector. Both the terms - PPPs and PSPs are used 
synonymously in the public domain as also in this dissertation. 
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from the market through a combination of regulated pricing and guarantees against 
commercial risks. 
The power sector experts advocate restructuring to achieve a competitive market 
model with wholesale and retail competition. Such reform will encourage sustainable 
PSP and maximize the benefits to consumers they say. The experts suggest five 
major steps in implementing this approach, and their order of precedence. To some 
extent, these steps may proceed in parallel, but they should be considered sequential 
actions that will lead to the implementation of a competitive power market: 
1. Getting the investment framework right. 
2. Deciding on the goals of restructuring and the ideal industry structure. 
3. Preparing the players to participate in a competitive market. 
4. Privatizing existing and new assets. 
5. Ensuring that the competitive market is implemented properly. 
Best practices for power sector restructuring would include the following: 
• Create an enabling legal and regulatory environment to support 
competitive markets in electricity. 
Un-bundle the power sector into separate generation, transmission, 
distribution, and possibly retailing sectors to achieve the maximum 
benefits for customers. 
Privatization should include the sale of power distribution utilities as well 
as generation, and should include existing assets as well as new projects, 
using a transparent process. 
• Open access to transmission and distribution wires, and the ability to 
trade power between buyers and sellers in an open market, are critical to 
achieve a competitive framework. 
• Operate the generation and retailing markets competitively, with a large 
number of generators selling into a wholesale electricity market at prices 
which balance demand and supply throughout the day. 
• Operate the transmission network as a concession on the basis of 
competitive bidding, or privatize it within a tight regulatory framework, 
controlling rates of return, prices or gross revenue. 
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The independent regulator should mainly oversee prices and incentives 
for transmission and distribution operations. 
Restructuring should proceed at a pace consistent with the development 
of a competitive and unbundled system. 
Sequencing of the reforms (as referred above) to be very crucial in Power 
sector reforms/ interventions. 
6.4 Best Practices - Water 
The water sector has moved more slowly towards private sector investment, relative 
to electricity and telecommunications for example, not least because of the 
jurisdictional, environmental and sensitive social concerns about water supply, and 
its affordability. While major private sector involvement has now been achieved in 
distribution (Manila and Jakarta), the bulk of transactions were BOT models with 
take-or-pay clauses guaranteed by governments. Adding to these difficulties was the 
lack of knowledge about the location and condition of the (underground) networks 
and aquifers in many countries. 
The volume on the water supply sector addresses the question of why, given the 
alternatives, the private sector should seek to invest in a sector with so many 
uncertainties, natural, governmental and financial. Water, unevenly supplied as 
rainfall, is often wrongly deemed a free public good, despite the costs of treatment 
and retail supply. Thus, there is often an ill-informed community constraint against 
private sector involvement in water supply, which in most countries has prevented 
arriving at the sorts of best practices. 
The water experts makes the point that when it comes to best practice in the case of 
water supply, most of the messages are for government — to install sound and 
independent regulatory regimes, catchment management policies and enforceable 
laws on tariff setting and collections. Once in place, best practices such as 
water supply concessions can be implemented. If not in place, then best feasible 
practice may simply relate to contracting out some services under government 
guarantee, or BOOT bulk supply to public sector water supply companies. It follows 
from this that since the particular features of the water supply situation and regulatory 
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and privatization policies differ greatly across countries, so, too, will the feasible best 
practice. 
One misunderstanding regarding the scope for bringing commercial practices to 
water supply is the issue of affordability. The report notes that the poor often pay 
more for water than the cost from efficient commercial piped supplies. Experience 
has shown that low-income families will pay for quality water supply - and are not 
averse to PSP - if it delivers. 
With the above referred perspective gained by ADB, they recommend the following 
to be the Best Practices that could be pursued: 
• The benefits of PSP in the water sector must be explained to win public 
acceptance. 
• The starting point in any reform process for water supply is to form a high-
level reform unit to drive and manage the process. It would be responsible 
for coordinating and facilitating the entire reform and PSP process. The 
reform unit may be a cross-sectoral unit. 
• While not essential to commence reform, the introduction of tradable 
water rights leads to efficient use of water, particularly when it is scarce 
and has alternative uses. 
• The water sector should be unbundled to the extent possible. The private 
sector concession model is most likely to achieve the greatest benefits to 
the community and the economy as a whole. The government continues 
to own the network while the private operators lease the long-term right to 
use the assets and collect revenue from service delivery. The benefits 
accrue due to strong financial incentives to reduce water losses and 
expand service. 
• If politically difficult, then the next best strategy is to use BOT, BOOT, and 
ROT (rehabilitate-operate-transfer) arrangements to bring expertise and 
finance to urgently required water supply projects. The bidding procedure 
should be carefully managed to ensure reasonable cost and the 
contractual arrangements should not constrain subsequent progression to 
more competitive models. 
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Commercialization/ Corporatisation of water supply utilities together with 
tariff reform is advantageous as an interim step if the introduction of PSP 
is to be phased. 
Tariff reform to achieve full cost recovery is essential for PSP. Cross-
subsidies for the poor can still be considered in a transparent manner. 
Critical to the success of PSP in the water supply sector is for the 
government to create sound and independent regulatory regimes, 
catchment management policies, and enforceable laws on tariff setting 
and collection. 
Risks are likely to vary between countries and even between different 
water utilities in a country. They should be managed by the party best 
able to minimize and manage each risk most effectively. Where no party 
has a clear comparative advantage to manage the risk, it should be 
shared. 
6.5 Best Practices - Roads 
ADB opines that in Asia's roads sector, PSP has been equated with major BOT toll 
roads. These have been targeted where traffic is greatest - in and near the capital 
city and sometimes along major inter-city corridors. This private investment has 
produced some successes but also many failures. After more than a decade of 
concerted effort, implementation experience has not matched expectations. Indeed, 
surprisingly little has been implemented outside the People's Republic of China 
(PRC). 
The road sector experts at ADB have advanced three reasons for modest progress 
in roads. First, governments have not defined their policy, often leaving the private 
sector to identify projects. Secondly, almost everyone involved has expected such toll 
roads to be profitable without government support, but this has only rarely proved to 
be the case (outside the dense PRC market, which is deemed a 'special case'). 
Thirdly, it has proved difficult to introduce promised tariffs and tariff increases in a 
171 
sector where roads have become to be regarded as free. The Table 6.5 below 
summarises some of the Key issues involved. 
What is clear is that private construction and maintenance of public roads produced 
better results where there was adequate competition and effective methods for 
enforcing contracts. Efforts to substitute private sector management for public sector 
officials in the management of the public network are in their early stages, even in the 
developed economies, but the preliminary results are encouraging. 
Worldwide experience identifies (as depicted in Figure 6.3) a broad range of PSP 
modalities, in which BOT is close to being the most difficult to implement. Other 
modalities include maintenance management contracts, turnkey, operate, and 
maintain or rehabilitate-operate-transfer concessions. Many of these modalities 
target improved maintenance, and rehabilitation of the network (rather than solely 
network capacity expansion). They have potentially much greater application than 
BOT projects. 
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Table 6.5: Key issues Arising from PSP and Funding 
Issue Comment 
1. Private sector's Ability to identify and implement 
projects 
2. Ability to introduce/increase tolls 
3. Macro-cconomie effects 
crowding out other invcstincnl 
Foreign exchange exposure 
Misallocation of Resources 
4. Development of Domestic capital inarkets 
5. Road network devclopincnt pace of network 
development? 
Does the private sector assist - or constrain network 
Development? 
6. Impact on Development and Transport strategy 
Concessions may constrain and/or distort strategy, by 
concentration on the major corridors 
7. Social / Environmental issues concessions may affect the 
application of social and environmental policy 
8.Development of Road Transport companies 
9.Procurement 
10.Implementation 
II.Political 
12. Role of international financial institutions 
Are they able to do this in the absence of strong governinent 
action? 
Need for 'free' alternative? 
Location of tollgates critical? 
Can tolls always be introduced? 
Are promised toll increases delivered? 
Avoidance of 'leakage' 
Scale of private investment relative to size of domestic capital 
market. 
Percentage of off-shore financing, scale of recent devaluation, 
willingness of government to provide forex guarantees. 
Economic returns on projects funded by the private sector? 
Do new financing instruments developed for infrastmcture 
financing have spin-off benefits for the economy? 
Ability to learn from experience? 
Extensions to existing projects? 
Private sector development of a network? 
Development of an integrated network? 
What objective - benefits for through traffic or corridor/area 
development? 
May concessions form a 'straight-jacket' to public action? 
Is there a concentration in capital cities? 
Potential for distorted transport development strategy? 
Resulting from the scale of public investment necessary to 
make private sector projects profitable 
Reinforcement of inefficient mega blocks, and concentration 
down existing corridors? 
Are social equity and environmental concerns addressed? 
Impact on land acquisition and relocation . Are due processes 
circumvented? 
Visual impact, severance etc. 
Shortage of companies motivated to manage roads for the long 
team. 
Treatment of unsolicited bids? 
Securing competition. 
Requirement for detailed project specification. 
Bidding requirements. 
Traffic disruption? 
Failed projects? 
Fear of foreign 're-colonisation', fear of loss of 
government jobs. 
This is minimal - Why? 
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Table 6.6 details the characteristics of the PSP options available in the road sector. 
Table 6.6 : Characteristics of the PSP Options 
Form of 
conlract 
1.Definition 
2.Examples -
(in Countries) 
3.Cost 
recovci^ 
4.Scaleof 
private 
investment 
5.Private 
sector risks 
e.Public 
sector risks 
(land 
acquisition 
and relocation 
risks incl.) 
7.Typical 
contract size 
(USS million) 
S.Min. size -
conccssionair 
c required 
9.Exlcnl of 
government 
preparation 
super vision 
required 
lO.Typical 
duration 
Mainten-
ance 
Mgmt 
Maintain free 
froin 
New south 
wages US 
NO Income 
-fixed 
government 
payment 
Very low 
Maintenance 
Small 
Small local 
conslniction 
finn 
Low 
2-10 years 
Turnkey 
Design & 
build fixed 
fee from 
US.Hong 
kong, china 
No income -
fixed 
government 
payment 
Considerable 
for very short 
tenn 
Design 
construction 
Force 
majeure 
planning 
Traffic levels 
maintenance 
Medium / 
large S50-
SSOOm 
Medium/large 
conslniction 
finn 
High 
Desired 
conslniction 
Operate & 
Maintain 
Maintain and 
operate 
Argentna, Hong 
kong, china 
Typically 
government 
receives some 
toll revenue 
Low 
Traffic* 
revenue levels 
Revenue 
collection 
political 
financial 
maintenance 
Revenue 
received social 
Small/medium 
Construction 
firm with mgmt 
skills 
Low 
2-10 years 
period only 
Reliabilitate-
operate 
Transf. (ROT) 
Fin., rehabilate. 
maintain and 
operate 
Argentina 
Colombia 
Conessionare 
maypay 
government or 
vice-versa 
Medium 
Rehabilitation 
Traffic& 
revenue 
collection 
political 
financial 
maintenance 
force majeure 
social 
medium/large 
Larger Constm. 
Finnwilh 
mgmt. skills 
Medium 
10-20 years 
BOT 
Fin.design, onstruct 
main & opcr. 
Corridor/ network 
Malaysia, 
philli.„Thailand, 
hong kong, china, 
argentna, US etc. 
Substantial 
government 
investment usually 
required 
Large/ very large 
Design construction 
Traffic& revenue 
levels revenue 
collection political 
financial maintance 
Planning 
force majeure. 
Macro social 
environmental 
Very large 
i.e.SlOOm-S 1 billion 
Consortium including 
major construction 
firms 
High 
25-30 years 
Corridor Management 
Finance,design, 
construct, maintain & 
operate 
UK(DBFO) 
Colombia 
Government contributes 
existing roads, and other 
invest, usually required 
Medium/large 
Design construction 
Traffic & revenue 
levels,revenue 
collection.political 
financial maintenance 
Planning force majeure 
Macro-social 
environmental 
Medium/large 
i.e,S90-S300m 
Consortium incl. a 
construction firm 
High 
25-30 years 
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The Best Practices that emerge are given as below by ADB: 
• Governments must prepare the PSP environment. Institutions may need 
to be restructured with the objectives of controlling the PSP process in the 
public interest, and creating a regulatory body, separate from vested 
interests. A sound legal framework and a predictable regulatory regime 
are essential. 
• Governments must identify priority PSP projects. This will almost always 
require an independent feasibility study, which focuses on traffic and tariff 
policy, project staging, network integration issues, risk allocation, finance 
and implementation issues. The Strategy objectives and the PSP options 
shall be considered in the lines depicted below: 
The PSP Options 
strategy Objftciivs. MainMi«nc» Turkey Mainiain S ROf BOT Cotiidw-
0|!^rai9 Man»ig*(n»m 
lmprw*d rvtaintennnca 6 6 6 6 
Rc-lT.iiJil.'iSori il existing rtxKte d 
• The best prospects for BOT projects are in middle-income countries 
(where the willingness-to-pay tolls exist) along existing congested 
corridors, or where there are missing links (e.g., estuarial/river crossings), 
A regulated income stream from a tolled public toll road is capable of 
securing project financing of an appropriate kind (i.e., suitable to pension 
funds and other long-term investor groups). 
• Private sector modalities other than BOT exist, e.g., concessions 
(including Annuity models), and should be applied more widely, as they 
can address many of the sector problems, and in the process create a 
new high growth industry for transport management companies. 
• Traffic risk is the major risk and may be shared. The core risk being taken 
by the private sector, with government taking a share of the upside benefit 
and providing a downside guarantee in the event of low traffic. 
• Transparency and competition are essential in the procurement process. 
175 
• Government support should be defined upfront as a maximum so that the 
private sector can prepare realistic bids. 
Roads/Expressways being one of the earliest to attract many multi-lateral 
development banks attention and intervention in the infrastructure spectrum Table 
6.3 takes a look at the requirements sought by these lenders. 
Table 6.7 : Development Bank Requirements for Involvement in PSP 
Expressways 
Development 
Bank 
Requirement 
Compatible with 
country/ Sector 
Strategy 
Technically Feasible 
Economically viable 
Environmental 
impact Assessment 
Institutionality & 
Financially 
Sustainable 
Limits on Bank 
Exposure 
Competitor for the 
concession 
ADB 
Must see that 
govemincnts arc 
committed & have 
poli. will to fulfil 
cont. obligation 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Investment in pvt. 
sector of a DMC. 
Majority of equity 
owned and oper. 
Controlled in pvt. 
sector.Doesn't sup 
tarifTprotcction. 
Not more than 
25% of total cost 
or USD 50m 
whichever the 
lower. 
Must improve the 
environment for 
private sector 
development. 
Must be awarded 
on competitive& 
transparent basis 
IFC 
Requires government 
commitment. 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Must have good prospect of 
being financially viable. 
Usually limited to 25% up to 
USDlm for small & medium 
sized projects USS 100,000 -
USSlm & from USSl to 
USS 100m for standard size 
projects 
Not necessary 
EBRD 
Must have transition impacts & fall 
within a coherent sustainable national 
transport policy. 
Yes 
Up-to-date, statc-or-thc-art traffic & 
revenue study by independent 
international consultants & suitable 
EIRR. Benefits to local & 
international economy. 
Yes & Public participation also 
required. 
Appropriate legal framework, stale 
guar, mitigation measures in case of 
government actions materially & 
adversely affecting the eonccssionairc 
& insurance. Must demonstrate 
bankability on reasonable set of 
assumptions. 20% equity required. 
Will normally limit exposure to 35% 
of total project cost 
Beneficiary considered to operate in 
competitive environment if equity 
partner was selected in a transparent 
competitive tendering process 
TADB 
Government must approve & 
country regulatory system 
must not comprojnisc project 
feasibility. 
Yes. New projects, expansion 
and rehabilitation all eligible. 
Refinancing asset transfer 
excluded. 
Not specifically. 
Yes 
Borrower must be established 
company within the law of 
the country in which 
investments is to be made. 
Majority of shares must be 
held by national of lADB 
member countries. 
Share of the project not more 
than 25% of the total cost or 
USS75m 
Not necessary 
Abbreviations used : ADB - Asian Development Bank, IFC - International Finance Corporation, EBRD -
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and lADB - Inter-American Development Bank. 
6.6 Best Practices • Ports 
In the port sector, the transfer of cargo-handling activities to the private sector has 
been, in most cases, extremely successful fn replacing inefficient government 
bureaucracy with commercially-oriented management. Improvements in productivity 
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and maintenance has increased tiie quality of service. However, where there was no 
competition, these arrangements were less likely to sustain these improvements. 
Private investment in port infrastructure has generally been limited to new and 
existing cargo terminals. Trans-shipment terminals were the most successful, since 
they were less dependent on local markets and land transport. Greenfield ports were 
slower to develop because they were farther from their markets and the logistics 
aspects of the multi-modal transport access was either missing or less developed. 
Basic infrastructure offered few opportunities for full cost recovery. 
The ports sector experts have noted that the private sector has always been actively 
involved in port affairs. The land and water transport services that use the port are 
almost entirely private sector. Nearly all of the cargo shipped through ports is 
privately owned. The private sector provides an array of complementary trade 
facilitation and logistics services for this cargo. Within the confines of the public port, 
cargo owners, forwarders, and ship agents actively participate in decisions 
concerning the handling and storage of cargo. The public sector's role is to own, 
develop, and manage basic port infrastructure and common-user facilities. 
The process of port privatization has rarely involved pure privatization, since land and 
infrastructure are rarely sold. Instead, the process involves PSP in operations and 
investment in equipment and facilities. The process is not a monolithic effort because 
of the diversity and complexity of ports and the services they provide. It can be 
divided into three components: (i) institutional reform, (ii) divestiture of existing 
services and assets, and (iii) investment in new facilities and services. These can be 
implemented individually or in combination. For each port component, there are 
many possible public-private partnerships. 
The main points for Best Practices were: 
• The bidding process should encourage unbundling not only of the network 
but also for the services within the ports. Where ports are not financially 
viable, they should not be bundled with profitable ports, but treated as 
stand-alone facilities that are turned over to local government or put under 
management contract using a competitive tender. 
• The landlord model is the best structure for promoting PSP because it 
accommodates different forms of public-private partnership while 
recognizing that the only fixed responsibility of the public port is the 
ownership of the site. 
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The most effective and efficient procedure for promoting PSP in tine port 
sector is to lease existing facilities with relatively short-term agreements 
that allow for reorganization and improvement in productivity. 
Subsequently, concession agreements can be used to encourage private 
investment in additional capacity. Where this capacity is required 
immediately, or labor problems make it difficult to lease out existing 
facilities, then concessions might precede lease agreements. 
• Continued public investment will be required, as it is difficult to recover the 
costs for basic infrastructure in a time period reasonable to the private 
sector. Public investment may also be required to reduce the barriers to 
entry. This is important where a new entrant would otherwise have to 
make a large investment before competing with existing service providers. 
• The best form of tariff regulation is market regulation; the second best is 
through the terms of the contract that identify the non-competitive services 
requiring regulation, state the maximum rates, the formulae for escalating 
these rates over time, and the arbitration procedures for discriminatory 
behavior in excess of that justified by commercial pricing. The third best is 
the establishment of a regulatory agency outside of the port which would 
apply a pricing formula related to cost recovery. All of these are preferable 
to a vague procedure for negotiating future changes in tariffs. 
• The private sector should assume all commercial risks. Other risks should 
be negotiated, based on which party has the capability to mitigate the risk. 
• The critical element in any effort to promote PSP is competition, or at 
least the potential for competition. This can be provided through direct 
competition between private sector service providers, between public and 
private service providers or between bidders in the case of an activity that 
does not allow competition. 
6.7. Best Practices - Airports 
For the airport sector, PSP in terminal operations produced significant improvements 
in financial performance and the quality of service. Private sector investments have 
increased substantially over the last five years. During the previous twenty years, 
there was little capital investment in airports, despite a five-fold increase in traffic. 
The airports coped with the higher levels of traffic through a combination of larger 
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aircraft, better air traffic control, improved runway design, and the addition of second 
runways and additional terminal space. This period has now ended and most 
countries need to invest in new airports. These are proving to be costly, complex and 
often controversial investments. 
The key policy questions concern how best to structure airports and groups of 
airports to obtain maximum customer benefits. The discussion on airports and air 
traffic controls indicates that there is little evidence of significant scale benefits 
flowing from multiple airport operation; equally, however, there is little evidence of 
significant scale diseconomies. The case for significantly reducing the concentration 
of airport ownership at privatization therefore depends on the trade-off between the 
up-front and visible costs of re-structuring, and the possibly less tangible benefits of 
increased competition resulting from break-up. The competition benefits in this 
industry are not clear-cut, primarily because major airports mainly serve distinct 
regional markets. 
In the United Kingdom, the authorities took the view that any potential competition 
gains from breaking up the British Airport Authority prior to privatization would have 
been offset by restructuring costs. In Australia, in contrast, the Government has 
preferred to restructure and reduce industry concentration radically, emphasizing the 
public policy benefits of inter-airport competition for long haul international traffic. The 
benefits of fragmented ownership also include those that flow from yardstick 
competition, enabling regulatory agencies to assess individual operator performance 
more effectively; and from introducing a limited element of competition by emulation 
between operators. The airport sector experts are of the view that the benefits from 
the Australian model is greater. Key recommended Best Practices for the airport 
sub-sector are as follows: 
• Airport privatization has to be encouraged by the existence of legislation 
in the form of a BOT law or similar, signaling the government's recognition 
of the need for PSP in infrastructure provision. It is also important to 
ensure that the government is able to demonstrate that any projects 
offered to the private sector are economically viable. 
• Regarding the optimum approach, full privatization based on asset 
transfer or acquisition through long-term leases is preferable to more 
restricted forms of PSP (but is also more demanding in terms of legal and 
regulatory frameworks). 
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• As to airport industry restructuring, there is no evidence of significant 
economies of scale in airport operation other than those associated with 
increased traffic density at a particular location. Hence, PSP can be 
based on individual airports (although facilities may need to be bundled to 
assist financing of major new developments or extensions to capacity). 
• The existence of unprofitable airports does not justify the maintenance of 
a highly concentrated industry structure to facilitate cross-subsidies. 
• Limited sharing of traffic and revenue risk (between the private sector 
partner and government) is justifiable in airport BOT or concession 
contracts. 
• Denomination of some, or all, airport charges in US dollars is an effective 
way of hedging against currency risk and may significantly reduce the risk 
premium required by private investors; 
• The benefits of PSP in airports are likely to be maximized by regulatory 
frameworks that incorporate good regulatory governance practice. The 
price-cap approach to constraining airport charges is likely to encourage 
better performance outcomes than one based on rate of return regulation. 
• Competition for the market, whether through sale or leases, or BOT/ 
concessioning, will be maximized by transparent bidding/sale processes. 
From the above discussion it is clear that in almost all infrastructure sectors Best 
Practices have been arrived at by the largest development financial institution in Asia 
i.e., the Asian Development Bank. It is pointless to arrive at another set of Best 
Practices with reference to Asia or for that matter India as already Benchmarks are 
available. Further if we were to look at risk-wise benchmark practices (instead of 
Industry or sector-wide prescriptions), there again rating institutions like the Standard 
and Poor have done good contributions by developing this domain of knowledge by 
deriving scoring models^ for most kinds of risks. They have also been rating the 
infrastructure projects using these scoring models Thus, it would be meaningful to 
study and analyse as to what extent we have adopted these Best practices in our 
infrastructure sectors. 
The scores prescribed by Standard and Poor for rating risks in Infrastructure projects have been summarised at 
the end of this chapter as APPENDIX (Benchmarks). 
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6.8. Adoption of Best Practices in India 
This Chapter tries to have a lool< as to what extent the Best practices have been 
adopted in the Indian Context. To this end a sample survey was conducted by 
including a significant portion of projects of all forms covering the entire spectrum of 
infrastructure sectors in India. It is a primary survey conducted with the help of a 
questionnaire and the respondents profile is summarized as shown in Table 6.8. 
Table 6.8 
Respondents for the Survey on Adoption of Best Practices in Private 
Infrastructure Financing Arrangements 
(Number of Responses Grouped as per Transactional Type and Infrastructure Category) 
Service/Management 
Lease 
BOOT,BOO,BOT 
Concession/ Franchise 
Full Privatisation 
Total 
111 
61 
0 
12 
10 
0 
83 
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1 
2 
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22 
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31 
1 » 
8 .2 
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18 
I 
0 
13 
10 
42 
III 
5 
0 
2 
2 
0 
9 
Total 
146 
12 
25 
30 
16 
229 
This could easily be one of the big baseline surveys conducted covering a total of 
229 infrastructure projects encompassing all the important infrastructure sectors of 
all forms/ transaction type. The respondents views on the adoption of Best practices 
were extracted from a mix of either the companies who had actually handled the 
project or the lending institutions who had financial exposure in the project and hence 
had good knowledge about the project's intricacies. 
6.8.1 Ranking Methodology 
The Best practices of ADB (discussed at length above) were grouped into 10 Best 
practices in each of the seven identified infrastructure sectors mentioned below and 
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named as Infrastructure Risk Management in Power (IRM - Power), IRM - Roads/ 
Bridges and so on. Hence 70 variables iiave been analysed respondent -wise for 
their relative standing. As the idea was to know the level of adoption of Best practices 
parameters amongst the sampled entities, a ranking methodology is employed. 
1. I R M - Power 
2. I R M - Roads/Bridges 
3. I R M - Water 
4. I R M - Ports 
5. IRM - Telecom ^ 
6. I R M - Airports 
7. IRM - Urban Infrastructure.^ 
These grouped Best practices are the parameters on which the surveyed samples 
are benchmarked. The ratings given by each of the respondents on their views of 
standing with respect to the Best practices were benchmarked against the ADB's 
prescription which was given an index score of 100. The 10 Best practices 
measures/ variables were captured for each of the project studied in the relevant 
infrastructure category. Each of the ratios arrived at was re-normalised by 
subtracting the mean and dividing by its standard deviation. We now have 
measures, where each had a mean of 0, standard deviation of 1, had no units, and 
could be combined without introducing any unit-related biases. An intermediate 
index was then derived, by giving equal weights to each of the measures of each of 
the 7 categories. This led to the creation of 10 intermediate indices. The final index 
was then created for each sector by taking the average of each of the 10 parametric 
indices. The 10 intermediate indices and the one overall index were then rescaled so 
that they had a minimum value of 0 and maximum of 100. A higher value indicates 
better performance in that category. An application software called "Rank Tool Box' 
which allows for multi-criteria ranking was also used after the indices were grouped 
on the basis of set parameters. 
Though the ADB has not come out with a specific Best Practices guidelines in sectors of Telecom and Urban 
Infrastructure, ADB's many review mission reports and studies exists in these sectors as well and hence variables/ 
parameters have been culled from such reports of ADB to constitute the Best Practices. 
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6.8.2. Analysis of Sectors 
6.8.2.1. IRM-Power 
Of the Nine Power/ Energy Utilities studied as part of this survey to know adoption of 
Best practices in Infrastructure Risk Management more than 90 % of the respondents 
(which included three SEBs) felt that sequencing of reform process which is a crucial 
best practice identified by ADB began at the wrong end in India. Though the Indian 
Power Sector could un-bundle its activities as generation, transmission, distribution 
and retailing the projects involving private participation soon found that the dues that 
they have to get from SEBs (which are mostly in the red) is not going to materialize 
soon. Even invoking guarantees were of no avail. This chocked the entire unbundling 
exercise and except a few State-run SEBs all the rest started showing alarming 
overdues. Most of the respondents have opined that restructuring of SEBs should 
have preceded the unbundling process. Legal and Regulatory concerns have also 
been expressed by the respondents. However, two-thirds of the respondents feel that 
with the new Electricity Act, could make a difference to it and improve the scenario. 
But, as restructuring has not proceeded at a pace consistent with the development of 
a competitive unbundled system the best practices parameters on sequencing, open 
access, transparency, retailing have all been ranked low with respect to the bench 
mark scores of 100. 
In India what we have had as of now is an unbundling coupled with private entry, but 
no competition really. Both the Enron and Cogentrix projects, for instance , are 
based on MOUs with a fixed rate of return on equity. There is now a move towards 
creating a more competitive structure-competitive bidding for projects with selection 
criterion based on quoted tariffs. 
Thus what one can aim at, say in the power sector for instance, is a national grid 
where producers compete to sell to distributors directly on the grid based on 
spot/forward prices as in the case of the power sector post - 1991 in Britain. 
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6.8.2.2. IRM - Water 
The Water sector is generally considered to be slowest in moving towards a PPP 
structure. The survey here was conducted amongst projects in the Water as well as 
Irrigation sector. Of the 22 projects surveyed in the Water and Irrigation sector 14 
projects were from Irrigation. While irrigation sector seem to have embraced the PPP 
and other innovative routes the unbundling of the water sector hasn't been 
successful. In all the Best practices parameters like Awareness, having a regulatory 
regime (like a Central Authority) to manage the reform process, tradable water rights, 
adoption of concession system or other innovative BOT/BOOT structures. 
Commercialisation/ Corporatization etc., - the water sector has been ranked low, in 
many cases much lower than the median ranks. However, the Indian Irrigation sector 
has attempted to embrace many models of PPP structures and in States like Kerala, 
Punjab and Karnataka wherein people's participation in development through strong 
panchayatiraj and co-operative initiatives exists, it has taken off. Atleast a good 
beginning has been made, and many such projects have managed to stay float albeit 
numerous local issues. In terms of adoption of best practices in these surveyed 
irrigation projects they have been ranked a good two to three notches above the way 
Water projects have been ranked, though in the overall ranks it doesn't seem to have 
made much difference. 
6.8.2.3. IRM - Roads/ Bridges 
The story of adoption of Best Infrastructure Risk Management practices in the Indian 
Roads (which includes bridges as well) sector is on the threshold of becoming a 
success story if we were to turn the time-graph. It has happened through determined 
efforts of all stake-holders. The highest number - totaling 83 projects of ail 
transactional forms have been surveyed for this study from this sector and this 
included some of the earliest projects of more than a decade back to some of the 
most recent ones. An in-depth analysis of the rankings clearly establishes that in the 
sphere of creating a PSP environment we have moved from early forms of 
maintenance contracts of roads to BOT/ROT and even advanced logistics concepts 
like Corridor. Many of the sampled have opined that though many legal and 
regulatory and operational constraints were there in the early days of PSP in the 
Road sector it has improved a lot. 
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6.8.2.4. IRM - Ports 
The study entailed analyzing 15 projects in the Ports and shipping sector and many 
have ranked that historically the participation of Private sector in port handling has 
been there. It is just that lot more port services are being managed by Private entities 
now. On adoption of best practices though many legal, regulatory and logistics 
constraints are there in port sector development, a good beginning has been made 
which should sustain the sector in its path. 
6.8.2.5. IRM - Telecom 
Forty two projects of all forms including the Basic and cellular operators have been 
surveyed for this study and most of them have opined that though the sequencing of 
best practices adopted is much to be desired in the telecom arena, the determination 
to stay corrected at each stage seem to have propelled the sector to the right path. 
The trodden path has been tough and arduous and it has taught many learning and 
unlearning. Nevertheless, it has to be mentioned that the most visible outcomes of 
PSP has been in this sector and fruits of this is being enjoyed by the countrymen. 
Telecom is a competitive growth story in India. 
6.8.2.6. IRM-Airports 
Eight transportation projects involving Airports have been surveyed for the study and 
almost all have brought out that following Best practices has been a far cry in this 
sector. The adoption has been very slow and the parameters analysed clearly 
establishes that there hasn't been any big involvement of PSP model in the sector. It 
has not really taken off. 
6.8.2.7. IRM - Urban Infrastructure 
More than 50 projects have been analysed ranging from parks and common facilities 
to Drainage and Sanitation. This included a few Municipal entities which have floated 
financial instruments like bonds for providing urban infrastructure. The analysed 
185 
parameters clearly establishes that the results have been pathetic and more often 
then not many projects are not even off the ground. Any practice, leave alone best 
practices seem to have been there in operationalising projects. It is unfortunate that 
such an important infrastructure sector seem to have been thoroughly neglected. 
6.9 Ranking of Infrastructure Sectors in India 
As a final step the survey used a proven multi-criteria ranking methodology (using the 
Rank Tool Box software) to rank the sectors in terms of the adoption of Best 
Practices and the scores have been detailed in Table 6.9. The sectors have been 
ranked using the chosen parameters in each sectors and are relative to the of Best 
practices of ADB which was given the Benchmark score of 100. 
Rank 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
Table 6.9 
Rankinq of Infrastructure Sectors 
Sector 
Telecommunications 
Roads and Bridges 
Power 
Ports 
Water and Irrigation 
Airports 
Urban Infrastructure 
Index Value 
70.68 
55.34 
38.21 
34.10 
28.65 
25.11 
11.21 
It can be seen from the above that the Telecom and the Road sectors has been 
ranked high with respect to the benchmark scores. It is because of their better 
indices values drawn from the variables studied. 
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6.10. The Road Ahead 
The rankings have established where the preparedness of the sectors are in the Indian 
context. Broadly, it can be said that the focus has been on putting the macro PSP 
environment conducive for private sector participation and in that we have moved in the 
correct direction till now, albeit a bit wobbly at times. The coming years and the road ahead 
are going to be more challenging and it is going to be a long journey and a great learning 
experience for the stakeholders willing to go down the path. Figure 6.4 depicts a model as 
to where the Indian Infrastructure sectors are placed with respect to the Public- Private 
spectrum and it has been drawn from the data coilected for this survey. 
Fieure 6.4 
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Chapter 7 
Summary of Findings and Conclusion 
7.1 Summary of Findings 
The study has tried to analyse the issues of Risl< Management in infrastructure 
Financing at both aggregate level (population-wide) and at disaggregated level 
(project level) with a lenders perspective. After a thorough analysis of the Structure 
and forms of flow of finance to infrastructure sector and the various mechanisms and 
strategies used for it, the acquired understanding as to how the role of Public-Private 
Partnerships (PPPs) route to infrastructure provisioning is redefining the landscape of 
Infrastructure was focussed upon. The findings and conclusions of the research have 
been high-lighted specifically at the end of each analysis/ chapters itself, and hence 
it is fruitless to repeat it again. However, what is sought to be achieved in the 
following paragraphs of this chapter is to highlight the findings in a very generic 
sense instead of going to the specifics. Needless to say, the shortcomings, 
extension that are possible to this piece of research to enhance and further the body 
of knowledge in this sphere has also been attempted. 
7.2 Analysis with Aggregates 
After understanding the basics and the role of PPPs, the subsequent analysis in 
Chapter 4 empirically analysed the population wide characteristics of PPPs using 
two most authentic databases in the subject- the PPI project Database of World 
Bank and the Loanware database of Capital Data (an Euromoney affiliate). It has 
very clearly brought out how the developing countries thrust for Private Infrastructure 
was led initially by Latin American and Caribbean countries which have gone for 
deeper sectoral reforms through disvestitures and privatizations which redefined the 
role of the State. Contrastingly, the analysis also brought out how the East and South 
Asia emphasized creating new assets through Greenfield infrastructure projects 
through BOT schemes. The sectoral characteristics has shown how the power and 
telecom sectors were off the block first and how it is difficult to commercialise and 
commoditise water. Deeper analysis of the data using OLS regression model has 
brought out the Loan Pricing inequalities and characteristics of various forms of 
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Project Finance that exist in the Global Finance lexicon today. These analysis has 
helped to understand the aggregate macro issues and functions in the sector which 
help sharpen the lenders perspective and involvement. 
7.3 Analysis with Disaggregates 
It is the researcher's understanding gained from more than a decade of experience 
as a Finance professional/ Banker, researcher, consultant and above all an avid 
observer that many excellent pieces of research work done on macro economic 
issues on vital topics fail the all important "applicability" criterian to the real world 
conditions, as micro issues, the influences of which are normally captured from unit-
level disaggregated data is over-looked or not given the requisite attention. It is also 
true that many excellent research work involving micro issues analysed using 
disaggregated data failed to make any impact as the jigsaw of how it fits into the 
macro canvas of the overall scheme of things is either not clearly conceptualised/ 
understood or sometimes overlooked. This issue of macro Vs micro is a running 
battle and a raging debate with the researchers across all countries- irrespective of 
topics or subjects. This debate is even more crucial in social sciences research as 
the very nature of social sciences research has limitations put in its applicability. 
The researcher having fully aware of the relevant factors and issues in this sphere 
was committed to pursue the research using both the approaches of analysing 
aggregates and disaggregates - independently and dispassionately so that the 
findings are understood with proper perspective. No generalisations have been done 
in this study wherein micro data is used to generalise a population-wide 
characteristic or vice-versa. It was the researchers commitment and gut feel gained 
from years of experience that the above referred are some of the potent reasons why 
the social sciences research fail the applicability test. An honest attempt has been 
made to address this issue in Chapter 5 of this dissertation. It deals with analysis of 
a fine collection of disaggregated data collected from the "insiders" and "outsiders" of 
the project finance arena and goes on to analyse the attributes which captures the 
project level variables and its influences as they perceive it. Advanced statistical 
modelling and scaling techniques have been used including proven index methods 
to convert what are seemingly qualitative attributes to quantitative ones so that dis-
passionate and objective analysis are possible. 
189 
The Project Evaluation model arrived at after studying the influences of 23 attributes 
which in itself has been selected after the initial data collection and screening is a 
multi-attribute evaluation model that can be used to evaluate projects and project 
promoting companies. The researcher had the opportunity to interact with a whole 
spectrum of infrastructure finance institutions in India and elsewhere for inputs at the 
time of development of the evaluation model. Some of the institutions like IDFC have 
started using this model already in their risk management cells and some are trying 
to evolve a software which would incorporate this model. Research models of this 
nature are bound to improve the quality of appraisal and use of risk management 
methodologies. 
7.4 Adoption of Best Practices 
It is only logical that nowadays any complex areas or topics, more so in vital sectors 
attracts framing of a set of practices as guidelines often dubbed as "Best practices". 
This is normally done by an organisation or institution which works at an Apex level 
or sometimes even the regulator. For example, the Bank for International Settlements 
(BIS) as a global regulator of banking standards has prescribed Best Practices in 
very many areas as and when required. SEBI does it for capital market related 
practices in India. When such best practices already exist in one's area of research, 
it is not incumbent on the researcher to prescribe another set of practices. It is found 
redundant. Conscious of these nuances, it was felt that analysing the progress made 
by us in adopting to the Best Practices would be a far better measure and would 
indicate how our infrastructure sectors are placed. The result of many negotiation 
and discussion with the industry people is the culmination of drawing Chapter 6 
which captures the essence of happenings in the Indian Infrastructure Sector and 
ranks them in their progress in terms of adoption of Best Practices. 
The findings interestingly revealed how we have jumped up sequences prescribed in 
Best Practices in sectors like Power and telecom (though they are ahead of the 
pack now) and as to how we could amend our mistakes in hindsight which saved 
the situation in these sectors. The rankings have highlighted how sectors like Urban 
Infrastructure and Water are finding it difficult to take off. A closer analysis of the best 
practices prescribed by ADB in each of the sectors would also bring home a few 
commonalities in issues which can be described as cross-sectoral issues in financing 
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of private infrastructure. ADB has also recognised tiiese and tall<s about the cross 
sectoral issues in many of its reports. The role of government, Institutional reforms\ 
Legal and Regulatory framework, Sources of Financing, Risk and Risk Mitigation 
etc., are all issues of cross-sectoral relevance, the influence of which cannot be 
undermined. It has to be admitted that this research couldn't tread to such areas 
because it was felt that much of these issues are in itself very big topics for research 
in the area and justice could not be done if it were to be done as part of this research 
piece. 
7.5 Extension of this Research Findings 
Most models that are analysed and evolved in financial research are either cash-flow 
based or Capital-based. Obviously, there exists a raging debate^ in the community of 
researchers and modellers with financial data, of the superiority of one over the other 
though none could establish it conclusively till date. 
Four factors make infrastructure investments tricky for traditional financial institution. 
First, since private investments in infrastructure are relatively new and few - and in 
comparison to corporate lending the information is closely held- there is considerable 
lack of historical data. In the absence of this informed judgement about possible 
outcomes for different situations is virtually impossible. Second each project will 
demand large funding exposures. Hence, in comparison to the past, institutions are 
bound to have their funds deployed in fewer projects, leading to a statistically riskier 
situation. Third, the challenges of the sector will ensure that the structures evolved 
for each project are unique, which will call for tremendous depth of appraisal and risk 
evaluation competencies within the financing institution. Fourth, risk mitigation 
measures followed in normal corporate financing will not be easily adaptable to 
infrastructure project finance. 
' " R O L E OF INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS IN FINANCING PROJECT COMPANIES IN ASIA", 2003 a Post-
doctoral work by the scholar Dr. K.A.K. Devipriya and a few others who have worked on the areas such as 
institutional aspects of infrastructure have established that reforming and restructuring institutional infrastructure of 
ministries, departments, regulatory and legal institutions are as important, if not more to see a real change 
happening in this sector. 
It is interesting to note that many high-end Journals in Finance including the famous "Journal of Finance" itself 
carry these debates, arguments and counter-arguments by publishing empirical research evidences to establish the 
superiority of one over the other. Anybody who has followed this debate for the past 10 years or so would subscribe 
that neither of the group could get an upper hand and even now the debate is on an even keel. Needless to say that 
professional researchers across the globe have benefitted immensely from these debates. 
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It is here that the thinking sinks in to say that infrastructure project financing would 
get a boost, if it would be possible to determine the quantum of capital necessary to 
cover unexpected losses on a given project, leading to an intelligent assessment of 
Risk Adjusted Return On Capital (RAROC). The attractive part of such a model 
would be its link to capital and RAROC. Unfortunately, it is beyond the scope of this 
research. The researcher would humbly leave it to the scholars who would be 
interested to work further in these areas. However, a few suggestions and ideas on 
how to go about it has been advanced which evolve from conceptualised thoughts by 
going on and on in this topic. 
How to do it? 
No research is complete in itself and it is a journey. Extension of a journey is very 
much a possibility. And the researcher is interested in lending ideas to anybody who 
would be doing further work in this area. The following lines are penned to meet this 
end. 
As a first step in going to a RAROC model a detailed Project Risk Review to find out 
the Expected Default Probability (EDF) by assessing the ability to contain the future 
losses in terms of timing, cost and recovery need to be undertaken of the samples 
under consideration. Probability of Default associated with a list of exposures like 
Country risk, Currency risk. Market Risk, Operating Risk, Interest Rate Risk, etc may 
have to be arrived at. Exposure at Default by analysing the cash flows to each factor 
like amortisation schedule, PPAs, Tolling Aggreement, Indexing Contracts, Hedging, 
Takeouts, Reserve Accounts, Offshore Escrow, Construction Incentives etc., can be 
arrived at by statistical simulation of project's operating characteristics. The Expected 
Default Probability (EDF) and Loss Given Default (LCD) derived could then be 
mapped on to the cash flow distribution to quantify the distribution of likely losses. 
A true Net Present Value (NPV) based performance measure can then be generated 
and pricing and portfolio performance can be compared and optimised. The project-
related profitability data provides unique insights to the structuring effects in terms of 
the expected loss (EL) and the unexpected loss (Capital requirements), over the 
tenor of the project. The transaction/ deal level analysis can then be consolidated 
across portfolios and business units with linkages established through correlation 
analyses. Ultimately, the institution can create a fully integrated structure for bridging 
together tactical responses, for instance, deal structuring, and strategic decisions for 
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instance exposure to telecom projects etc. The most attractive element of having the 
project evaluation model in this form is it becomes a RAROC model and would tell 
the financier as to what extent he is risking his capital. Further, such a model has all 
the advantages of a RAROC based approach to risk management. 
7.6 The Road Ahead 
The road ahead in infrastructure financing is bound to be interesting in the days to 
come, especially in a developing country like India which is in the threshold of 
catching up with the developed nations of the world. The importance of having the 
requisite infrastructure in aiming for a double digit growth need not be over-
emphasised. There are many learning and unlearning to be done in the process of 
the journey and the success of it, would lie in perhaps shortening the curve of both 
learning and unlearning. A mention has been made during the initial analysis of the 
chapters as to how experts conceptualise nationalisation and privatisation as a cycle 
when one analyses it in a broader time-line. If it were to be true, a fitting candidate for 
such a cycle could be found in infrastructure financing itself. The reference here is to 
the various BOT structures in infrastructure financing which by its very design 
transfers the ownership from the SPV (which is a private entity) to the government 
after the project promoter reaps his sunk cost with an agreed return on the 
investment. Hence, it is interesting and welcoming that no emotions are attached in 
promoting such concepts which are bound to stay. 
7.7 Conclusion 
Through this study which involved pain staking effort spanning more than half a 
decade of effort at analysis and understanding, a long cherished dream of 
undertaking application- oriented research in lesser explored area could be brought 
to its logical end. it has enriched the understanding of hard core research by leaps 
and bounds and have taken the researcher to an innumerable number of 
people/professionals and institutions. While thanking each one of them for their 
contributions, the real use of this research which has been tried with applicability as 
the mantra, would be more than well served if the institutions and individuals use it 
to their advantage. 
***** 
193 
Books, Articles, Reports, Monographs, Presentations 
Referred 
1. Haimes, Y. (1998) Risk Modeling, Assessment and Management New York: 
John Wiley. 
2. National Research Council; Committee on Risk Characterization (1996) 
Understanding risk: Informing decisions in a democratic society P.C. Stern 
and H.V. Fineberg (eds). Washington, DC: National Academy Press : (2a) 
Fischhoff, B. (1994). "What forecasts (seem to) mean" International Journal 
of Forecasting 10:387-403. 
3. Slovic, P. (2000) The Perception of Risk London, UK: Earthscan. 
4. Flynn, J., Slovic, P. and Kunreuther, H. (eds) Risk Media and Stigma 
London, UK: Earthscan 
5. Kasperson, R., Jhaveri, N. and Kasperson, J. (2001) "Stigma and the Social 
Amplification of Risk: Toward a Framework of Analysis" Chap. 2 in Flynn, J., 
Slovic, P. and Kunreuther, H. (eds) Risk Media and Stigma London, UK: 
Earthscan. 
6. Kunreuther, H. Novemsky, N. and Kahneman, D (2001) "Making Low 
Probabilities Useful" Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 23:103-120. 
7. Huber, O., Wider, R. and Huber, 0. (1997) "Active Information Search and 
Complete Information Presentation in Naturalistic Risky Decision Tasks" 
Acta Psychologica 95:15-29. 
8. Kahneman, D. Slovic, P. and Tversky, A. (eds) (1982). Judgment under 
uncertainty: Heuristics and biases New York: Cambridge University Press 
9. Svenson, O. (1981). "Are we all less risky and more skillful than our fellow 
drivers?". Acta Psychologica 47:143-148. 
10. Slovic, P., M. Finucane, E. Peters, and D. MacGregor (2002) "The Affect 
Heuristic", in T. Gilovich, D. Griffin, and D. Kahneman (Eds.), Intuitive 
Judgment: Heuristics and Biases, Cambridge University Press. 
194 
II.Loewenstein, G., Weber, E, Hsee, C. and Welch, E. (2001) "Risk as 
Feelings" Psychological Bulletin 127:267-86. 
12. Hsee, C and Kunreuther, H. (2000) "The Affection Effect In Insurance 
Decisions" Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 20:141-59. 
13. Morgan, M.G. Fischhoff, B., Bostrom, A. and Atman, C.J. (2002) Risk 
communication: A mental models approach New York: Cambridge University 
Press. 
14. U.S. Congress. (1995). Federal Disaster Assistance. Report of the Senate 
Task Force on Funding Disaster Relief Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Government Printing Office. 
15. North, W. (1995) "Limitations, definitions, principles and methods of risk 
analysis" Scientific and Technical Review of the Office International des 
Epizooties 4:913-23. 
16. Kunreuther, H. and Heal, G. (2002) "Interdependent Security: The Case of 
Identical Agents" Paper Presented at the National Bureau of Economic 
Research Insurance Project Workshop Cambridge, Mass. Feb. 1. 
17. Y.V.Reddy :Financial Sector Reforms: Review and Prospects - Reserve 
Bank of India Bulletin, January 1999 
18. Y.V.Reddy :Managing Public Debt and promoting debt markets in India 
(Keynote address at Asia Debt Conference organised by Finance Asia.com, 
Hongkong,June 20, 2000) 
19. Y.V.Reddy :Securitisation in India: Next Steps (Inaugural address at the 
seminar on Government Securities Market organised by the Primary Dealers 
Association of India in Chennai, April 17, 1999) 
20. Ajay Shah:lnstitutional Change in India's Capital Markets - Economic and 
Political Weekly, January 16-23, 1999. 
21. Reserve Bank of India - Annual reports - (1995- 2003) 
22. Reserve Bank of India - Report on Currency and Finance - (1998-2002) 
195 
23. Reserve Bank of India Bulletin - A review of internal debt management policy 
and operations for the period ended, 1995 -, November 1996 
24. C.Rangarajan - Some critical issues in monetary policy - Economic and 
Political Weekly, June 16, 2001 
25. BIS - The changing shape of fixed income markets (BIS papers No.5) 
26. 'World Development Report 1994: infrastructure for Development' published 
by world Bank, 
27. National Stock Exchange of India - Indian Securities market Review -- (1998-
2002). 
28. The India Infrastructure Report' brought out by the Expert Group on the 
Commercialisation of Infrastructure Projects (Chairman: Shri Rakesh 
Mohan). 
29. Annual India Infrastructure Report published by Oxford University Press on 
thematic concerns in the field. The first such report was published in 2001 
titled "Issues in Regulation and Market Structure"; the 2002 report was based 
on "Governance Issues for Commercialisation" and the 2003 report covered 
the issue of "Public Expenditure Allocation and Accountability 
30. Asian Development Bank; (2000a); Developing Best Practices for Promoting 
Private Sector investment in Infrastructure-Power, Road, Water, Airports, 
Telecom; ADB, Manila. 
31.Aylward A. and Glen J.;(1998); Primary securities markets: Cross country 
findings, World Bank; Mimeo; February. 
32. Beck T., Demirguc-Kunt A. and Levine R.; (2000); A new database on the 
structu.e and development of the financial sector; World Bank Econo. 
Rei/.14 (3); 597-605. 
33. Cheemmanur T.J. and John K.,(1996), Optimal Incorporation, Structure of 
Debt Contacts, and Limited -Recourse Project Financing, J. Finan. 
Intermediation, 372-408. 
196 
34. Destais C, (1999), Transaction Costs Theory, Asset Specificity and R/s/c 
Appraisal An Analysis Based on The Example of Limited Recourse Project 
Finance, Paper presented at the International Society for the New Institutional 
Economics, Third Annual Meetings: Washington D.C. 
35. Dennis A. S. and Mullineaux J.D.,(2000), Syndicated loans; J. Finan. 
Intermediation. 
36. Devapriya K.A.K.; (2003); A Study of Project Finance in Asia with Emphasis 
on Private Infrastructure Project Finance; PhD thesis; University of Hong 
Kong. 
37. Edward S. and Ng F.;(1985); Trends in real exchange rate behavior in 
selected developing countries; Working Paper, The World Bank; Washington, 
D.C. 
38. Estache A. and Strong J.; (2000); The rise, the fall and emerging recovery of 
project finance in transport; Working Paper, May 200, World Bank Institute, 
The World Bank. 
39. Esty B.C.; (2002); Returns on project-financed investments: Evolution and 
managerial implication; J. Appl. Corp. Fin.15.; No.1. 
40. Esty B.C. and Megginson W.L.; (2000); Syndicated structure as response to 
political risk in the project finance loan market; Working Paper, Harvard 
Business School, MA. 
41.Greenbaum I.S. and Thakor V.A.;(1995); Contemporary financial 
intermediation; The Dreden Press; Florida, USA. 
42. Joshi P.;(2002); Dabhol: A case study of restructuring infrastructure projects; 
J.Struct. Proje. Finan.; Spring 2002; pp 27-34. 
43. Kleimeier S,(1993), Essays on project finance, Ph.D thesis, University of 
Georgia, USA. 
197 
44. Kleimer S and Megginson; (2000); Are project finance loans different from 
other syndicated credits?; Working Paper, Michael F. Price College of 
Business, the University of Oklahoma. 
45. Lang L.H.P;(1998), Project finance in Asia; Elsevier Science, Netherlands. 
46. Lissowska M.; (2001); Credit contracts in transition countries: contractual 
problems and different solutions; presentation to "Institutions and 
Governance"; 5* Annual Conference of International Society of New 
Institutional Economics, September 13-15, 2001; Berkeley, California, USA. 
47. Merna T. and Njiru C; (2002); Financing infrastructure projects; Thomas 
Telford Ltd.; London, The UK. 
48. National Economic Research Associates (NERA);(1998); Governance and 
Regulatory Regimes for Private Sector Infrastructure Development: Final 
Report; Asian Development Bank; Philippines. 
49. Nevitt K.P. and Fabozzi F.(1998), Project Financing ,8'^ Ed.,Euromoney 
Publication, The USA. 
50. Palay T.M.;(1984); Comparative institutional economics: The governance of 
rail freight contracting; J. Leg. Stud, xiii (2); 265-287. 
51. Pejovich S.; (1998); Economic analysis of institutions and systems; T'^ E.D.; 
Kluwer Academic Publishers; Boston, USA. 
52. Pollio G,(1999), International Project Analysis and Financing, The University 
of Michigan Press, The USA. 
53. Political Risk Services; (2001); International Country Risk Guide (ICRG); 
Sepember,2001; East Syracuse, NY. 
54. Shah S. and Thakor V.T.; (1987); Optimal Capital Structure and Project 
Financing, J. Econ. Theo. 42, 209-243. 
55. Standard and Poor's; (2000); Debt rating criteria for energy, industrial, and 
infrastructure project finance; Standard and Poor's, New York. 
198 
56. Williamsons, O. E.; (1985); The Economic Institution of Capitalism; Free 
Press, New York. 
57. Williamsons, O. E; (1996); The Mechanisms of Governance; Oxford 
University Press, New York. 
58. The World Bank; (2003); Private participation in infrastructure: Trends in 
developing countries in 1990-2001; Private provision of public services 
group, The World Bank. 
59. The enabling framework for private investment in infrastructure', 1998 
published by world bank: 
60.'Moving towards private infrastructure', 1997 published by IPC explains 
privatisation experiences in the asia & latin American regions including 
capital market developments in these regions. 
61. 'Lessons of experience - financing private infrastructure', 1996, published by 
IPC- an authoritative treatise on country risk analysis and an excellent source 
on secondary data of all IPC financed projects including debt-equity structure 
of finances. 
62. "Infrastructure in India', 1998 edited by K.P.Singh national institute of 
management technology reveals various concepts in town planning and 
urban development like satellite towns, corridor concept etc. and the 
modelling aspects of the same. 
63. 'Dealing with public risk in private infrastructure, 1997 edited by timothy Irwin 
and published by world bank with contributions from many countries. 
64. Key note address by Rakesh Mohan on 'infrastructure challenges & 
constraints' at the IGIDR, 1998 explains various Indian experiences in the 
areas of power, telecom, roads etc. 
65. 'Report on infrastructure privatisation' - an intelligence report by ICRA 
published in 1998 explains various methodologies and instmments with an 
international perspective 
199 
66.'India file- infrastructure', 1998 - a special supplement by economic times 
chronicles tlie happenings in the infrastructure sector. 
67. THEORIES OF RISKS & ECONOMIC BEHAVIOUR, von Neumann and 
morgenstern(1947), Princeton university press. 
68.'PORTFOLIO SELECTION - EFFICIENT DIVERSIFICATION OF 
INVESTMENT', harry M.Markowitz{yale university press), monograph (1959). 
69. THE ECONOMICS OF UNVERTAINTY, Karl Henrick Borch (1972), Princeton 
university press. 
70. ESSAYS ON ECONOMIC DECISIONS UNDER UNCERTAINTY, jacquesll. 
Dreze (1987), Cambridge university press. 
71. INTERNATIONAL BANKING - INNOVATIONS & NEW POLICIES', Charles 
IFIand and Pierre languetin, Macmillan press,1988. 
72.'THE NEW FRONTIER- INFRASTRUCTURE', quarterly money manager, 
(business standard magazine of finance). May - June 1995- A compilation of 
very recent thinking in financing infrastructure. 
73. INFRASTRUCTURE FINANCING,Rajrishi singhal, the economic times 
(money & banking column),28.9.96,p 6. 
74. SECURITISING TERM LOANS ,Rajrishi singhal, the economic times 
(moneys banking column), 3.11.95,p 6. 
75. 'THE GUJARAT GOVERNMENT CONTINUES TO PLAY AN IMPORTANT 
ROLE IN MARKETING SARDAR SAROVAR', lubna kably, business 
standard, 25-5-95, p3. 
76. 'BOND STRIPPING - PERFECT BUT PREMATURE', rajrishi singhal, the 
economic times 11-1-96,p 6. 
77. 'DEALS WITH STRUCTURED OBLIGATIONS GAINING GROUND ', George 
albert, business standard, 4-8-1995,p 14. 
200 
78. 'PATH WITH A DIFFERENCE', C. Shiv Kumar, the business standard 27-6-
95,p14. 
79. 'FORFAITING SERVICES',Rajat Bhattacharya, the economic times,4.1.96, p 
6. 
80.'PITFALLS IN FINANCIAL MODEL BUILDING'.William C. Brainard and 
James Tobin (Yale University), American economic association(1991), p.99 
81.'MACRO ECONOMICS- A MATHEMATICAL APPROACH', Anita gahtak, 
1994. 
82. 'INTRODUCTION TO TIME SERIES MODELING AND FORECASTING IN 
BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS', Patricia E. Gaynor and Rickey C.Kirkpatrick 
(Appalachian state university) (1994), McGraw Hill inc. 
83.'ECONOMIC HISTORY OF INDIA',vol I& II, Ministry of information & 
Broadcasting ,Gol, 1988. 
84.'BUDGET SPEECHES OF FINANCE MINISTERS-1951-52 TO 1984-85', 
Ministry of information & Broadcasting, go!, 1988. 
85. 'BANK INSOLVENCY AND STABILISATION IN EASTERN EUROPE', Daniel 
C.Hardy and Ashok kumar Lahiri, Jan '92,IMF working paper, WP/92/9. 
86. FOREX ACCOUNTING NORMS - A MATTER OF PROFIT', Shobana 
Subramanian, the economic times,2-9-93,p7. 
87. SICOM - A CHANGE OF TRACK', Indrani dasgupta, the economic times, 2-
9-93, P .7. 
88. 'SOCIAL APPRAISAL OF THE BUILT-OPERATE-TRANSFER PROJECTS 
OF PUBLIC OWNED UTILITY INDUSTRIES IN COMPARISON TO 
TURNKEY PROJECTS',panaystis F. Diamandis & George P.Diacogiannis, 
public finance (1994), vol 49(1), 1994,pp 12-41. 
201 
89. 'PUTTING A CAP ON PUBLIC DEBT', S.Venkitaramanan, the economic, 
2.3.94.p11. 
90.'AN ECONOMETRIC INVESTIGATION OF THE DETERMINATS OF 
DEMAND FOR MONEY IN INDONESIA', Kabir hassan and tatak suryadi 
(university of new orleons) 
91. 'THE ROLE OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN CHINA'S POST-1978 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ', chung chen,Lawrence chang and yimin 
Zhang; world development, vol.23.no.,pp 691-703,1995. 
92. 'POWER - THE ENRON ROW',Deepak V.Upreti, deccan herald (business 
page),12-6-1995,PI. 
93. A POVERTY -ORIENTED COST - BENEFIT APPROACH TO THE 
ANALYSIS OF DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS',Paul clements.world 
development,vol.23,No.4,PP 577-592.1995. 
94.'PRIVATE PARTICIPATION IN POWER GENERATION - ASPECTS 
NEEDING REVIEW, K.P.Rao, the Hindu,Business review,6-12-95. 
95. 'ENRON DEAL vs NEW ENERGY PARADIGM', Amulya K.K.Reddy and 
Antonette D'Sa, The economic times,28-6-95. 
96. 'SHAKE , SLITHER AND —SCHUSS', the economist, sep 12-19,1995. 
97. CRIS-INFAC - Roads and Highways Annual Review - 2001 - 2003, Crisil 
Infrastructure Advisory services Report. 
98. Jun, Kwang W., The World Bank, and Thomas L. Brewer (1997), "The Role of 
Foreign Private Capital Flows in Sustainable Development," Fourth Expert 
Group Meeting on Financial Issues of Agenda 21, UNDPCSD/ECLAC/IDB, 
Santiago, Chile, 8-10 January. 
99. Karasapan, Omer (1996), "Private InfrastructureDA Bibliography; A Guide to 
World Bank Publications on Private Participation in Infrastructure," Public 
202 
Policy for the Private Sector Note No. 81, June, The World Bank, 
Washington, DC. 
100. Saburo (1996), "Emerging Asia and the Future of the Environment 
Perspective and Agenda," Background paper for Emerging Asia Study, ADB. 
101. Pernia, Ernesto M. and Stella Luz F. Alabastro (1996), "Aspects of Urban 
Sanitation in the Context of Rapid Urbanization in Developing Asia," Economics 
and Development Resource Center, Asian Development Bank. 
102. United Nations (1996), CSD Panel on Finance: New York 22 April 
1996, United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development, Fourth 
Session, New York. 
103. World Bank (1996), The Privatization Dividend, Finance and Private 
Sector Development Department Note No. 68, February, The World Bank, 
Washington, DC. 
104. Asian Development Bank (ADB) (1994), Financing Environmentally 
Sound Development, Gene M. Owens (Ed.), Asian Development Bank, 
Manila, Philippines. 
105. Brook Cowen, Penelope J. (1996), "Getting the Private Sector 
Involved in WaterDWhat to Do in the Poorest of Countries?" Public Policy for 
the Private Sector Note No. 81, June, The World Bank, Washington, DC. 
106. Crampes, Claude and Antonio Estache (1996), Regulating Water 
Concessions: Lessons from the Buenos Aires Concession," Public Policy for 
the Private Sector Note No. 91, September, The World Bank, Washington, 
DC. 
107. Kucera, D. (1996), "Are public-private partnerships really partnerships?" 
online at http://news.publicworks.com/daniel/kucera4.html. 
203 
107. Law 2245/1996 "Ratification of Contract for Design, Build, Finance, 
Operate of Athenian Ring -Road". 
108. Under, S. & Rosenau- Vaillancourt, P. (2000), "Mapping tlie Terrain 
of the Public-Private Policy Partnership" in Rosenau- Vaillancourt, P: 
Public-Private Policy Partnersliips, Massachusetts: MIT Press. 
109. McQuaid, R. (2000), "The theory of partnership: why have 
partnerships" in Osborne, St.(edt) "Public-Private Partnerships. Theory and 
practice in International perspective", London: Routledge. 
110. Ministry of Environment, Planning and Public Works (1996), 
"Concession Agreement for Design, Construction, Financing and 
Operation of Eleusinas, Stayros-A/D Spata & West Ymittou highwaty" 
111. Moulton, L. & Anheier (2000), "Public-private partnerships in the 
United States: historical patterns and current trends" in Osborne, St. (edts) 
"Public-Private Partnerships. Theory and practice in International 
perspective" London: Routledge. 
204 
Summits / Conferences Attended in the area of Infrastructure 
The researcher as part of this study could attend many conferences and seminars in 
the past seven years in the infrastructure sector which has helped in understanding 
the subject in deep and in sharpening the perspective. Incidentally, the meetings with 
many executives of banl<s, financial institutions and infrastructure companies in these 
conference has helped in networking and establishing contacts which have helped a 
great deal in this study. On a few occasions the researcher has also been invited as 
moderator and resource person for some of this conferences. The following is the list 
of such conferences/ seminars ad summits. 
1. Workshop on "Making Infrastructure projects happen", 25-26 Aug 1997, at 
Trivandrum, conducted by Kerala State Industrial Development Corporation, 
CRISIL Advisory services and others. 
2. "Power India 2003", 11-14 November 2003, International summit at Mumbai 
conducted by Government of India, Ministry of Power, Department of Non-
conventional Energy, Ministries of Coal, Petroleum and Heavy Industry. 
3. "Communication Convergence : The Mult! Billion Indian Opportunity", Dec 
12-14, 2002, Conducted by Indian Merchants' Chamber, Mumbai with active 
participation by Department of Telecom and Dept of IT, Governement of 
India. 
4. Maharashtra Infrastructure Summit, 10-12 Nov 2002, an international summit 
with complete participation of the entire set of Ministries and the Chief 
Minister of Maharashtra with delegation of international investors from 15 
countries conducted by Maharashtra Economic Development Council 
(MEDC) and the Industries department of the Government of Maharashtra. 
The summit was a precursor to passing the Maharashtra Infrastructure 
Development and Support Act, 2002 (referred commonly as MIDAS ACT, 
2002) by the State. 
5. "2"'' International Conference and Exposition on Infrastructure Development", 
Dec 1999 conducted by Confederation of Indian Industry in New Delhi. 
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6. International Conference and Exhibition on "Indian Ports & Shipping, 2002", 
Dec 8-10, 2002 with the theme " the future is now" conducted by the Bombay 
Chamber of Commerce & Industry (BCCI) and supported by Union Ministry 
of Shipping at Mumbai. 
7. "Why Roads hate Monsoons", Jan 2003 seminar conducted by Maharashtra 
Economic Development Council and MSRDC at Mumbai. 
8. "Water Privatization", Dec 2002 conducted by IDFC with participation from 
Union Ministry of Water Resources and international experts at Mumbai. 
9. Conference on "Indian Banking : Global Benchmarks, 2003", 25-27 Sep 
2003 at Mumbai conducted by Federation of Indian Ctiamber of Commerce 
and Industry which included an half-day session exclusively for Infrastructure 
Financing in India. 
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19. www.ffiec.qov/nic/ 
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31. http://www.hbs.edu/proifmportal/ 
32. www.nhdp.com 
33. www.indiashimng.com 
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34. www.imaritime.com 
35. www.msrdc.com 
36. www.hudco.co.in 
37. www.rbi.orq 
38. www.kpmq.com 
39. www.crisil.com 
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208 
STATISTICAL APPENDIX 
VSTVR STATK IRKNllS IN INMrlSIMKMS 
APPENDIX -1 
Sbi« 
Ainllir.i Prattesh 
Vssiim 
Bih,ir 
(Aifinl 
Hayniw 
Hinwclial I'anlcsh 
Kamalnka 
Kerala 
Mitdhya Pnwtedi 
MalKiiastili;i 
(Jrissa 
I'linjab 
R.ijaslhan 
Tamil Nmlii 
IJtUTi r>iT)*)esll 
VVvst Itengal 
U indiit 
rwnd*In lom 
Inu-slim-nt In-Slat» 
(Rs C'rureisi 
137,475 
Vim 
25.6:J> 
KiaMS 
I3_\=i^ 
.>.>.7>X 
L2S,.>0& 
^l.4S? 
4sm 
l.MJSf. 
Ml .4X4 
.^1355 
4:!.4>:) 
).mj\(. 
(A,'M) 
65, VI1 
15,65.076 
(%) 
»,7S 
0,?S 
1 64 
(0. ,?>> 
1,48 
116 
»,3:) 
.?.2*) 
,?,u 
10.5,1 
5.14 
.'.CKi 
277 
l(U4 
4 15 
4,17 
l!)O,0 
Ti'^ nds In Invjstmsiii iJiKler 
li)i|iiciTi«iLiii«)i) 
R,*. Ci'mes) 
uO.,12 ;^ 
S,1X,2 
IO.LW 
X2,.S(i5 
l l , l«> 
1S,4?3 
3Q,IS5 
6Jif>,? 
. l l , « l 
S5,H5J 
2>,i/2> 
l(,,(>42 
i:vw5 
53.iM)5 
^SJW 
20,f.57 
fsS 7.206 
KS"lat« 
I'K.) 
8,75 
1,19 
1 47 
12.0.5 
1.62 
2.fM 
i.TO 
I.C© 
4,(i,:? 
12.4") 
.5,77 
2.},i: 
2 m 
7S„? 
412 
,5,01 
100,0 
rronds in the 
RaUJol 
Inipleinaiuiiian 
(%) 
4,',74 
67,:» 
W28 
>o.'x;i 
4S,2,1 
.54,,«3 
1«J,,M 
K?,W 
65,49 
52, ( » 
?.2 2l 
SI 16 
%? ?•? 
•I..V,56 
4.V5,'> 
:M,6? 
4.191 
s^iirc*: .M9MW> Rt^lw «f iBvestaieai ItojKts. s«}>t«ral)sr 2mi 
209 
ROADS : Road Length and its Growth 
Year 
1970-71 
1971-72 
1972-73 
1973-74 
1974-75 
1975-76 
1976-77 
1977-78 
1978-79 
1979-80 
1980-81 
1981-82 
1982-83 
1983-84 
1984-85 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
Surfaced 
roads 
397940 
435974 
474467 
498837 
522635 
547414 
571675 
595964 
623402 
644216 
683676 
731959 
726159 
747003 
787935 
824916 
857890 
888380 
957631 
1016386 
1024339 
1048682 
1150795 
1176257 
1202085 
1334078 
All roads 
917880 
1012399 
1127943 
1171318 
1215262 
1204851 
1307798 
1372140 
1445286 
1491873 
1485421 
1545891 
1579106 
1620504 
1686948 
1726104 
1785077 
1843420 
1919885 
1983867 
1998220 
2021441 
2114498 
2142791 
2171335 
2403634 
% chg of 
surfaced 
roads 
9.56 
8.83 
5.41 
4.77 
4.74 
4.43 
4.25 
4.60 
3.34 
6.13 
7.06 
-0.79 
2.87 
5.48 
4.69 
4.00 
3.55 
7.80 
6.14 
0.78 
2.38 
9.74 
2.21 
2.20 
10.98 
% chg of all 
roads 
10.30 
11.41 
3.85 
3.75 
0.86 
8.54 
4.92 
5.33 
3.22 
-0.43 
4.07 
2.15 
2.62 
4.10 
2.32 
3.16 
3.53 
4.15 
3.33 
0.72 
1.16 
4.60 
1.34 
1.33 
10.70 
210 
Iii<tr - statf P<iM»r Mi(>(>ly PoMiioii 
<ln MV%) 
StltcS 
AMhni 
Piudesh 
[jjhur 
C"i(ij,-«l 
H;«y,iai 
Kamsota 
K*rati 
Maii-iRBhii-j 
Madhvi 
I'racbsli 
Oiissi 
Punjab 
Rojaslhiin 
Tamil Nadu 
Uinr 
Pwilesli 
Wifsl 
fteng i^l 
Ali (ifdia 
Rc'qiili-aneiit 
24';il5 
74lii 
2s5((5 
lijV'f, 
iO.<SO 
7 4 # 
42i;)7r-,t 
31115 
Ki65 
I72.SS 
I32S3 
J « I O 
.llslO 
1 1 1 * 
:.<5Jf9"4 
Availnbiiity 
l - » l - 9 > 
22415 
5; IS 
24417 
10123 
I 5 5 » 
719? 
41:1 i « . 
1W42 
740'.> 
ICI?? 
IKiXi 
220S(. 
2S380 
I0I4C' 
2ir'.64J2 
l>1k-il 
(..7 
29.7 
4.:< 
2.0 
2.'.f> 
.5.:» 
4 5 
5/3 
7.0 
62 
14 
4S 
10.3 
9.0 
-.s 
k.xiuirenwm 
477' '2 
'>2t>S 
5K).5S 
17275 
j;i.f242 
l.^5M 
T9527 
m>*i 
11710 
276X1 
25080 
427D2 
M,2m 
1S7S7 
50721.^ 
Avalkil>il ay 
2 W 0 - 0 I 
44'.i55 
v?i,y 
47877 
li,7'3.'! 
Z)4<X} 
12670 
7 I I S 4 
J4747 
12070 
2 W 2 . ' 
241 ?SI 
yui-d 
.W5Sii 
lit<i5lg 
467401 
IX'Ncil 
7.S 
7.0 
'f.7 
2.S 
<>.! 
6.6 
10.5 
124 
- i . l 
2.7 
3 ^ 
7.6 
14.6 
.1:1,9 
7.H 
21: 
Iiivt»s(innit5 ill P«>vtfr 
iR« l»i}Joii) 
StiKjs rkviriiiiy GBnwuiioii Bediicilv Di%ii1l,>uiion Toul F,l«lrlcily 
.\iidlir.i ftadcj-li 
Bihar 
Delhi 
G M 
Cujnral 
Harysirei 
IIInuctBl PiiRiesili 
KariKiUifci 
(Cerald 
Mirfhya Pryttesh 
?(i:i)iarash(ra 
Oiir^a 
Pimjsh 
RfiJisLli**! 
Tamil Ivudu 
Urlir Praifcsh 
XVasi (?i.'irj;i( 
AllliKiJa 
+}5,yi 
ns;M 
« 5 2 
N.A 
4-7 -^s 
i,lM 
2S0"i 
386.10 
185.S5 
184.37 
278.6.' 
445.74 
lo:..?-
;i2,i5i 
T6.\f,.? 
B7.© 
225 2^ 
52?4.4X 
SsuKK emu. |No»«H*CT 2 W n 
OS.) l.V>08 
o.w 4«.(;i 
N...'i N.A 
2.44 4S3:'.02 
0.2.'! t." T4 
l,\t;4 ^^t,.?" 
11.94 >»04 
0 IS5.55 
0 1X4 2-
1.15 2'».«0 
.?».<>:. 4S4.7I 
0 102.57 
0.S7 21.'.U5 
0 7(.5.65 
10 «I I4?..4y 
12.20 2:VT.4.^  
|0<3.'« 54T|,46 
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N \ r i O \ A I . HI t iHWAYS PROPOSE 1) FOR FCH R/SIX LANIIVG I NDKR NHDP 
State GoWtn 
Quidnlaki'ii 
Corridor Corridor MiDr 
South VVV'M 
Tott I 
.'Jiithni ftjcli'sh 
X'^SM} 
Hituir 
IX-lhi 
Giijriral 
Hjiyam 
Hinmclul f'radesti 
Jsinmii S. Kashmir 
Jhurkhariil 
Kaniatali:i 
Ker.ila 
Wiidhyn ('(!iifesl) 
Miih:»ashlf.-i 
Orissa 
Punjab 
R;ijaslh:ui 
Tinii l Nadu 
Utar Pradesh 
West liJainjjl 
Lengths of 
sile«l;tt? hy|»ss 
!A3MrtKd'MI)Hs* 
I W 
-
2i>i:i 
25 
*)K 
17.^  
-
-
b)2 
(« 
-
• 
4X7 
4J? 
-
f.XS 
275 
"52 
471 
6-> 
75;« 
.'4 
254 
14 
125 
Itfi 
524 
296 
*"> 
2i& 
(.U 
4^0 
548 
Toul 59JJ 
7,5 > 
75K 
517 
.'4 
fM 
254 
14 
405 
125 
Ic.O 
I'M'/, 
>« 
2*36 
512 
S51 
81.i 
.?t,6 
7413 
175.5 
758 
717 
50 
1152 
420 
14 
405 
1'32 
» l l 
ICO 
6i,(. 
7U> 
4? 7 
20ft 
1200 
1126 
I 5 « 
8.^ 7 
<J6 
13365 
S9uiT«>: Iniltii!) lafraslructurp. 2fl0! 
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IRUIGAI ION POTtN I lAL CRKA fED & I H L I S K D T H R O U C U MAJOR ii 
iVIEDIUMrvilNOK lIlRICAdON SCHKMKS L I' l l ) Till-: KM> Of I9*S -«»7 
(PROVISION A I.) 
AfidhM 
Prjdesh 
.\S'!ani 
B t o f 
CiM 
Gujiaal 
KailUlsilCU 
K^rjtj 
UatlSwa 
Muluni'^ilrj 
Orisa 
?iiiijati 
K.ijjslliim 
TsiililNiKil 
IDLir 
PiiKlesli 
•\Vesl 
Ifensal 
TMid -
I J I i 
ratal 
R-iieiitEiU 
Mak>] & 
Vlfibum 
W . , iO 
I9S..67 
2MCM 
MM 
liSM-ftJ 
lti<.,<)2 
>r.v,5i 
23i7,.>j 
.'.?l.il*j 
1557.75 
J5i:,«5 
.>27.V»> 
1545,51 
TOS'IMS 
1444. (IS 
:V2».1S.6.» 
IS.5J 
H « s r i 4 
rreakM 
Minor 
;".wilH.7 
<')i.7<i 
5IOs,24 
21X52 
10.55 ..50 
l.'!.?l,l>l 
57.!. 12 
265752 
26)0.20 
),!57.47 
J.?5'f,l" 
242124 
2115,22 
2.?.V)5,fM 
;i217 .i7 
5;4S9,'J3 
.1)1.9! 
56«1.«,« 
Ten l 
5'.54i:..iJJ 
TOT. 41 
TO 10.74 
.',»,54 
.!2S5.Mi 
Jl«,f»5 
liK6.4,! 
*)75.I2 
4'),V2,2S.) 
2015.22 
SM-'Ol 
4</>5,12 
3(x*,?.5 
.1W.54.Dfl 
4irf.|,45 
iWiJSA'; 
i10.42 
M.'i5M7 
niterllal iitillJiM 
"• ' Ma£r& 
2!r!S\S0 
nS. 1 7 
2324.20 
12.07 
I200.>)0 
1471.70 
4(.4..i;| 
I620.'J5 
I2S7.7D 
I442,<.<". 
2452. ;4 
laxs.iv 
154,^49 
6126.(10 
i3J2,52 
JUiiM 
S.ti 
2844(1,67 
Minor 
2<:«7.U, 
^8445 
4573.70 
17.77 
(».W.<>2 
I4S5S.TI 
5.17.4«» 
242ZU2 
2541.10 
1227.05 
52'»{..I2 
2,?.!«L7S 
2111.30 
2l"»2.?,t» 
2576.1)0 
52214,40 
If t iO? 
51.1IS.47 
T<iWl 
5 5 7 a . ' * 
(.22.62 
*S*V".W 
-O.SM 
.>059.i:.2 
29«.41 
lOOI.ai 
4':J42.'>7 
Man.n) 
2«^.7l 
574«.4(5 
4425.1? 
.'056X5 
28(,»*3(M 
J>M.42 
R864.5.7S 
i l.1„W 
Sfl7M.14 
Somet: Mttwnof Water .suppij-. t;fl>«rnm#aj »f Imlla 
214 
I rlvan Devel-tpmeut Indic^trnr^ 
Stwe I'ltjuiLilt'D wnvil Iv.' •oil' 
drinking w.iloi i"..i 
Fopniiikm f ovfjvd hy 
Urtanhilipnr200l) 
1 i 27.IW 
16 12.72 
M J 0.47 
:vs 37, .w 
: s 2'j,0':i 
14 9.?«> 
8 24,KS 
.•« n.m 
28 25.«)7 
S 36.«i7 
40 42.-t.) 
N A IJ.74 
1() I4.>}7 
49 .'J.9.1 
10 2\.5S 
4S 4}.8<. 
15 17.02 
14 20.78 
20 2».0> 
28 27.7K' 
* Mgiwc fe to All India, ln*df>5 Union TcrrlBrtilB 
Soiirw; liidten latrasirECtur*. 2i,H)i 
ivialiirasihira ts ilsfifc t'ltjaBiscd Siaie & lias rdalircfy tsmvT lufraslructuri' tluin orliaii aivas in otbvt 
stirs*. ho««-«ir m*rf if i pA|.j^ nrl^ } )a Improve qutitty «J I'rfJM) Life. 
.\itiihra Praitesh 
.\s.i;im 
Bilur 
(lUjorji 
Cixi 
HLiiy^iiiLi 
Himiidul 
Pnxtwl) 
Jciniinu& 
Ka.iliDiir 
tCamaUiku 
koiiila 
J.1;Klliva Pr.>ibrf) 
-MaterashlM 
Megliajayo 
N;)2nkini! 
<'.)ii?i«i 
l'wu«ib 
R.ijuslhuiii 
Tamil M;«.lu 
Tripiira 
ITtl.'irrVdde.sli 
WsHl Iteiisal 
Lfrtvin Intlii 
7.\S 
<4.] 
H7.2 
S72 
r,l.7 
'TV.: 
91,9 
H.A 
XI,4 
\<i.b 
79.5 
(XX 5 
75,4 
45, .s 
(.2.8 
<H.2 
«,5 
742 
71,1 
S5,8 
»:..2 
SI 4 
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BOT PROJECT DATABASE SUMMARY 
CaMmr>' 
PROJECT STATUS 
Op^Ti ConsttiKition Planninsj fr«-Ptanning AhandonwJ Total 
Bangladt'sh 
Hciiit) KoiTfj. CWnii 
lrn:l.-i 
UoPDR 
rvkii£iyfii.-i 
PakKfeiri 
Philifpincs. 
Sri Larika 
ThailofirJ 
e 
6 
11 
? 
1 
s 
4 
20 
? 
1 
15 
1 
•10 
4 
1S 
1 
IS 
Vit"l to 111 
Total 
PRC 
21 
21 
J2 43 
11 
1 
?iB 
1, 
0 
1 
133 
35 
NOTE: flgisres are coria'&mnsive. ^xc9o: tar PP.C -dfwrs iu$ v^rr diffK-a!: m iststyusn r,i« scaSe , 
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BOX PROJECT DATABASE 
SUYsl* 
B.»ngl,3d»$li 
P t m n r i g 
HfinciKonii, 
C h m 
C'5nslnic(Bn 
C<p»i 
Open 
Cp'in 
Oi.ier) 
Indiii 
P b i w i i g 
Ptai inr ig 
Ptannmg 
PkJiiri i ig 
Ptannino 
PbiHtBig 
Pt.inriing 
Pfa^nnrig 
Ptaf inl i t j 
P t i n n n g 
Ptjnn'mtj 
Pre-Plamiiiig 
Pre-Plarifilng 
Pfts-Plai-S)intj 
Pre-flanniri'3 
IndorwiUi 
Consiniction 
Conslruclion 
Consirucien 
Constr i icton 
Constfuclen 
Con5iriiciton 
(>l>eii 
Open 
Pktnning 
PUuifiiicj 
Pfeirinlria 
P t i nn i i g 
Pbnnr tg 
Planning 
Pkmnirg 
Pre-plan 111 nt| 
Pr»~Plarfling 
Pfts-Plarmirei 
Pr-ii-Planiiiiy,! 
Prio-Plani«ix( 
P re-Planning 
PrK>-f'1annlng 
Prsi-PtaiinJntj 
Pr»3-Wannii>a 
p re-Ran nlng 
S<:h9ni« 
DlXTk.T E3£i(»rn I.V/p.-i«,s 
R«.*s 3 : Country Park Seclfwi 
Wsstem Hartyif Crosshg 
Tate's C;iini Tunnel 
T-.TSl«m Horbw Crc>saii>5 
Cr!5s.t H a t e r Cros;siiK) 
Ca i i t> i )k i« ESyiMis. Tamil Na-Ju 
BaroiTvl-Hal-;>l, Gujarj l 
Ulhas ae*k , Mali.;ir;)sHii 
Jateigyn Bn-Jge. Matiarasrila 
Hetv/a Brklgft w e r Rrver Koy.ina 
Nain;»:ta Br t t j t i , GUwiJl 
Ah!iieclcit^3t:l-Va(.ltx>:xr>J Ksprewiwxiy 
13>.:*nt>iiv~VS'itkxJ«:ira Bxprmstvay 
Manii).Td byyasi", 
D>3lhi livT'tiss 
Dffilhi f;!ri>;:lEj<. 
R2ja!.th<iii 5 I'fcilways 
l3ombay-P«n.3 fij(pr<?s«.«ay 
Ddhi-Amtei : ! ExirtossaQy 
ItoncKilorstrsVincfalCif* Kxpressi't-ay 
Tnn/i.«ig Priok b Clkunt-
Jf ik ir l t i Ctiler F-Sny Rosstl (VV«sl 2> 
B«kasl-Guiiuncjp«tn icHl I t o i d 
Jaterto CXter Uirig Rci!3<J (l-.-asI 1) 
iakarta CXim- Ring RO;KI (West 1) 
l^sridoksiran-Sc-rpfsxi loll K M C I 
Jakarta f l-S 
JaKarta o a w Wnti Ro»J (SoLth) 
Pand-wn-rasuman loll Rond 
Ci;:r*vi-*>ukai:tui!ii 
Cll!aiiir,'el5-Padrt;»iiiH) 
DnwAnn-Prtl i ianan Toll Rp>aa 
/ Jo ta Vr;iiu.Tq P w ; * 
Jakarta Sscond Outer Krrj Ifeaci 
7"a(if»>g P rk * l ink lo J#ml:»it;»i Tiga 
t^amtirigan-Ngawi 
.fer/a Bali Brtcliye 
C i j a t t * P«;!lat«.ihan Ralii 
S*rpong-Pafuna 
Anta«iri4J8)5oic 
Cil•^gol^Lal>ul]ll 
Cilogi.in-BoJiin'.Krt) 
S«»rp0itj-P,-sirKj Panjiiny 
f.tetkin-Kuala iianiu 
Ngav1-Caa»)iin 
locat ion 
U i t a i i 
Urt>an 
Urt-an 
Urban 
Urban 
Ut lwi i 
Iniw-iJibaii 
Smf-Oitian 
InterJJifctin 
lnfei-Uit>ari 
lfiter-Llrt.,-i)-i 
In ta- lJ i lo i i 
Intel-UrtMii 
hil«-Urt)nn 
UriKsn 
Urban 
Urban 
Intcr-iJrbaii 
Intor-UrtMn 
Intw-Llitjan 
intw-Utoan 
6iie-r-t(rt)an 
Ur t«n 
Urban 
IJrlx)n 
Urban 
Urtcin 
iJrlKin 
Urban 
Intef-iJrban 
liilor-lJrl)aii 
Inler-UrtKiii 
inte-r-llrban 
Uitsan 
Urban 
Utl*im 
iivtw-Urban 
inl«--ljrt 'an 
ln(«'4J(l*!irr 
intfri-Uiban 
int6<r-LM;ian 
Inter-iJibfiii 
liUer-Urban 
int«i-lJrl5ar1 
liil«r-Urt'fin 
inlw-Urtjari 
0|)«nirKi 
imm 
1SS'7 
1 « 1 
19«9 
1S72 
2 wo 
1 M 9 
tsw 
L»nglh 
w 
4 
2 
2 
20 
a 
15 
0,4 
1 
5!i 
19 
10 
22 
t i -
l l 
r 
yr 
14,83 
i2i> 
if. 
ia,- i 
10 
13,iM 
3S 
f / i 
IT 
1.!J 
6 5 
10 
30 
27 
34 
Crjst 
0.9 
0 7 
0. i 
0.05 
O.OJ 
0.O3 
0.O4 
0.O2 
0 . M 
crxB 
0,2 
0,1 
o.ce 
0,7 
0.25 
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Stag* 
P.ikbtan 
Op^n 
RatTiing 
Ptaimirnj 
PtamlTfq 
Philipptnss 
Construe! ion 
Consiryclion 
Construclion 
Construction 
ConstruclBn 
P lamhg 
Ptatniria 
Ptanntig 
Ptarmlnci 
Pkinning 
Flaming 
Ptamiiici 
Planning 
Plannng 
Pro-Plcmnlng 
Sri LanKa 
Piannfrig 
ThiikiiKl 
Abandoned 
Al)ai(Jorifs.t 
Construction 
Construction 
ConstTuclion 
Construclion 
Construction 
Often 
Ojfen 
Qp«n 
C'tX'n 
Or»rt 
Planning 
Planning 
Pns-Planriing 
Viet Nam 
Pr€;-Plarii'«nt) 
Scf-psm* 
(stomabad-Ljrfiom fitotor*ay 
Lattore-Faistatxad Highway 
P»sliwtir-lsl;iniii.ii)«,l Hiyluviry 
Karachi-Psshav/ar 
SciUth Luzon Eyiij<'^S'>'/!iy Ext l>5 F^bi lao 
North Uiacfl ExprossvAay tij(t !>;• CtarfciSul* 
ST/^; iSouth Tagaiog Arii>nsi} Head to 
Sky*!ivSla9«»i 
fclanJIa-CsF/tto l:.i:proMAvav' 
Calanit.a-TjKia>1ay 
Worth Luzcfi Pariqaslnan B<taTs'»n 
Pr>IR Pabaliay Sa Rilos Exiwots^ay 
C5r\lorth 
Paslg Expresvivay 
fctertia Skywav Slags Z<'3 
06 S'xitti 
R10-C3 
C6 Qinlrai 
Morth Lcjjcfl Expro&sway to Caga/an Valby 
fiatanayaKs Ej<prs5»t>y 
Khiong Saen Soj) 
Hoiww<.-i|l 
Bang hte-Trat ExF-resssiWy-
Outsr Hng fea-d East 
tai Muarig Tollwoy Extaisioii 
C'Utar Rhg Roa-d : Vi^al-S'Xith 
2nd Slags Expf &ss*-ay te-rth&rn Extn. 
Ban'jhok-Clicntujn H i^way 
l>wi tAmiirj Tf4'Mirf 
Second Stage Exp-rs-ssiftay Systc-rn 
Firs-l Stage Exp^oss-way System 
t:IC3nKli-Rarn IfKlra l;.:x[.ir'3S»wy 
Tttird Sta'35> Expressway Swtem 
Fotirtf) Stago ExF-r««'#ay Sysi&ms 
l<latittiai Motorway Sysbjni 
Hariw-Hai()liong Higlwjiy 
Location 
hterJJrban 
Intar-Urban 
liiteiJ.lrbiin 
In tar-Urban 
irdsrJJrban 
mi-sr-Urban 
lnte.f-Urb.-n 
Banian-jas 
Urt<5n 
Urban 
hler-Urban 
Inier-Urbai 
Urban 
Urban 
Urban 
Urban 
Urtjan 
U i tan 
Urban 
inisr-UrbafT 
Urban 
vnan 
Urtwn 
lnfer-urt:'an 
Urt<3n 
Urban 
Urtjan 
Urban 
In tar-Urban 
Urtxin 
Urban 
Urban 
UrtKin 
Urban 
Urtan 
liicr-Urb.in 
lntsr-Urb;;Bi 
0 |»n ing 
19.97 
2C«1 
n/a 
n/a 
Length 
(km) 
340 
106 
157 
33 
9 
16 
20 
255 
16 
48 
13 
21 
18 
7 
23 
270 
IS 
t'S 
62 
13 
34 
15197-1999 A3 
1»5 -7 
VJ92' 
l&S? 
i9S<)-r 
15 
39 
2? 
IS 
33 
•1150 
Go»t 
l*b;-
D.7 
0.5 
0.5 
0,3 
0.5 
0,1 
0.4 
0,3 
0,1 
0,45 
0,4 
1 2 
o,e 
Q.y 
0,1 
0,6 
0.3 
0.65 
0.1 
0,6 
.--, ^ V,^^ 
0,3 
1,1 
OBS 
1,0 
12.4 
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St,ig» 
Pro-Pkinniiig 
PT«)-f1,-«iin.j 
Pro-PI a w i n g 
i ' re-Ratirtng 
[•"re-Pkinriliiii 
Pre-Rjiiininy 
Lao PDR 
ITsinning 
Maliiyski 
Constniclion 
Goiislii jclion 
Cons1it(Cl«>n 
Conslroclwn 
Construclion 
Coa£l«iCl(Ci» 
Conslwctlon 
Constniclion 
Constnicton 
Coiisifwcftfin 
Cons miction 
Ccinstrucli<K> 
Ccinsimctton 
Coiistniclifin 
Opm 
C3poii 
O p a i 
capsn 
Cijson 
Ptaiinititj 
(•Tannine) 
(Winning 
FVinnlng 
I ^ n n i n a 
f l i inn ino 
rtinnrig 
( • l innr ig 
Prs>-Plai»ik>j 
[•Te-RiHinkKi 
fT*-Raiirt i )g 
f^s-Bai inlrej 
f-Te-f-tanning 
Pri^-f-lanniig 
r f s - n n m i n g 
[ ' iW l i »« i i i * j 
Sch?iT^ 
Sefc Dcj-Taivjorang 
S iK i (tar l;i-*.'l;»it«)g.-»ri 
Cilfltji:)(l-Tnt).Tl 
Clfayon-lfeluk Bantei 
C i l ^ i i i - L a n i i t i n 
Kaici-Psjagan 
UjimCir'aiiaaria tea f-5o.td 
S«iinar«ii*3 SsclMi C Toli R IKKI 
frtertirvlSinja 
laiigsrarig Outer Ring Ro.id 
ClTiiir^ [*iii-Lix;is-Kui*niKj 
AsMrr jaY/a- lonan Rlmt'n IcmplC'r 
f.-«)st 0.>a&l Kxi:c«savi:iy 
l i r o l v lumi i HifjlTOay 
De-irated Hcilwir,-
Ne«,' hiodh Kllinej Straits By|X«s 
Nsw PanMi HitilT«%-
l<U^>)r^)-Sen>iTiljafi Higtmay 
Kaia ig Trarf»e Dispersal Rng Road 
lS.itii5r*'orm O i t w King l^oftl 
.Anifjang Etewjletl Higlway 
Stngal li!<w (ilghswy 
Cheras-Kajancj Roatl U()'jr»te 
QjfiiiiUKjra-KnctiorH) Hlglw.iy 
V^slRrn Kl. Trr l ln as{)«r;ai Scl-»n»e«:SPf?INT) 
BultsTivorHKiiicin Ex|5«BSfA<(ay 
Sscfflid MoltTy»ia-&ti(i;nx>re Crc>ssiii9 
KL-Kar*. l l c ( w a y uwradi i ig 
Pa iang BfWgc-
l\lortli~&x«h Exprffl«5*ny' Centrrt Link 
Notlh South ffxpressivrnr 
Serenten-Porl Dickson Higtujiiy 
r tev KItYig V'iillsy GxfWMSYciy 
Shah Alain r x f r w a w i y 
VifesI Co3!E.t E.x(ireis!.i,<r?iy 
GS'iiK»-Pasir Godar^ Expt<««<My 
PS'iioiig S«oivJ Crossing 
Sa\t\ Klang Va8*y F;)(i>r«»w«y 
KL -El«»/al«l t-«tstai ffxtiTssw/ay 
Guthrie. RfMd 
Jtiki laig fix(*sssi«»y (P«<i.-i(K|,i 
Panda n Cwri t l t r Hoatl 
rAi3r-7i»n <|<a k-So«|;5 mat I llt/v«,-ty 
Sscavi Easl-VVesI: Rojid 
Malayslaivlhoitarw LarKi-Biidae 
KL ^Jortl1-East Exf>r«s£rfiai 
Paiang CX«w RirK) ffeaa 
F*i'pr Kirt i f i K lew iW EjjWfjsaa-ATy 
KL North-Weslern P i p * ' ^ ' * ! Scheme 
KL Bislern l~x|)r»«»'iiy iKlElv.) 
Lc<:ol is>n 
Inl6'f-Url>;wi 
Intel-Ltlx'ai 
lnli?r-liiti;ai 
inisr-Uit i t l i 
hK-r-Uitx-sri 
intsr-Uilxin 
Inter-Urbafi 
liil«r-Liiti{in 
lntef-ljil>an 
Urlwin 
Inter-Liltoii 
Inter-Urban 
l->ter-i.iil«> 
Inler-Uli i in 
Inteif-L^lxiri 
H!sr-Utl«wi 
lrter-U(l>an 
iiiiaf-iJrl>ai 
iJrLmn 
Urtvin 
Uitfccin 
Urban 
Urt;>ijn 
U i ton 
Urb<in 
Inter-ljrl>,-)n 
tuaf-i-irban 
Inler-llrijfln 
Slier-L>t«i) 
inter-Urt-xw 
Inter-ljrlxm 
Irter-Uitan 
Llri:«n 
Ur tan 
kitjr-lW>an 
Intcr-UilMli 
lils>r-Url>an 
Intu-r-lirtian 
Urban 
Ur ton 
ijrtraii 
UrlMil 
lnl«r-!Atian 
Irnsr-Liitein 
lr«;et-Ult>saii 
lnfc>r-Urt>an 
UrtMh 
Urban 
Urban 
Urixin 
0|}?riino L 
7»:n 
2cm 
2QC>7 
i 'OJI 
issia 
2000 
2000 
2000 
2002 
2000 
1999 
1999 
199S 
looi 
199ij 
Mm 
nm 
1996 
imx, 
1£i«8/1994 
i 9 £ e 
1994 
im?,.t?m 
2CC6 
2003 
200;? 
2001 
2002 
2COI 
2002 
2002 
2001 
2002 
«nnth 
f km; 
16 
20 
V> 
13 
60 
34 
25 
10 
31 
338 
m 
42 
15 
20 
49 
57 
IS 
; 
16 
12 
40 
2B 
6 
60 
48 
e4f! 
?3 
•?<* 
'jm 
2&J 
6 
4S 
22 
9 
15 
43 
?1 
22 
IS 
Cost 
^&h^ 
ft? 
0.25 
a(Ki 
0,2 
1.1 
0.2 
0.6 
0.2 
0,5 
0.3 
0,1 
0,1 
0,1 
0,1 
0,5 
0.;. 
24 
0,5 
0 1 
14 
0,5 
1 6 
0,1 
0.f> 
*s:r 
o.s 
0 4 
0,6 
0,3 
Qiv 
2 . / 
Q& 
or. 
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Staji* 
Pakbton 
Op-jn 
Rarmlng 
Ptennlmi 
Plamtx) 
Philippines 
Construclwn 
ConstruclKsn 
CoiislructBii 
Con?tructton 
Constiiiclfen 
P lamhg 
Ptannt-ig 
RaiTiing 
Planning 
Plannlig 
P lam l i g 
Pkifiiiing 
Planning 
Planning 
Pre-Plannlng 
sn Lanka 
Pk? ruling 
Thailand 
AbaKJorifflfJ 
AliJindor*»J 
ConstrucJton 
CottsltuciKm 
Construction 
Construclwn 
Conslruclion 
Or^n 
Open 
Of»n 
Ojx>n 
Or>eti 
Planning 
PtitTiiny 
Pm-PUinning 
Vi»t Nam 
Pre-Planr«iig 
Sch«m* 
telamat-acHahon? rmtamiiy 
tahoro-Kalstabad Highway 
Psshwar-lslamabad Hicjhwa-v' 
Karxtv-Psiha-fm 
South Liisc'h Expressway Ext lo (^blla>:' 
Math Luzon tj(pm!&>fi'iiy Exl to Clark-^Sublc 
ST;4R I'Scmlh T,Tjafecj Artofiaf} Raifi lo 
Slf/^ay Stag© 1 
J,teiiil;.'»-Ciwilf» {:xpfi?!««av 
Cdamba-Tf>gaytav 
M;f8i Luzon PangaEinan Exlixiston 
PNR Pal:ahay Sa Rilos lb(prc>is»x5¥ 
CC MDith 
ftslg [^prcwway 
fctor^la S»!'sv<ay stage 2 0 
C6 Scwtti 
Rirj-C3 
C6 Qsntral 
Nortn l.LBon E)(pms«way to Cagay^n Vallsry 
fefciniiy:tei ExpressiTcr^ -
KtjfcifKj S,*sti S«p 
ftofifi'-iVfill 
Ban-g ^^to-^rat ExpresssAsay 
<>(!« Rim! Ro*,:J &K3| 
Iktn MLKirtj lolj-ivay Extenfibn 
Outsr Rl!>g Road : V«sJt-SC'Uh 
2nd Slage ExiTTt-ssway Norllwni EjJti. 
Barigtaik-Chtnil'Miri llis^iway 
Don Mufflicj Toli'.'.ay 
Second Sta^e E>:pr9ssway 57512*11 
f-iisl SI;igo Expre&svi'ay Syxloin 
f k£9i-n!.ii4?am lixira Ejp-resfaTOy 
TNrt Stag? tyjprem.wQf Sj«torn 
Fixrth Stage E:>pre&4w.iy Sysli?in& 
Nalionj.il Moloway System 
Hani • Hap hong Htg t>»;.jy 
Location 
misr-Urbcin 
IntQrJJrbai 
Inter-Urban 
m^r-Urban 
SilerJJttiati 
htQfJJlt.JBI 
inteM-'rfcJin 
Ban tongas 
Ut tan 
UrlMn 
Intsr-iJrban 
inter-Utfcan 
Urban 
Urban 
U i tan 
Ut tan 
UrlMn 
UrtMn 
Urban 
Jnkar-Urbai 
Urt»n 
Urtxin 
UltMII 
mtsr-Urban 
Urlian 
Urlwn 
Urban 
Url;'an 
Jnter-Urbiin 
UttKin 
Urban 
Urtwin 
UrlMn 
Urt3on 
Urtaan 
Inler-Urbtri 
Intor-Urtjiin 
0|5'Snlnsi 
19S? 
2001 
n/a 
ii'Vi 
Length 
ikm» 
340 . 
I K J 
15? 
33 
9 
16 
20 
2>t> 
16 
48 
19 
21 
18 
7 
23 
270 
1« 
as 
62 
13 
M 
1SS7-1999 63 
1S»6-? 
1993 
19^7 
1J»4-? 
16 
39 
27 
19 
J3 
41&0 
COST 
i » f 
0 7 
0,5 
0,5 
0.3 
0.5 
0 1 
0,4 
0.3 
0,1 
0,'li. 
0.<1 
1.2 
0,8 
0.9 
0,1 
0.6 
0 3 
0.66 
0.1 
0,6 
0.3 
0.3 
1.1 
0,86 
1.0 
124 
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APPENDIX-11 
BENCHMARK SCORES USED BY STANDARD & POOR IN RATING 
INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS 
Ttj set !:u% 3 «5ja i6S32 *vn-s' r 0 ! «.*isa"« £»if*'Kn r^f< t;^ej!*3;a:t ts a'^ -"-relsgir^ st^ txK-i?! b* *^MiU^ s? -t f^ ci£?*«< Mt^f^ff ra^ineits 
?-j»^*mt«ee!*^3r«;p«ffsc:£235msi*v«^ssr ns^iyt^assetsast^rx'.! asm^s i^'^&acsii'^-'wmm^rQfjntiQp^i 
F*ssxthtit^B*a t aigtgncaxm.-S'StCf EEif'SoJ'*tate^«ime'!ir^p.w »:sF«ii'a«6f9r^fif*fitc{i'aic^»f hvsajfcr/^ty^sosJr^mbia^isit 
J^ s act mi.;; H S55 'fcHnrr U3S en a Htfiis aurffiriei* IJJI issx rot fi^Sfi jr^cirn 'smJ^s "nii 'mftct 'rUmm. y *<t* q« esi^iirg* la^-
rrsiscs ra.^ fcs a ^ mKstim. p^^ed, l«jt s ss'.^n4 isi Umm., fe^ms, snai, and ccnUaG'^ rf? «zz»is ts inar*sts, 
CoRlfasi "sats Ji^  s'^a^! Of t^mnr,mx. 
Busmsss r»:s!n^m aflsi casiaJtv iJ '^^ tKiw psMss =ifi pisse 
Diffract Bijts « t^rmilktA essi^ arNsipai 
hk vtitim. 
i':>;^ .r5C!s •'xir.m po:il'i 4&V.m-i p.mi^'^t^t- and ^^Sig i^s^ it ,^ :j^ i!gf^ i^ ':;s. 
Vitii^ Hy r;o Kcr.r^ jb m cast! ?ic'^ ; 
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Li_ 
^ ^ M | i V ^ ] ^ ^ g g ^ ^ | | j g | ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
Stsie Cterac<«ii«ios 
tela) tJi'n^s.Nghtf raiai fe* SBrsdaS Si Fasii TO tansaaai tttiiib fti^a»3a «^pi8ws gifc!fSf*!SB,a! 
Riiiii ASM 'S!tti3a vx* w ' t ' i i i no Ai^s^j 
Btti^'t 3iJ jci'sdaie are ocrit's, BTI ajgressna 
Irs'oaift sets ctdois !E rqscrt 
If ovaiijin ft 'jjii'i 'SjrapBt'Sti 
". '>Jttt^«. hswjf'ef Jitts-cstd (^('(ot i»!i*«! *$c.i! i j'iei'a.igii<j..tei- »^i«'4.>i»V!lf«":<ri^^«. 
"iste ife-ritigts >jwr. £p;«rf3;' ' i or Maty SmJiasu!)! Oinsawsiai, .maat^ -.^a «t ptfBium ras. TOflf 
CsBt^ aeijIff pw»at£d;titii^y»x«d 
3W tsarsc! w(th iMj-fafwrirt <kwig« 
7 RqcKt h33 (»rts! %s.ti-m.«. tim-(vm», iyr,tey Mrilas aad ws'-pte Hiitites •titsk.quammm.'»aw 
ctSsiRESaa; isstalalKstsst ji»«n!airiTa;«cf nasisdibia; par,te ls!;iir!|a»disr^i!aw:,;p:sabit baf 
poftMiftfiBMlaltifj prei3is(re 
feawlssf isriss jsifl 
ffi rsscfi Is3»«s rsay iss« spai. 
•\\.yMmf.-Mn ErC toTtrsiii)! 
feirsiS tttitisg, sgisj ei»3s e<is! 
fte (c rspsi 
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Scoi* Clisrwl«ri»to 
Dsmayi E SKUSOT (at pr&iif t / j w t e 
r«f iiaa-corwnaii» pt jdtcteaavta ptoiaa 13 n litsttrn CfuMi" 'i f f K i j : m mi aijsi'i 
Rr<a%is ail's t f f f / c a w a r t i wsi' .>*!?(? tea i^ftjaa ucaiiswiMf 
fsrfsBi Mils s ai»?i6*N joia sv»i<«v in f^gsessi t i w * * ; 
?• t c r j l i 1!! ft'tx CDSJ queniitS tsi piai!ii:»s 
0«m«tii B £s^ !',CT»! for f;Eiut!/!«<ii:!i 
'5! r,ap.:amT3.i.% pi'Xit.'%'w.e: p!i,.B:tis « ^ a p i J i t t t qj jr: ' t of (.•ila.caand aijsff 
l i fsrs r'e (*•« (Tcn off. 
Beiisrw aiiS sufUf s»«!3as s S titefs'tep pfsprt satisiaica!. •. . • • ; , 
ft!:«« E ia 8W gKWd s«3t !|jan lis aS iirsd«ira 
CoirpBitOT sk'anap in i<xsss!i, iScttioSi®'. snd kitow+iiw, bsi s:»^ te Isaa !a dskiisi ia-j; wm, 
Fsf iion-camimiiff frad9!:ta?sa'.<i!:fis: ptsja:! is n sstrmJ cmt tjBrtils af pctiirara; 
iJ»3 nai iia'« a pkraiui prKjuct. 
Psising i;aot!Si«d,'1fl8uf seed b; a tiigjiaiar. 
Rq«i3 »9s a tfflsiiriijiiil', txji ssW n iirasjd raaitaj, 
h CI*;! i j in fte tSrsl OKI qiintils at prcdatw 
t s! !ioi!<an»aiiitf pcojeasfee'ittss: proptt is in tissd coa quaitiie si pwlcsts ?tsitiK«K 
il!»3S so: isjvsa p®»urs pi&Ml 
%immi >,a ptaiaaijjtvbs 1;itoiwj ariiJs3»3si5|, 
Rt (« ! u 3ia 3f siij-iaS a; KJISS »si; ^ , 
?•(tjai a: anKsiiawtai» v iruPf o is f ta 
F»a«> igsi! a oi!8s~,5;!iTt', ta so4:J ersv m n tmi nsariisB 
Viriiaift' n i temSESisii-e sJc^tsCs »" sm'asKrt oi i"5 bujims-s 
is;tioiKotiiinsjiii*ftoiecis. {isj^ai^ii>'ajrli!qiisuisofi!/i</<;ost pi6iiu'.S3SPA 
I i;rle iimmti fa ptaiiits/sajisits 
Pfaat (13iw.xint.m;t^, u mfali(mtei n'mtistMi wish it. 
mii^^gmi^^^:f^ii^SM^^^^ 
loo:* irtasa' 
&t«q)teii; 
roli rffids. Cfsines, 
Hy)i(D8l«cBic p s « ' riatits 
iitf a a ^•plsx'ty.r opt '^ ion Csa^4'tl.li ;<;«ft pjant; N s j s l -Jj;/ 
*{•« 4ij8tf»;i,'pr»3fitiFid!c<)n!!tss'i8t: gen«f«r«s frfrfauAW j i x " . Mr fs 
Tqhiii!r.ia|«afs=!ju8ri;isli:5»;a!»;i(!i 
to Hi^4'JSsp>(»(e!iBKiaif. 
tiEsoisij tight iti-fc^s am-ftj jj-sSm Ofaatiaa 
FsSiXtiSreica! pkWi P«fii5iBtiK 
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L_ J upiil8$l'8mGiHni.»^s 
Ctaiact«i>uk« 
_ftqa;! SS3Qsdif tea,!:ell-sf-Stgii-ws»txmsa,emr, i»pKpn isatstinoftjiiaSTipaisSiasa!tatos 
' It ta:d»s^ foli rRsmepa-ii^sBtssifSBas;» sm«« tJGd itigaiicns 
VimaSj no iSfef f« rase 3ti3t!(«»t *f t 
K«v 'fcsk or lOfrstei SnsJtcsig }u i i*'Jion 
Mf^usia legal wnicre aipfxw i»iEn j!xura«rt#iiai' col'aisa! i-xl iEi£?ar-t tan ra*.t«< 
f4>»' "fci ar Imtlm firancisq junidri cti 
AMEiisMs k<^il «{jfiitr8 wpwa PRJJBS loanwnaaoo, wilawa! and »fw^i w* r6!k« 
&if®r«r ?)Mre:»tj deauntntimtr 
Httx V-.tit t>r lacifcs finsicsg iiir.!>,t «•> 
Wsauaw tejai trinicre juppjs p^ tsisd •ioaf««a«o!i, oollats-ai. srd m',i*tsr>t tsf. s^tsn 
!v*«3f iailiri »Wi;>' fs issB« iddrtsei-a! ifeiii • 
ColbMBi ami SKMity stroiigiy «»!o!C«a!ii6 
Prsject !s laaswBtiylMRtoiiftW'Wnats anii aisngf? SP£ 
f«»'To* i3T ionctoj firascisg juisiaOT. 
Ad»|!SM Isjal opninns appos psciiio iisatmrtsim, cotesal. and ssir^a-i! a s !t«»-3 
Al«5tB!s SgajitisgdxuresTiffitios. 
Ptoisct cai issas addiiiifislifeW w * S3W senfrds 
CBto»ial s«J i«Mitt adKjflteSY •^ifcKsaMs, 
U|al qsiaiv'M !>.«ais a anaaiiafete, 
P?ri!9:! C3n issse lifiliBsiet! sAiRicfisl tiisa. 
tiiinimai 343 atsjit, ffctebf^  nd; sir'stcsjiia 
i f iiai cpi!ii6S5 iinaM!!3^ % 
iluts;cBX>k<ssissoisfcshtv si t'Samai 3d ssaisri 
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Scow C}i«»a«Mi«i«i 
fsnoncisl S«bi(i:^ lot iwadai 
ScsiHtCfSrwtt^ debt s-toA'sd 
fiHincUf mafef jsnrgtf-sfartj prajsct dxurortaKj i 
U»mm CSCS gaisds 4 a< 
A<«3S DSCfi mmii (•& 
Detias s » ( * » a ! a i s « s * 8 a ' tern t l i « l^j) tests jwal Ewertge iJasnsawgn, 
Sacj SrtwaaliJwibiirtf 
AnistSKsg (istes w i^nsBSs 
Awags 0Ss31:! nng« irsm J Qs M 3 & . 
ftsj«:t swsai^ t« htataj!, scflaiicn. a«!i S«*igs wtixwgs Mte, 
BiarsE? xmiitiomshwn ,*8<.v !<»! (km 83 bma jt«M t!«>*raj« 4«!*»stBS 
fvfesfty sisstisoj dsh, bat am hare lirailsi) Wtot ps/Bsrsiisl 
SuboidiMjsd S®6t alisasai, h ( siiws i ^ i m t ^sict dtitt a s lisniaA 
f i itaxal niod^ crr-ffes ivitti p-qt s dccutwiasos, 
Miniwrn DSCR ssttsai ! Z: 
h'M^p ?SC1; args irsm i Ss to ? M 
IsnSsd Saansai f«»,it,iiirf. 
r?f!<r<'Ui! njixfe! s^ f fcts with r*<^ ««rt '1co,ji^ ®iJa*sot 
Mitiifrtjiri DSCB effisais 1 to 
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Stsre Oi8ta<;ttns(«5 
S13-)' fa"" i^ rc'^  r' !r3i5p-!«nc, 11 'i',:nc <i' pp'tt i g 
C . " "P-v" <51'"f '"••1 f •>""4B" ft! ?«•-»« 
FmantiaS jyjara bilirising !s da'»kSJ 
Ms *a;«i sstulii for pska feaiiK, 
fSS^^^^S 
StetB CliarscMibtics 
f (cjKt IS 4 o a i l l ! j « , te'i-!i(-tn5'; '/jMef a r a a i , isisti H tm pajt asm laMaabfraftpeaBwal f a& «, 
ftoiKl IS a o a t t iea», h«8-si!.l»^-wafe 03iw>a, ewri if the p » i M « aatinsbisaiViipaBfeaa! fei'us, 
it r«ca'.as iuB tpwiac j » ' ^ s t $ 
£app}« and dftale ctnsan coxss'jurt'ts itaw! gsr i oaJd nissss 
Ssofisa! <:janta party xSigjinsi s-t isctei 1^ j sa i utsgBor ItlCs 
G?'««in"t«f? coartg-fBtusa t( atf h.m ^sod trad t Ht)f,gs 
i-ir,ax,iai caj(,tB?as,£3 fa.'* gcod M i ; Mt(fi» 
Ssipplf arti ditdte c w s s taitiSSjsrtlM to<a adtpatei sisiJjt rasrgs 
fiwama^ot «uma|»rt8S rf anj, !-a«'e «l«|satEasJn mmp • 
5<w9ma<>nt ra8«ap.3ifiss rf anv, hats MK|iiate atiM rslJop 
fisjreial axi'S&f 3;i£<s hjcs i *a* cffitls! rsHgii 
i»pp!« aic d!ui8 siraatt axntarii:)(ii«i 5os«s cos; '.mM^'Stsnksnu 
Sscmer coarasfSff^ coliplcs^ sis '.»3ak, 
Dc't«!n.3«i5! iXisfJlsojrae,! ;! ant. iait pi;a ui'M mtiiqt 
hnmM cc<J«9S3!is |-t3« pscf OTdit taring? 
':?r<cs r':*.J'5terpafts?'^ awposj' ^^f^^ sa'irsgs^  
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Basic Questionnaire / Interview Schedute Used 
GCHEDULE- I 
RIGK MANAGEMENT IN FINANCING INt^RAGTRUC T'.j ' :-: TROJECTf 
IDENTIFICATION INFORMATION 
1,1 NAMf;' OF •illK INGIITLif lON 
1,3 PLACE 6 FULL AODREGC 
1,3 NATURE OF TFiE INGTl lUTION ; 
DFI n 
FINANCIAL CERVICES CO, \_j 
HEAVY ENGINEERING CO, Q 
INFRAGTRUCTURE FIN CO D 
EAS-\'f-;3 CC'v'~ANY 
I ; ;^- . ' - - 'A ' ; : :L C O 
JCTlONCO 
n 
D 
D 
[] 
1,4 YOUR RELATIVE LEVEL OF INTEREGT IN INFRAG" 
HIGH 
•;E FINANCING : 
LOW 
1, ECONOMIC INFRAGTRUCT [ ] 
2, GOCIAL INFRAGTURCTURE Q 
D 
D 
REGULARITY OF INVESTMENT 
RE^.-i^ll,Ai-; j GPORAC 
PAGE 1 
l.G NO, OF INFF-^ASTURCTURE PHOJECTG FINANCED BY Y O U ' 
1 . LEGS THAN 5 
2.'3- 10 
3. 10 - 2 0 
1. MORE THAN 20 
1, INVEGTWFNT INFOFIMATION : 
ECO. 
D 
D 
.D 
D 
INFRA COCIAL INFflA 
n 
D 
• 
D 
2,1 NO, OF VARIOUS INFHAGTRUCTURE FINANCING FFOJECTG HANDLED/PARTICIPATED 
EOT GOOT ECLT EOO OTHERG 
1,LEGGTHANG D 0 D D D 
•Z. C5 - 10 
3, 10 - 20 
D D 
D n 
D 
D 
a 
a 
D 
D <!. MORE THAN 20 D U L ' 
TOTAL AMOUNT OF FINANCING/INVEGT.VENT L'ONE UNDER VARIOUS TYPES 
BOr • EOOr -^OLT 
1, LEGS THAN 5 CROREG Q j { J 
?., 5 - lOCnOREC 
3, 10 - 20 CHORES f j 
A. MORE THAN 30 CROnr 
BOO 
D 
Q 
D 
n 
OTHERG 
D 
D 
D 
G 
PAGE 2 
;^3 KIN;? Of" iNrnAsmucTuf i r : rnojfcvr^ vxro. '-o 'K) 
1. LEGo THAN G 
•p, C, . 1 0 
I M f i i G A T I O N 
D D D D G 
D [J n a 
3. 10 • ?0 
4, Tv'ORE THAN 20 • D D [J D 
2.'i QUANTUM OP EXPOGURE UNDER VARIOUS KINCG OF INFtlAGtRUGTURE FnOJECTG : 
ROAOG i • 'VJ- <^ iriT'C'.OM V / A i r n / OIHERG 
ICriKiAtlCjM 
T LE5GTHAN 1 CnonE [ ] { ) [ j | ] |_| 
;.; 1-5 GflOF^EG [^  | [ | [ | [ ] [ J 
3 r> • 10 CFTOflEG { 
-1 MO^ETHA^nocRO^E[_ j [ ] [ j [ j ("J 
•.-:.5 ;.:oijr-\"GG o r R INANGE (OHO r a co^un v,.-, GUAN; I I i v 
EOUIIY l.'L'A'.G LOANGf-RiOM 
f-f-;-\' ' ' ' J N ' . ) ? VUL1M.AT OIHERC 
AGENCIEG 
1, l.GGG -IHAN 1 CnORE 
1 - '.J CROREG 
G G - 10 CROR.EG [ 1 
A. MORE THAN 10 CrVDRE 
I I 
f^AGE 3 
.0 A V L H A O t D U U i - l . Q U I I Y ( iA I I ' . J O i 11 II M ' M' '., I ; ; f irWArK.r () (CA i l''--,OI">Y-V/ir,P) 
i.noADt: 
P O W E R 
T E L E C O M 
IV. V V A T E R / i n n i G A T I O N 
V. O T H E R S 
H O W M A N Y P f K J J E C I 3 I lAVE '-•./>•.. ' i: ' ) i '',/••••; l A l M/. / ; . ! . , : " ; 
1. N O N E 
2. 1 - 5 
5 - 1 0 
r;oA:)o. r::'.';^ '^  IELPCOM V/AIER/ OTHERS 
I R R I G A T I O N 
[] n D D D 
' 1 , M O R E T H A N 10 [ ) 
D 
D 
[] 
D 
n 
D 
.8 W H E T H E R A G T R U G T U R E D C T X ' ~ R E ^ ' r ; ' ; v ' vE '''••. \ ' E E N " - ^ C A T I O N IG C O N E 
IN fT-iO..IECT f l N A N C I N G O N A C U t J I l N ' "G'JG ; :A ' ; ; " ; -
[J •:•. j ] 
f ' A ' j E '•< 
2.9 HAG THERE BEEN All IDEDTIFICATIOr/ OF VARIOUG RIGKG (IfJTEREGT GROUPG-V;iGE) 
BEFORE FirJAIJCirJG/PAmiCIPATIOn : 
WORK GMEET FOR RIGK IDErJTIFICAllOfl 
PfraJECi i.inGURAriCE 
I 
COMPAfJY COMPANY 
F0iJ'nC.4L lilSKS 
POLITICAL GUPPORTRIGKC 
TAXATION RIGKG 
t-XPitoi'MiATiorj/rjANorJAi iGAiiofJ I!I;;K 
FOP.CED DUY-OUT I^ IGKG 
CANCELLATIOfJ OF COtJCEGGIONG 
IMPORT/EXPORT REJ5j_RICl I0N_G _ 
FAILURE TO ODTMrOR'NEv77rpT'7!6\/AL 
OIHEI', 
DOrJTf^ACTOR 
HOGT 
••GOVERrJMENT 
cURRETJcWflCOilvrRtlBiLrfYl^iGKG I 
„-OREIGN EXCHANGE RIGKG 
DEVALUATION RIGKJ 
irjFLATlON RIGKG 
imEREGT I'.ATE RIGKG 
|ojiiRiiifTlin;iilK§' 
CHAfJGEG IN LAW AfJD REGULATIONS 
[LAVW ENFORCEMENT RIGKG 
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